Belote v. Coffman

• Decision Date: 15 March 1915
• Docket Number: 246
• Citation: 175 S.W. 37,117 Ark. 352
• Parties: BELOTE v. COFFMAN
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

175 S.W. 37

117 Ark. 352

BELOTE v. COFFMAN

No. 246

Supreme Court of Arkansas

March 15, 1915

Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court; John E. Mar-tineau, Chancellor reversed.

Decree reversed and cause remanded.

Hal L. Norwood, for appellant.

The real question to be determined in this case is whether or not the appropriation is for the purpose of "defraying the necessary expenses of government," within the meaning of the Constitution. If it is not a necessary expense of the government of the State, it is obviously the duty of the court to declare the act void as having failed to receive two-thirds vote of each house of the General Assembly. Art 5, § 31, Const. 1874; 76 Ark. 199; 2 Law Ed., (U. S.) 60; 123 U.S. 623; 66 Ark. 575.

Appropriations for exhibiting the State's resources at expositions have never been recognized as being necessary expenses of government either by the judicial or by the executive departments of the State, neither have they been so construed by the legislative department, until this act was passed, as witness the printed journals of the Senate and House. Columbian Exposition Appropriation 1893, S. B. No. 179, S. J 366; H. J., pp. 564, 595; Louisiana Purchase Exposition Appropriation, 1901, S. B. No. 95, S. J. 200; H. J. 494 and 507; Supplemental Louisiana Purchase Exposition Appropriation, 1903, S. B. No. 42, S. J. 107, H. J. 382 and 391, and same bill on its return to the Senate for concurrence in amendments, S. J. 277, and 291.

The legislative determination in this case that the appropriation is for a necessary expense of the government, is not conclusive upon the courts. 78 Ark. 432; 106 Ark. 506; 27 Ark. 266; 105 Ark. 380; Cotton v. City of Benton, 117 Ark. 190, infra; 77 S.E. 264; 139 P. 685.

W L. Moose, Attorney General, and Rose, Hemingway, Cantrell, Loughborough & Miles, for appellee.

1. The Legislature has done everything possible to declare that this bill has been duly passed, and consequently that it is for necessary expenses of the State government. The legislative finding is conclusive. This court has wisely reserved the right to control arbitrary abuses of the legislative power, but it can not be said that the Legislature has abused its power in this instance. The Constitution has entrusted to that body the deter-ruination of the question whether an expense is necessary, and it should, as this court has said, require a very plain abuse of power to justify an interference by the judicial department. 66 Ark. 575, 579; 76 Ark. 197, 202; 169 S.W. 802; 114 Ark. 212.

It is plainly apparent that the word "necessary" as used in this connection, does not mean "indispensable," but only that it is appropriate to the end sought. See Words & Phrases, and cases there cited.

If it be conceded that the Legislature may, by a bare majority, vote money for advertising the resourses of the State in one way, as for instance for the Commissioner of Mines, Manufactures and Agriculture, a mere advertising bureau it is not apparent on what principle it could be held that an appropriation for advertising in a different way would be beyond the power of that body. See 113 Ark. 493, 168 S.W. 1066; Id. 849. The cases hold that an appropriation for any reasonable municipal purpose, such as to install electric light plants, water and sewer systems, to improve streets, etc., are necessary expenses. 45 S.E. 948, 950, 133 N.C. 587; 45 S.E. 1029, 1030, 134 N.C. 125; 63 S.E. 167, 150 N.C. 35; 72 S.E. 460, 156 N.C. 402; 53 S.E. 229, 140 N.C. 429; 3 Cushing, 530, 533; 29 S.E. 368, 142 N.C. 420. Yet in the case of municipal corporations there is no such presumption in favor of their law-making bodies as is indulged in the case of a co-ordinate branch of government like the Legislature, to which the Constitution has entrusted in the first instance the determination of the question of a necessity, and whose discretion can be overruled only in case of palpable abuse.

