Bell v. State
| Decision Date | 14 February 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-861,77-861 |
| Parties | Warren Mitchell BELL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Elliot H. Scherker, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and Ronald A. Dion, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before HAVERFIELD, C. J., and PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.
Defendant, Warren Mitchell Bell, appeals his conviction for two counts of robbery and two counts of possession of a firearm during commission of a felony.
Bell first contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury (1) on specific intent as being an element of the crime of robbery, and (2) on the defense of voluntary intoxication raised at the trial; and further erred in instructing the jurors that the element of intent was irrelevant to their determination of the defendant's guilt.
The dispositive issue hereunder is whether specific intent (i. e. the intent to permanently deprive the owner of property) is still a requisite element of the crime of robbery as now defined by Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975) which reads:
The law is well established that it is within the power of the legislature to dispense with the element of intent and punish particular acts without regard to the mental attitude of the accused. Coleman v. State, 140 Fla. 772, 193 So. 84 (1939); Ex parte Stoddard, 160 Fla. 188, 34 So.2d 92 (1948). Thus, where a statute denounces the doing of an act as criminal without specifically requiring criminal intent, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the commission of such act was accompanied by criminal intent. It is only when criminal intent is required as an element of the offense that the question of "guilty knowledge" may become pertinent in the prosecution's case. State v. Medlin, 273 So.2d 394 (Fla.1973) and 9 Fla.Jur. Criminal Law § 28 (1972) and cases cited therein.
At the common law and under the former robbery statute, Section 813.011, Florida Statutes (1973) 1 and its predecessor, a felonious taking or intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property was an essential element of the offense. Montsdoca v. State, 84 Fla. 82, 93 So. 157 (1922); Bailey v. State, 199 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967).
However, in enacting Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975), the legislature omitted the word "felonious" thereby expanding the definition of robbery to include any taking and eliminating the requirement of specific intent. Cf. Traxler v. State, 96 Okl.Cr. 231, 251 P.2d 815 (1952); State v. Thompson, 221 Kan. 165, 558 P.2d 1079, 1086 (1976).
The cases cited to by defendant in support of his argument that specific intent is still a requisite element of robbery are inapplicable because these cases were decided under the former robbery statutes. See e. g. Arnold v. State, 83 So.2d 105 (Fla.1955); Bailey v. State, 199 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967), supra; Stevens v. State, 265 So.2d 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972). We also conclude that defendant can take no solace in McCloud v. State, 335 So.2d 257 (Fla.1976) because our Supreme Court was involved there with the issue of force necessary to convert a larceny into a robbery and did not concern itself with the issue of specific intent. Thus, we find that this point of appellant is without merit as robbery is now a general intent offense. See Cirack v. State, 201 So.2d 706 (Fla.1967).
Defendant secondly argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of larceny and...
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...a prosecution under then Florida equivalent of Missouri's second degree robbery law. (The Florida law was since amended, Bell v. State, 354 So.2d 1266-7 (Fla.App., 1978)). The defendant, armed with a gun, and posing as a policeman, pulled over the victim, threatened the victim with prosecut......
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Smith v. State
...robbery, No. 2.07, without also inserting the requirement of a specific intent to deprive the possessor of his property. Bell v. State, 354 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), establishes that no such requirement exists under the present definition of the crime of robbery as contained in Sec. 81......
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Bell v. State
...Justice. This cause is before the Court on petition for certiorari to review a decision of the district court of appeal, Bell v. State, 354 So.2d 1266 (Fla.3d DCA 1978). The district court certified that its decision passed upon a question of great public interest. We have jurisdiction. Art......
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Green v. State, 81-1013
...same law repealed section 812.041, defining as a crime unauthorized temporary use of a vehicle.3 In the DCA opinion, Bell v. State, 354 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), the Third District Court of Appeal expressed the view that the legislature's enactment of a new robbery statute in 1975 did ......