Bell v. Vista Unified School District

Decision Date27 June 2000
Docket NumberNo. D033824.,D033824.
Citation98 Cal.Rptr.2d 263,82 Cal.App.4th 672
PartiesCraig BELL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VISTA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Appellants.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Stutz, Gallagher, Artiano, Shinoff & Holtz, Daniel R. Shinoff, Jack M. Sleeth, Jr., San Diego, and Paul V. Carelli IV, for Defendants and Appellants.

Robert P. Ottilie, San Diego, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

WORK, Acting P.J.

Vista Unified School District, Rancho Buena Vista High School (RBV) Principal Alan Johnson, RBV Athletic Director Ric Bethel, and Associate Superintendent Peter McHugh (collectively VUSD) appeal a judgment mandating it to nullify its termination of RBV football coach Craig Bell, because of a notice violation of the Ralph M. Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq.;1 the Brown Act), and awarding him $157,674 in attorney fees and costs. VUSD contends the trial court erred in concluding that a meeting to discipline an employee after an adverse finding or decision by a separate administrative body constitutes a "complaint or charge" under the Brown Act, specifically section 54957, requiring 24 hours written notice of the meeting. VUSD also asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it acted before the expiration of the statutory 30-day period to "cure or correct" the Brown Act violation under section 54960.1 and by awarding attorney fees and costs unrelated to it. As we shall explain, we conclude VUSD violated the written notice requirement of section 54957 and that section 54960.1 does not provide a procedural impediment here. However, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in failing to apportion the section 54960.5 attorney fees and costs request. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment as to the attorney fees and costs award and remand it to the trial court for recalculation following reasonable apportionment consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

By the Fall 1997, Bell had been a VUSD employee for 13 years and the only football coach in RBV's 11-year history. As a tenured instructor, his coaching assignment was separate and renewed annually each fiscal year. That assignment had been renewed on July 1, 1997, and was to expire on June 30, 1998.

In the spring 1997, Robert Ryan, the father of Australian high school student John, asked Bell to help arrange his son's transfer to Vista to attend school and play American football. Bell advised Ryan he had a "no cut" policy, but any decision regarding eligibility would be made by the California Interscholastic Federation (CIF), a voluntary association which governs eligibility for interscholastic competition. Bell immediately reported Ryan's telephone call to Athletic Director Bethel and directed Ryan to the counseling office for processing the transfer. Ryan later asked Bell to obtain a visa for John to enter the United States, an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) form 20. In turn, Bell contacted Bethel and VUSD Associate Superintendent Peter McHugh who told him VUSD did not provide the form; made inquiries on Bell's behalf; and later advised him where he could obtain it. A third party obtained the form and Bell had a Vista counselor, Frank Donez, sign it. Bell's assistant coach offered to take John into his home for the year at a minimal cost.

After John's arrival and registration, RBV Principal Johnson wrote the CIF requesting his athletic eligibility. CIF Commissioner Jan Jessop met with John. Upon learning his age, his prior education and Bell's involvement in his transfer, on September 9 Jessop denied the request for eligibility on the grounds he was a "fifth year" senior and a transfer student. On October 2, she further ruled Bell had violated CIF's undue influence rule, John was ineligible for one year, and RBV was placed on one-year athletic probation with the suggestion VUSD consider disciplinary action against involved employees.

John appealed the decision to the CIF Appellate Panel, which following hearings on October 13, upheld the undue influence ruling, but reduced his ineligibility to 13 days. The panel placed the school's entire athletic program on probation for one year, suspended its membership in the CIF for the year, and ordered VUSD to review the matter and take whatever action it deemed appropriate regarding Bell. On October 16, the VUSD Board of Trustees (the Board) held a special closed session Board meeting to consider action to take in response to the CIF probation. It posted public notice describing the subjects to be considered at the meeting, including "public employee discipline/dismissal/release." Although it is undisputed that VUSD did not give Bell 24-hours notice of the meeting, he received written notice late that morning of the meeting, specifically advising him the Board would discuss the issue of RBV's placement on probation for violating CIF rule 5102 and requesting his availability (outside of the closed session) as a potential resource if the Board had any questions. On his attorney's advice after discussing the matter with VUSD counsel, Bell did not attend. Bell was not advised either in writing or orally that the Board intended to consider any personnel action against him at the meeting. The Board voted to permanently remove Bell from his "additional assignment" as football coach, without loss of pay. He was not removed from his tenured teaching position. Johnson advised him of the Board's action the following morning orally and later that afternoon in writing.

