Below v. Robbins

• Decision Date: 29 April 1890
• Parties: BELOW v. ROBBINS, SHERIFF.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

76 Wis. 600

45 N.W. 416

BELOW

v.ROBBINS, SHERIFF.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

April 29, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court, Langlade county.

Bloodgood, Bloodgood & Kemper, for appellant.

Lynch & Latta, for respondent.

COLE, C. J.

It is not denied that the judgment against the defendant in this case was for the wrongful conversion of property exempt from sale upon execution. In other words, it was for the conversion of a stock of goods, selected and kept by the plaintiff for the purpose of carrying on his trade or business, not exceeding $200 in value. The statute expressly exempts that amount of stock. Subdivision 8, § 2982. The defendant, as sheriff, had wrongfully seized and sold the stock upon an execution issued on a prior judgment against the plaintiff in favor of S. T. and F. E. Mock, judgment creditors. After the judgment for the conversion of the exempt property was rendered and docketed, the defendant therein attempted to discharge it by paying the amount thereof to the sheriff of Langlade county, taking a receipt for the same, who had in his hands an alias execution issued on the Mock judgment. This was done in pursuance of section 3028, Rev. St., which, it is claimed, authorizes such payment. Therefore the question presented is, does that section of the statute authorize such a payment and discharge of this judgment for the conversion of exempt property? The section reads: “After the issuing of execution against property, any person indebted to the judgment debtor may pay to the sheriff the amount of his debt, or so much thereof as shall be necessary to satisfy the execution; and the sheriff's receipt shall be a sufficient discharge for the amount so paid.” We are clearly of the opinion that this provision was not intended to include, and should not be applied to, a judgment for the value of exempt property. If such a judgment could be discharged by applying the amount on another judgment against the person claiming the exemption, the spirit and policy of the statute would be defeated, in many cases. This court has uniformly held that the exemption laws must have a liberal construction, so as to secure their full benefit to the debtor. It would be useless to grant the privilege contained in these laws if it could be defeated or rendered of no possible value by allowing the judgment for the conversion of exempt property thus to be satisfied. Unless the judgment itself is held exempt, or enjoys the privileged position which the property had which it represents, the debtor is not protected. This is very obvious. Public policy requires such a construction of the above provision that it will not impair in any degree the beneficent intent of the exemption law. In the language of Commissioner LEONARD, when considering a kindred question in Tillotson v. Wolcott, 48 N. Y. 188: “Public policy requires such a construction of the statute as will insure its full benefit to the debtor. It would be useless to grant the privilege contained in the statute if it could be rendered of no effect by refusing an adequate remedy for the invasion of the exemption, or by permitting a recovery, when obtained for such in vasion, to be wrested from the debtor by proceedings on behalf of creditors. The judgment, when recovered by the debtor for the wrongful invasion of his privilege of the exemption of his property from levy and sale, represents the property for the value of which it was recovered.”...