Bell v. Todd

• Decision Date: 14 September 2005
• Citation: 206 S.W.3d 86
• Parties: Eleanor BELL et al. v. Roger TODD.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 86

206 S.W.3d 86

Eleanor BELL et al. v. Roger TODD.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, at Nashville.

Assigned on Briefs February 26, 2004.

September 14, 2005.

Opinion Denying Petition for Rehearing September 26, 2005.

Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court March 20, 2006.

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Roger M. Todd, Woodbury, Tennessee, Pro Se.

R. Steven Waldron and Terry A. Fann, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellees, Eleanor Bell, Rena Bell, Clay Bell, and Ricky Bell.

OPINION

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM B. CAIN and PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JJ., joined.

This appeal arises from a wrongful death suit filed by a murder victim's family against the person accused of the murder. The victim's family filed suit in the Circuit Court for Cannon County seeking compensatory and punitive damages from the accused and to set aside the accused's transfer of his real property to two friends following his arrest. After the accused failed to answer, the trial court granted the victim's family a default judgment on the question of liability, granted a writ of attachment for the accused's real property after setting aside the transfer as fraudulent, and ordered a jury trial on the question of damages. Thereafter, the accused filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, an answer, a motion to hold the trial in abeyance, and a motion to release funds to enable him to hire a lawyer. The trial court did not address these motions, and a jury awarded the victim's family $600,000 in compensatory damages and $80,000 in punitive damages. The accused murderer has appealed. We have determined that the judgment must be vacated because of the trial court's failure to address the accused murderer's pending motions before conducting the trial on the question of damages.

I.

During the early morning hours of February 22, 2002, Eleanor Bell received a telephone call from the Warren County Sheriff's Department informing her that a truck owned by her son, Jeffrey Bell, had been found burned and deserted near the Cannon County and Warren County line. Ms. Bell immediately called her son on his cellular phone, but her son did not answer and failed to return her call. Several days later, Ms. Bell received a telephone call from Roger Todd inquiring into her son's whereabouts and requesting her to telephone him if she heard from her son. Several hours later, Mr. Bell's family reported him missing. On March 12, 2002, Mr. Bell's decapitated, dismembered, and burned body was found in a well.

On March 28, 2002, Roger Todd was arrested and charged with the first degree murder of Mr. Bell.¹ He has remained in the Cannon County jail since his arrest. Shortly after Mr. Todd was arrested, he made an oral agreement with two friends, Jimmy and Kimberly Duncan, to convey them his house and 3.92 acres of real property for one dollar in return for their agreement to use the property as security for a loan that would be used to hire a lawyer to represent him in the criminal proceedings. The Duncans acquired the property on April 7, 2002 and recorded a warranty deed on April 11, 2002.

In the meantime, on April 9, 2002, Mr. Bell's family filed a wrongful death action against Mr. Todd in the Circuit Court for Cannon County. Acting on information supplied by one of the sheriff's employees, the family also requested the trial court to issue a writ of attachment for Mr. Todd's property on the ground that he either had disposed of it or was about to dispose of it. The trial court issued the writ of attachment on April 9, 2002. On April 17, 2002, after the Duncans had recorded their deed, Mr. Bell's family amended their complaint to add the Duncans as defendants.

Mr. Todd was served with copies of the Bell family's complaint and amended complaint but failed to answer. The Duncans also failed to answer. On June 4, 2002, the Bell family moved for a default judgment. The Duncans then retained a lawyer who filed an answer and a motion to dissolve the writ of attachment on June 24, 2002. Mr. Todd, however, still failed to file an answer or other written response to the Bell family's complaint. On July 8, 2002, following a June 24, 2004 hearing on the default motion in which Mr. Todd participated, the trial court entered a default judgment against Mr. Todd on the question of liability and ordered a jury trial to assess damages.

The trial court conducted another hearing on July 16, 2002 regarding the Duncans' motion to dissolve the writ of attachment. Mr. Todd was present and represented himself at this hearing. On August 30, 2002, the trial court filed a letter opinion concluding that Mr. Todd's transfer of his property to the Duncans was a fraudulent transfer. Accordingly, the court entered an order on September 23, 2002 setting aside the conveyance and granting the writ of attachment.