On October 23, pursuant to section 54960.1, subdivision (b), Bell notified VUSD it had violated the Brown Act and requested it to cure or correct the violation. Later that same day, Bell filed his complaint for mandamus, injunctive relief and damages. That evening, the Board considered Bell's request to cure, but reported in open session it had voted to initiate an investigation into the "undue influence" issues. On October 24, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) staying Bell's termination as head football coach. The parties entered into a written stipulation extending the TRO until the trial. The first amended petition and complaint contained 15 causes of action; however, only four related to Brown Act claims, seeking injunctive relief, an alternative writ of mandate, a peremptory writ of mandate, and declaratory relief. The remaining 11 claims, tried separately, asked for tort damages based on various actions such as wrongful termination (retaliatory firing), intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation.

By telephonic ruling on June 17, 1998, the trial court concluded CIF Commissioner Jessop's letter dated October 2, 1997, to Johnson constituted a "charge or complaint" against Bell, requiring 24-hour notice to him under section 54957. That letter contained Jessop's opinion Bell had committed undue influence and her recommendation that VUSD review and take whatever personnel actions it deemed appropriate against Bell and others. Johnson notified Bell of the October 16, 1997 meeting where the Board would consider RBVs placement on probation for violating CIF rule 510. The notice, however, was silent regarding a closed session to consider Bell's discipline or dismissal. Consequently, the trial court ruled that because such notice was not given, the action taken at the board meeting was null and void pursuant to section 54957. The court further found VUSD neither cured nor corrected its failure to provide Bell notice of a meeting to discuss his termination as football coach or his right to request an open meeting. The court then ruled that pursuant to section 54960.1, subdivision (a), mandamus was a proper remedy to declare the action taken at the October 16 meeting was null and void. The court directed VUSD to nullify its prior decision terminating Bell as RBV head football coach, remove any mention of termination from his personnel file, not communicate in the future he was ever terminated, and permanently enjoined VUSD, its agents and employees from attempting to enforce the October 16 termination decision. Finally, the court concluded that Bell had timely requested VUSD to cure or correct the statutorily deficient notice and that his filing suit before the expiration of the 30-day period to correct a Brown Act violation was not prejudicial and did not bar his mandamus action. The court ruled Bell was entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs under section 54960.5, subject to a cost memorandum and motion for attorney fees. The matter was then heard on June 19, after which the court took the matter under submission and confirmed its telephonic ruling with slight modification. Judgment was filed on August 14, incorporating an award for attorney fees and costs in the sum of $157,674.81 (costs of $9,812.81 and fees of $147,862.00). VUSD appealed, but the appeal was dismissed without prejudice for violating the one final judgment rule. The remaining tort actions went to trial in March 1999, but the parties resolved them before its completion. VUSD paid Bell $125,000 and gave him a paid leave of absence during the second semester of the 1999/2000 school year to settle his remaining claims. VUSD then timely noticed this appeal on June 22.

THE BROWN ACT WAS VIOLATED

VUSD contends the closed meeting did not violate the Brown Act because Bell was only entitled to a 24-hour written notice of the meeting under section 54957 if the Board intended to consider complaints or charges brought against him by another person or employee. Here, VUSD asserts the Board did not do so, but rather it met to consider whether to discipline an employee after an adverse finding or decision by a separate administrative body (CIF) and that action did not constitute a complaint or charge under the Brown Act. Bell responds that when...

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