2. The act was passed by two-thirds majority of both houses. The word "house" as used in article 5, section 30 of the Constitution, refers to the membership present at the time the vote is taken. Note the distinction made by the Constitution itself on this point in section 26 of the same article, where, in dealing with appropriations to pay for services after they have been rendered, it provides that it is necessary that the bill be passed by "two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the General Assembly." See, also, section 21, same article. 144 U.S. 6; 35 A. 932-934, 84 Md. 304; 21 La.Ann. 79-103; 46 So. 268, 20, 154 Ala. 249; 26 Fla. 281, 8 So. 429.

OPINION

HART, J.

During the session of the Legislature just ended, (session of 1915) an act was passed entitled, "An Act to Appropriate Money for an Exhibit of the Resources of the State of Arkansas at the Panama-Paci-fic International Exposition of 1915, and for other purposes." The act appropriated $ 40,000 for the purpose of exhibiting the resources of the State at that exposition. The bill received a two-thirds majority of those voting thereon in the Senate but did not receive a two-thirds majority of those voting thereon in the House of Representatives.

Joel C. Belote, a citizen and taxpayer of this State, instituted this action in the chancery court against L. L. Coffman as Auditor and R. G. McDaniel as Treasurer of the State of Arkansas. The plaintiff prayed that Coffman be enjoined and restrained from issuing warrants upon the appropriation provided in the act, and that R. G. McDaniel as treasurer be enjoined from paying any warrants under the provisions of the act, and that said act be declared void.

The chancellor found the issues in favor of the defendants and the complaint was dismissed for want of equity. The plaintiff has appealed.

As shown by the statement of facts, the bill received a two-thirds majority of those voting thereon in the Senate but did not receive a two-thirds majority of those voting thereon in the House of Representatives. Therefore counsel for the plaintiff contends that the bill failed to receive the necessary affirmative vote required by article 5, section 31, of the Constitution, and never became a law.

On the other hand, it is contended by counsel for the defendant that the action of the Senate and House of Representatives constituted a declaration that the appropriation was for a necessary expense of the State government as contemplated by the clause of the Constitution just referred to and that on this account a majority vote was all that was necessary for the passage of the act.

Article 5, section 31, of the Constitution, reads as follows:

"No State tax shall be allowed, or appropriation of money made, except to raise means for the payment of the just debts of the State, for defraying the necessary expenses of government, to sustain common schools, to repel invasion and suppress insurrection, except by a majority of two-thirds of both houses of the General Assembly."

This clause of the Constitution has been construed in the cases of State v. Sloan, 66 Ark. 575, 53 S.W. 47, and State v. Moore, 76 Ark. 197, 88 S.W. 881, and counsel for the defendants rely upon these cases to uphold the decree of the chancellor.

In the case of State v. Sloan, supra, the court held: "Where a bill making appropriation for building a new capitol received a majority merely of the votes of both houses of the General Assembly, and the presiding officers of both houses decided that the bill received the majority necessary for it passage, from which decision no appeal was taken, it will be inferred that the Legislature ratified the acts of its officers, and thereby declared that the act was constitutionally passed, and therefore that the building of a new capitol was a necessary expense of government."

In the case of State v. Moore, supra, the court held that an appropriation to promote the efficiency of the Arkansas State Guard is an appropriation to meet the necessary expenses of the government within the meaning of the Constitution of 1874, article 5, section 31, which may be passed by a majority vote simply.

In that case the court, after quoting some of the language of the decisions in the case of the State v. Sloan, supra, used this language:

"The court in the Sloan case did not mean to lay down the doctrine, nor do we now, that the power of the Legislature to determine what is a necessary expense of government is arbitrary, bounded by no limitations, and absolutely beyond control by the judicial department. We can readily call to mind subjects for appropriations so obviously beyond the scope of what may be deemed necessary expenses of government that the courts could, and in duty should, ignore a...