BELLIS v. KERSEY

• Decision Date: 26 October 2010
• Docket Number: No. S-10-0013.,S-10-0013.
• Citation: 241 P.3d 818,2010 WY 138
• Parties: James E. BELLIS and Bette Lu Bellis, husband and wife, Appellants (Defendants/Plaintiffs), v. Ronny L. KERSEY and Peggy J. Kersey, husband and wife, Appellees (Plaintiffs), and Benjamin H. Howard, Jr., Benjamin H. Howard, IV, Rocky Mountain Timberlands, Inc., and General Education Foundation, Inc., Appellees (Defendants).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

241 P.3d 818

2010 WY 138

James E. BELLIS and Bette Lu Bellis, husband and wife, Appellants (Defendants/Plaintiffs),

v. Ronny L. KERSEY and Peggy J. Kersey, husband and wife, Appellees (Plaintiffs),andBenjamin H. Howard, Jr., Benjamin H. Howard, IV, Rocky Mountain Timberlands, Inc., and General Education Foundation, Inc., Appellees (Defendants).

No. S-10-0013.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Oct. 26, 2010.

Representing Appellants: Frank J. Jones of Wheatland, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees Ronny L. Kersey and Peggy J. Kersey: Gay Woodhouse of Woodhouse Roden, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees Benjamin H. Howard, Jr., Benjamin H. Howard, IV and Rocky Mountain Timberlands, Inc.: William H. Vines of Wheatland, Wyoming.

Before KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

VOIGT, Justice.

[¶ 1] The district court consolidated two civil actions involving ownership disputes among neighboring landowners in Platte County, Wyoming. After a bench trial, the district court concluded that the appellants had not proven ownership of the disputed land through adverse possession, ordered their ejectment from a portion thereof, to which portion title was also quieted in the record owners, and ordered the appellants to pay trespass damages and costs. This appeal followed. We conclude that the district court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous on some issues, but are clearly erroneous on other issues, and we therefore affirm in part, and reverse in part.

PARTIES AND PLEADINGS

[¶ 2] So as better to present the detailed facts and the issues, we will briefly introduce the parties and identify their primary pleadings. The appellants are James E. Bellis and Bette Lu Bellis (the Bellises). They were the plaintiffs in a quiet title and declaratory judgment action filed on April 4, 2006, against Torey S. Hanks and Julie B. Hanks (the Hanks), Benjamin H. Howard, Jr. and Benjamin H. Howard IV (the Howards), and Rocky Mountain Timberlands, Inc. (RMT). ¹ The Hanks, Howards, and RMT filed an Answer denying the Bellises' claims, but presented no counterclaims. Prior to the filing of that action, the Bellises were the defendants in an action filed by Ronny L. Kersey and Peggy J. Kersey (the Kerseys) alleging trespass and seeking quiet title, injunctive relief, and ejectment. In their counterclaim against the Kerseys, the Bellises asked that title be quieted in them. The district court consolidated the two cases because both disputes involved a contiguous area that had been under common ownership and the Bellises' claim of ownership to the disputed area of each parcel was based on the same evidence in regard to adverse possession. The following map shows the lands in question, with the shaded area in Sections 3 and 10 east of the Bellises' 1997 purchase and west of the fence being the disputed area.

ISSUES ²

[¶ 3] 1. Did the district court err in ruling against the Bellises on their claim of adverse possession?

2. Did the district court err in ordering the ejectment of the Bellises from the Kerseys' tract?

3. Did the district court err in denying the Bellises' quiet title claim, and in granting the Kerseys' quiet title claim?

4. Did the district court err in granting trespass damages to the Kerseys?

5. Did the district court err in granting costs to the Kerseys?

FACTS

[¶ 4] Because the primary claim presented to the district court was one of adverse possession, the trial transcript and appellate briefs present a detailed history of the ownership and use of the disputed lands. We will resolve this primary issue upon grounds somewhat different from those relied upon by the district court, so we will focus upon the facts that are relevant to that disposition.

[¶ 5] The disputed land and the surrounding area was developed as a ranch beginning with the arrival of Millard Coleman in 1888. As of April 30, 1987, Rowena Coleman owned the subject lands in Sections 3 and 10, while Charles and Jean Coleman owned the subject lands in Section 4. On that date, Charles and Jean Coleman sold to the Bellises a parcel of land that, for the purposes of this inquiry, had as its eastern boundary the section line between Sections 3 and 4. In other words, that deed conveyed nothing in Section 3 or in Section 10.

