Bellard v. State
| Decision Date | 31 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 72, Sept. Term, 2016,72, Sept. Term, 2016 |
| Citation | 157 A.3d 272,452 Md. 467 |
| Parties | Darrell BELLARD v. STATE of Maryland |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Julia C. Schiller, Assistant Public Defender (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, FOR PETITIONER.
Todd W. Hesel, Assistant Attorney General (Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, FOR RESPONDENT.
Barbera, C.J.; Greene, Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, and Getty, JJ.
In 2013, Maryland repealed the death penalty. To effectuate the repeal of the death penalty and provisions related to the death penalty, the General Assembly repealed several statutes, and repealed and reenacted, with amendments, other statutes, including Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.) ("CR (2012)") § 2–304(a), which previously governed the procedure for sentencing a defendant who was convicted of first-degree murder to life imprisonment or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, where either the State did not give notice of intent to seek the death penalty, or the State gave such notice but the trial court or jury determined that the death penalty should not be imposed. See 2013 Md. Laws 2298–99 (Vol. III, Ch. 156, S.B. 276). The General Assembly amended CR (2012) § 2–304(a), effective October 1, 2013, by making the following deletions:
2013 Md. Laws 2317, 2323 (Vol. III, Ch. 156, S.B. 276). As such, after the amendment, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.) ("CR") § 2–304(a) provided and currently provides:
(a) In general. —If the State gave notice under § 2–203(1) of this title, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding as soon as practicable after the defendant is found guilty of murder in the first degree to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole or to imprisonment for life.
The General Assembly did not amend the remainder of CR § 2–304, which provided, and continues to provide, as follows:
As a result of the amendment, CR § 2–304(a) provides that a trial court shall conduct a sentencing proceeding to determine whether to sentence a defendant who is convicted of first-degree murder to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, whereas CR § 2–304(b) refers to a jury determination as to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
The General Assembly's amendment of CR (2012) § 2–304(a), without amending CR (2012) § 2–304(b), gives rise to the two issues that we must decide in this case: (I) whether a defendant who is convicted of first-degree murder has a right, under CR § 2–304, to have a jury, rather than the trial court, determine whether to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; and, if not, (II) whether Maryland's sentencing scheme for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional.
We answer these questions in the negative and hold that: (I) under CR § 2–304(a), where a defendant is convicted of first-degree murder and the State has given notice of an intent to seek life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the trial court, not the jury, determines whether to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; stated otherwise, CR § 2–304 does not grant a defendant who is convicted of first-degree murder the right to have a jury determine whether to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; and (II) Maryland's sentencing scheme for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole does not violate the United States Constitution or the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and neither the United States Constitution nor the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides a defendant with a right to have a jury determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; stated otherwise, both the United States Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights permit a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole to be imposed in the same manner as every other sentence except the death penalty, which has been abolished in Maryland.
Darrell Bellard ("Bellard"), Petitioner, was charged in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County ("the circuit court") with four counts of first-degree murder and related offenses arising out of crimes which resulted in the deaths of two women and two children, all of whom had been shot in the head. In the early morning of August 6, 2010, Bellard was taken to a police station to be interviewed as a witness. As law enforcement officers gathered evidence throughout the day, they learned that Bellard was a drug dealer from Texas and that he had been mad at one of the victims; Bellard, thus, became a suspect. Bellard initially denied responsibility for the deaths of the four victims, but later confessed to the shootings.
On February 4, 2011, the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Prior to the start of Bellard's trial, in 2013, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill 276, repealing the death penalty, and on May 2, 2013, the Governor of Maryland approved Senate Bill 276. See 2013 Md. Laws 2323 (Vol. III, Ch. 156, S.B. 276). The act was to take effect on October 1, 2013. See id.
On June 3, 2013, in response to the pending repeal of the death penalty, the State filed in the circuit court a "Notice to Withdraw Intent to Seek Death Penalty." On June 6, 2013, the State filed a "Notice of Intent to Seek Sentence of Imprisonment for Life without Possibility of Parole" as to all four counts of first-degree murder.2
On March 5, 2014, Bellard filed a "Notice of Defendant's Election to be Tried by Jury and, if Convicted of First[–]Degree Murder, to be Sentenced by Jury." On March 31, 2014, Bellard filed a request for specific voir dire concerning life imprisonment without the possibility of parole—specifically, voir dire questions "relating to ... prejudice, partiality, presupposition, and/or inability to follow the law with regard to the sentencing process." On April 4, 2014, Bellard filed a motion to strike the State's notice of intent to seek life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In the motion to strike, Bellard contended that the amended version of CR § 2–304 requires a jury to decide whether to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, while Maryland Rule 4–342 requires a trial court to determine a defendant's sentence. According to Bellard, given the conflict between CR § 2–304 and Maryland Rule 4–342, it would be "impossible" to sentence him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole "in a manner that complies with both the statute and the rule [.]" Bellard also argued that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole would violate his rights under the United States Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
On April 7, 2014, the State filed a motion to strike Bellard's notice of election to be sentenced by jury. In the motion to strike, the State contended that, in repealing the death penalty, the General Assembly did not intend to create a statutory right for a defendant to have a jury determine whether to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. According to the State, with the exception of the death penalty, a defendant has no right to be sentenced by a jury, and no statute confers such a right to a defendant, despite whatever language the General Assembly left in CR § 2–304. The State further argued that the Maryland Rules clearly provide that a trial court shall determine whether to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
On April 7, 2014, the circuit court conducted a hearing, at which it heard argument on the motions to strike. At the hearing, the parties made the same arguments that they raised in the motions to strike, with Bellard's counsel contending, among other things, that amended CR § 2–304 provides for the right for a defendant to have a jury determine whether to impose life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. And, the State argued that the General Assembly's intent, as reflected by the plain language of CR § 2–304 and the legislative history of the bill repealing the death penalty, was solely to repeal the death penalty, not to create a new right to jury sentencing in cases in which the State seeks life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit...
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