Belo v. Fuller

• Citation: 19 S.W. 616
• Parties: BELO <I>et al.</I> v. FULLER.
• Decision Date: 26 April 1892
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas

19 S.W. 616

BELO et al. v. FULLER.

Supreme Court of Texas.

April 26, 1892.

Commissioners' decision. Section B. Appeal from district court, Bexar county; GEORGE H. NOONAN, Judge.

Action by Joe Fuller against A. H. Belo & Co. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants appeal. Reversed.

Garrett was an agent of defendants, and the conversation referred to in the opinion was concerning defendants' motive in publishing the article complained of. In the case of Belo v. Wren a sum of money had been recovered from defendants for libel, and plaintiff's counsel remarked in his argument to the jury that they stood convicted as libelers of character.

Summerlin & Wise and L. N. Walthall, for appellants.

FISHER, J.

This is a suit by appellee against A. H. Belo, J. J. Hand, and D. C. Jenkins, composing the firm of A. H. Belo & Co., to recover damages for a libel alleged to have been published and circulated by A. H. Belo & Co., in the Galveston News, on the 10th day of February, 1887. Defendants answered, alleging, in substance, that A. H. Belo & Co. was a corporation at the time of said publication, and that the individuals sued were not personally liable for the acts of the corporation; that the libelous matter was retracted; that they entertained no malice towards the plaintiff; and that said publication was innocently made under a mistake, and that the words were not actionable, and that plaintiff has sustained no damages. The death of Hand was suggested, and case as to him dismissed. Judgment was rendered in favor of appellee against A. H. Belo and D. C. Jenkins for the sum of $500 and costs of suit. It is here contended that it was error to render judgment against A. H. Belo and D. C. Jenkins, because they were not parties to the publication and circulation of the alleged libel, but that it was the act of A. H. Belo & Co., a corporation. All persons engaged in publishing and circulating a libel are responsible therefor; and, by reason of the doctrine of the several liability of tort feasors, the remedy may be pursued against one or more of those guilty of the wrong. It was evidently the supposed application of this principle of law that influenced the trial court in submitting this case to the jury, and in permitting a recovery to be had against the appellants. It is the law in this state that a corporation may be civilly responsible for libel. Railway Co. v. Richmond, 73 Tex. 572, 11 S. W. Rep. 555. If a corporation publishes and circulates a libel by the aid and assistance of others, they are equally guilty, and will be liable either jointly or severally, as the pleader may elect. Their liability does not grow out of the fact that they are stockholders or members of the corporation, but springs from their active agency in producing and circulating the libel. It is the corporation that is the publisher, and not the persons constituting its membership. Simply to show that persons are stockholders and officers of the publishing corporation will not make them responsible for libelous publication appearing in the paper, unless it is shown that they, in some way, aided and assisted and advised its publication or circulation, or unless their duties as officers of the concern were of such character as charges them with the performance of functions concerning the publication and circulation of the paper; such duties being of such a nature that the law would imply that such officer knew or should have known of the publication of such libelous matter. Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we find the evidence fails to connect either of the appellants with the publication or circulation of the paper containing the libel, or that their duties as members or officers of the corporation were of such character that the law would impute to them an agency in its publication or circulation. For this reason we reverse this...