[¶ 6] James Bellis testified that, over the following years, the Bellises ran cattle, hunted upon, and leased out not just their land in Section 4, but also the land in Sections 3 and 10 west of the fence shown on the above map. Mr. Bellis further testified that Charles Coleman knew the fence was not on the property line, but recognized the Bellises' use of the now-disputed area under “the old fence law,” meaning adverse possession.

[¶ 7] In 1997, the Bellises learned that the Colemans intended to sell their property in Sections 3 and 10. Mr. Bellis and Mr. Coleman discussed resolving the boundary issues in those sections, to enable the Colemans to sell the property. Not wanting to go to the expense of a formal survey, the two men agreed upon a straight diagonal line running northeasterly from the section corner (3, 4, 9, 10) as the boundary between their properties. That diagonal line, as described in the ensuing deed from the Colemans to the Bellises, is shown on the above map as the western edge of the disputed lands. The Bellises paid the Colemans $18,000 for the additional lands not described in their earlier deed. Significantly, Mr. Bellis testified that he “was purchasing a settlement” and “was resolving the entire issue,” and that “we couldn't go for adverse possession for another month [because] [i]t was not ten years up.”

[¶ 8] In summarizing the Bellises' position, Mr. Bellis testified that (1) the 1987 deed “[was] a perfectly good deed, except in those days fence lines and property descriptions on section lines do not match[,]” and (2) the boundary line in the 1997 deed was erroneous in that it should have gone to the northeast corner of the quarter section, rather than to the center of the northern border of that quarter section, meaning it should have encompassed the disputed area. ³

[¶ 9] The party to whom the Colemans intended to sell, and did sell, their property in Sections 3 and 10, was RMT, one of the current appellees. That transaction took place on May 20, 1997. Subsequently, the Kerseys, the Howards, and GEF obtained title to the tracts shown on the above map. Disputes over the property boundaries resulted in the Kerseys filing their action against the Bellises on June 23, 2005, and the Bellises filing their action against the Hanks, the Howards, and RMT on April 4, 2006. The details of those disputes are discussed at length in the trial transcript, but those details are not of significance to our resolution of this matter.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] [2] [3] [¶ 10] We have often reiterated our standard of review upon the appeal of a district court's decision following a bench trial. Factual determinations are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, while conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp., 2003 WY 165, ¶ 13, 81 P.3d 215, 218 (Wyo.2003). “A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Harber v. Jensen, 2004 WY 104, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, 60 (Wyo.2004) (quoting Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Dexter, 2003 WY 38, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d 385, 389 (Wyo.2003)). We may affirm a district court's action upon any sustainable legal ground shown in the record. Hoy v. DRM, Inc., 2005 WY 76, ¶ 21, 114 P.3d 1268, 1279 (Wyo.2005).

DISCUSSION

Did the district court err in ruling against the Bellises on their claim of adverse possession?

[4] [¶ 11] In 1987, the Bellises purchased from the Colemans a portion of the Colemans' ranch, including the land in Section 4 shown on the above map. Subsequent use by the Bellises of lands retained by the Colemans in Sections 3 and 10 to the east of Section 4 apparently led Mr. Bellis and Mr. Coleman to conclude in 1997 that there was some question as to the boundary between their respective properties in that area. Although Mr. Bellis does not challenge the correctness of the 1987 deed, he contends that the fence, rather than the section line, was always meant to be the eastern boundary of his property. His legal argument at trial was that the Bellises adversely possessed the disputed area.

[¶ 12] When Mr. Bellis and Mr. Coleman met in 1997 to discuss the Colemans' planned land sale, the two men discussed the Bellises' potential adverse possession claim. The Bellises did not pursue that claim, for two reasons. First, the ten-year statutory period had not passed, meaning the claim had not “ripened.” And second, Mr. Coleman did not want to pay to survey the fence line for the purpose of establishing the western boundary of the property he could sell. Consequently, the Bellises and the Colemans resolved the difficulty with an agreement: the Bellises would pay $18,000 to extend the eastern border of their land to the diagonal line in Section 3 discussed above. This transaction was accomplished by payment of the money and execution and delivery of the deed.

[¶ 13] While nobody in this case has argued that the 1997 deed is ambiguous, parol evidence was admitted to explain its purpose. That evidence clearly shows that the intention of both the Bellises and the Colemans was to establish a boundary between their properties that would allow the Colemans to sell the lands east of the boundary. Mr. Bellis, himself, repeatedly testified that such was their purpose. Given that purpose, and given the exchange of money for a warranty deed specifically identifying a property boundary lying entirely west of the fence-all of which took place before the period required to establish adverse possession-it simply cannot be said that the evidence can support the Bellises' position that they retained a...