Bell v. Texas Workers Compensation Com'n

• Decision Date: 20 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 03-02-00510-CV.,03-02-00510-CV.
• Parties: Robert S. BELL, M.D., Appellant, v. TEXAS WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION and Richard F. Reynolds in his official capacity as Executive Director of Texas Workers Compensation Commission, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

102 S.W.3d 299

Robert S. BELL, M.D., Appellant, v. TEXAS WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION and Richard F. Reynolds in his official capacity as Executive Director of Texas Workers Compensation Commission, Appellees.

No. 03-02-00510-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin.

March 20, 2003.

H. Douglas Pruett, H. Douglas Pruett, P.C., Austin, for appellant.

Dewey E. Helmcamp III, Assistant Attorney General, Administrative Law Division, Austin, for appellees.

Before Chief Justice LAW, Justices B.A. SMITH and PURYEAR.

OPINION

BEA ANN SMITH, Justice.

This is an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a temporary injunction.¹ Some eighty-five percent of Robert S. Bell, M.D.'s orthopedic surgery practice involves workers compensation patients. Dr. Bell sued the Texas Workers Compensation Commission ("Commission") because it removed him from its list of approved doctors when his license to practice medicine was revoked as a result of a felony conviction. Removal from the list means Dr. Bell cannot treat patients covered by workers compensation insurance. Dr. Bell and another similarly situated physician² brought suit against the Commission asserting that their rights to due process of law under the United States and Texas Constitutions were violated when they were deleted from the list of approved doctors without an administrative hearing. After obtaining a temporary restraining order, the doctors sought a temporary injunction prohibiting the Commission from removing them from the approved list while this suit for declaratory relief is pending. Their application was denied, and Dr. Bell alone appeals. We will affirm the trial court's denial of a temporary injunction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 18, 1999, Dr. Bell pleaded nolo contendere to a third-degree felony of deadly conduct. The conviction arose from Dr. Bell driving by his former business partner's home and firing several rounds from his 9-mm semi-automatic pistol into the home while the former business partner's family was present. Dr. Bell also admitted to four other drive-by shootings. Punishment was assessed at one hundred twenty days in jail and eight years of maximum-supervision probation, with conditions that he perform six hundred hours of community service, pay a five thousand dollar fine and restitution, and undergo psychiatric counseling for three years.

On August 26, 2000, the State Board of Medical Examiners and Dr. Bell entered into an agreed order that found Dr. Bell guilty of unprofessional or dishonorable conduct likely to deceive, defraud, or injure the public, specifically the felony offense of deadly conduct.³ Dr. Bell's license to practice medicine was suspended, but the suspension was stayed and he was placed on probation for five years.

On May 6, 2002, the Commission sent Dr. Bell written notice that he was to be removed from the list of approved doctors pursuant to the workers compensation act. Section 408.0231(a)(3) of the act requires the Commission to delete from its list any doctor "whose license to practice in this state is revoked, suspended, or not renewed by the appropriate licensing authority." Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 408.0231(a)(3) (West Supp.2003). The Commission's administrative rule 180.26(b)(4) requires deletion for "suspensions or revocations that are stayed, deferred, or probated and voluntary relinquishment of the license to practice." 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 180.26(b)(4) (2002).

Dr. Bell responded to the notice by objecting to his deletion from the approved list and requesting a "progressive disciplinary agreement." Dr. Bell described himself as a "sanctionee." On May 23, 2002, Dr. Bell requested an administrative hearing. On May 30, the Commission advised Dr. Bell that he was not entitled to an administrative hearing under the workers compensation act or the Commission's rules. The letter also advised Dr. Bell that he could apply for reinstatement to the list if "he had all appropriate unrestricted licenses/certifications, [and] had overcome the conditions which resulted in the deletion."

Dr. Bell contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the temporary injunction because the evidence shows his probable right to recovery and the irreparable harm he will sustain if it is not granted. He argues that his right to treat injured workers in the workers compensation system is a constitutionally-protected property right that he has been deprived of without due process. He argues that (1) section 408.0231 of the workers compensation act contains an implied right to an administrative hearing; and (2) the Commission is not relieved of its obligation to conduct a hearing merely because he had a right to a hearing prior to the Board of Medical Examiners suspending his license.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending trial on the merits. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). It is an extraordinary remedy that is not issued as a matter of right, but is committed to the broad discretion of the trial court. Id.; see also State v. Ruiz Wholesale Co., 901 S.W.2d 772, 777 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ). An applicant for a temporary injunction must show: (1) a cause of action; (2) a probable right to the relief requested;⁴ and (3) imminent, irreparable harm in the interim.⁵ Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204.

We review the denial of a temporary injunction by asking whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion. See Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.1993); Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 861-62 (Tex.1978). We are not to examine the merits of the pending lawsuit, Universal Health Servs. v. Thompson, 24 S.W.3d 570, 576 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.); Board of Pardons & Paroles v. Graham, 878 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, no writ); rather our task is to determine whether the court's ruling was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion. Thompson, 24 S.W.3d at 576; LeFaucheur v. Williams, 807 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex.App.-Austin 1991, no writ). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's order and will not reverse if the record contains evidence that reasonably supports the trial court's decision. Thompson, 24 S.W.3d at 576.

Mandatory Removal of Doctor

The Commission maintains a list of licensed doctors who are approved to provide health care services to injured workers covered by workers compensation insurance. Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 408.023(a) (West Supp.2003). In recent years, the legislature has greatly expanded the Commission's obligations to address the quality of care provided by doctors participating in the workers compensation system. In 2001, it added a directive that the executive director "shall delete from the list of approved doctors a doctor ... whose license to practice in this state is revoked, suspended, or not renewed by the appropriate licensing authority." Id. § 408.0231(a)(3). Furthermore, the legislature authorized the Commission to establish rules setting forth criteria for "deleting or suspending a doctor from the list of approved doctors." Id. § 408.0231(b)(1).

Administrative rule 180.27(f) prescribes the process the Commission must follow to delete a doctor's name from the approved list.⁶ The doctor is notified of the impending deletion and the grounds for that action, and is given fourteen days to contest the validity of those grounds. This procedure provides notice and an opportunity to be heard, but limits the scrutiny to an objective determination about whether the mandatory grounds for deletion exist.

It is conclusively established in this record that Dr. Bell (1) was removed from the approved list of doctors under rule 180.26(b); (2) received notice of the Commission's intent to remove him and its asserted grounds; and (3) responded in writing and requested a hearing, but did not contest the existence of the grounds for mandatory removal.

Implied Right to a Hearing

Dr. Bell raises only procedural due process claims on appeal, arguing that the Commission violated his constitutional right to due process and due course of law⁷ by removing him from the list of approved doctors without affording him a meaningful opportunity to contest the Commission's action. The only question before us in this interlocutory appeal is whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion in denying the temporary injunction. After evaluating Dr. Bell's probable right to recovery on his claim that the act implies a full administrative hearing before he can be removed from the list, we hold that the trial court was within its discretion in denying the temporary injunction.

Questions of procedural due process require an analysis of (1) whether the plaintiff has a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest at stake, and (2) if so, what process is due to sufficiently protect that interest. See Board of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). At a minimum, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Perry v. Del Rio, 67 S.W.3d 85, 92 (Tex.2001); University of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex.1995).

Exactly what process is due in a given situation is measured by a flexible standard that depends on the practical requirements of the circumstances. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893; Than, 901 S.W.2d at 930. The flexible standard balances three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the state action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest under the procedures used and the likely benefit of any additional procedures; and (3) the government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional procedural requirements would entail. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96...