In late October 2002, the trial court set the trial on damages for December 9, 2002. On November 25, 2002, Mr. Todd, still representing himself, filed several papers in the trial court, including: (1) a motion to set aside the default judgment, (2) an answer, (3) a motion to set civil trial date after criminal trial, and (4) a motion to release funds to enable him to retain "criminal and civil attorneys." The trial court never addressed any of these motions, ostensibly because Mr. Todd had failed to request that they be set for a hearing.

The trial on the issue of damages was held on December 9, 2002. Mr. Todd was present at this trial and participated in the proceeding without a lawyer. The jury awarded the Bell family $600,000 in compensatory damages and $80,000 in punitive damages. The trial court thereafter entered a judgment on the verdict, and Mr. Todd has appealed.²

II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ADDRESS MR. TODD'S PENDING MOTIONS

As a general matter, appellate courts will decline to consider issues that have not been raised by the parties. However appellate courts may, on their own motion, consider issues not explicitly raised by the parties in order to prevent injury to the public's interest or prejudice to the judicial process. Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d). See, e.g., State v. Goodman, 90 S.W.3d 557, 562 n. 3 (Tenn.2002); Panzer v. King, 743 S.W.2d 612, 616 (Tenn.1988). This appeal involves one of the rare occasions where fairness and justice require us to take up an issue that has not been explicitly raised.

Litigation involving self-represented litigants can be challenging and difficult. Irvin v. City of Clarksville, 767 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tenn.Ct.App.1988). It can become even more difficult and cumbersome when the self-represented litigant is incarcerated. Chastain v. Chastain, No. M2003-02016-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 725277, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App. Mar.22, 2004) (No Tenn. R.App. P. 11 application filed). However, an incarcerated litigant's right to meaningful access to the courts requires that the litigant be afforded a fair opportunity to present his or her side of the controversy. Knight v. Knight, 11 S.W.3d 898, 903 (Tenn.Ct.App.1999). To provide this opportunity, trial courts may be required to waive the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure's time requirements and to grant self-represented litigants extensions of time subject to reasonable time restrictions. Logan v. Winstead, 23 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tenn.2000).

Appellate courts frequently have been confronted with cases in which the trial courts have disposed of claims either filed by or asserted against self-represented prisoners without first addressing the prisoner's pending motions. No matter whether the prisoner is the plaintiff or the defendant, reviewing courts have consistently held that trial courts err when they proceed to adjudicate the merits of the claim without first addressing the prisoner's pending motion or motions. These oversights have generally been found to be prejudicial rather than harmless because the failure to address pending motions "give[s] the impression that a litigant is being ignored," Logan v. Winstead, 23 S.W.3d at 303. We have also held that a prisoner's failure to comply with local rules requiring motions to be set for hearing does not provide a trial court with an excuse for failing to address the pending motions. Chastain v. Chastain, 2004 WL 725277, at *2. Accordingly, when a trial court has failed to rule on an incarcerated litigant's pending motions, reviewing courts have consistently vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to consider and act on the pending motions.³

In this case, the trial court proceeded with the damages portion of the trial against Mr. Todd without considering his motion to set aside the default judgment, his motion to hold the Bell family's claim against him in abeyance until the completion of the pending criminal trial, and his motion to release his funds to enable him to retain lawyers to represent him in both the pending civil and criminal proceedings. This was plain error, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Todd had not requested a hearing on any of these motions. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment awarding compensatory and punitive damages against Mr. Todd and remand the case to the trial court with directions to consider and dispose of each of Mr. Todd's motions using the legal standards applicable to each of these motions and to enter an order specifying its reasons for either granting or denying each motion. Logan v. Winstead, 23 S.W.3d at 303.

III. REMAINING ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL

Even though we have vacated the judgment for damages against Mr. Todd and have remanded the case for further proceedings in the trial court, we have determined that it is appropriate for us to address four other issues Mr. Todd has raised on appeal because doing so will prevent needless litigation and complexity on remand. These issues include Mr. Todd's claims that the trial court should have provided him appointed counsel, that the trial court...