Bell v. Towns
| Decision Date | 29 December 1949 |
| Citation | 95 Cal.App.2d 398,213 P.2d 73 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | BELL v. TOWNS et al. Civ. 16722. |
Catherine A. McKenna, in pro per.
Nessen, Becker & Becker, Max Bergman, Los Angeles, for respondent.
Action to quiet title to Lots 384 and 385 of the Forthmann Tract in the city of Los Angeles, formerly in the city of Watts. Judgment was entered for plaintiff from which defendant Catherine A. McKenna appeals.
Plaintiff's title rests on tax deeds issued to the State of California after nonpayment of taxes of 1928 on Lot 384 and taxes of 1924 on Lot 385; deeds issued by the State of California in February, 1943, to Record Searching Title Company for both lots and a conveyance by that company to plaintiff.
Defendant has no record or documentary title to Lot 384. She claims title solely through adverse possession. She asserts title to Lot 385 by adverse possession together with a tax deed issued to A. M. Robinson in 1918 and mesne conveyances from him to defendant. In 1930 she enclosed the two lots with a fence and has ever since maintained it.
1. Defendant contends that the statute of limitations protects her against plaintiff's claim of title. Though she has been in possession of the property since 1930 there is no evidence that she has paid any taxes on it. The contrary is attested by the fact that both lots were sold to the State for nonpayment of taxes and conveyed by the State to Record Searching Title Company in 1943. Title by adverse possession cannot be obtained without the payment of all taxes levied on the property. Code Civ.Proc. sec. 325.
2. Defendant asserts that the tax deeds to Record Searching Title Company are void for the reason that the property was advertised to be sold for taxes levied by the city of Venice when in fact it was in the city of Watts. This would be important if true, but the tax records in evidence describe the lots as being in the city of Watts. The delinquent tax list is not in the record but a sufficient amount of it was read into the transcript to show that it covered all property in the county on which taxes had not been paid, including that in the cities of Venice, Watts and other municipalities which had authorized the county to assess and collect their taxes. References to taxes of the several cities named in the delinquent tax notice obviously are applicable only to taxes on property that was then in the respective cities and not to any other property.
3. Defendant contends that the deeds are void for the reason that they were not acknowledged before an officer qualified to take acknowledgments of deeds, the assertion in her brief being that they were acknowledged before B. F. Murphy who was a deputy tax collector. The deeds in evidence were acknowledged before the County Clerk by F. B. Murphy deputy. It will be presumed from the recital in the document that he was a deputy county clerk. There is no evidence that he was a deputy tax collector, and if he had been such there is no legal impediment to his acting as a deputy in both offices.
4. The other contentions of defendant as to the alleged invalidity of the tax deeds may be considered together: (a) That there is no affidavit or certificate attached to the published delinquent tax list for the year of the sale to the State that it was published by authority of the tax collector; (b) that it was not in fact published by his authority; (c) that there is no certificate that it is a copy of the delinquent tax list for the year in question; (d) that the tax deeds are not in the exact form prescribed by law; (e) that the deeds to Record Searching Title Company are void for failure to recite therein that the property was sold to the highest bidder and that the company was the party which made the highest bid. None of these alleged procedural errors or defects, if any in fact exists, is jurisdictional. If any occurred it is such as has been cured by the Curative Acts. Stats.1943, ch. 458, p. 1993; stats. 1945, ch. 1134, p. 2176.
A tax deed to the State is prima facie evidence of the regularity of certain of the tax proceedings and conclusive as to all others from the levy of the assessment to the execution of the deed. Pol.Code, secs. 3786, 3787, in effect when the deeds to the...
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...Timber Co., supra, at p. 656, 29 Cal.Rptr. at p. 757; see Bank of Lemoore v. Fulgham, 151 Cal. 234, 239, 90 P. 936; Bell v. Towns, 95 Cal.App.2d 398, 400--401, 213 P.2d 73.) Such a defect is jurisdictional where the nonperformance consists of constitutionally indispensable steps. (Ramish v.......
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