Belshaw v. Agricultural Ins. Co. of Watertown, N.Y.

Decision Date21 July 1948
Docket Number31267.
Citation80 N.E.2d 675,150 Ohio St. 49
PartiesBELSHAW v. AGRICULTURAL INS. CO. OF WATERTOWN, N.Y.
CourtOhio Supreme Court
Syllabus by the Court

1. When reasonable minds may draw different conclusions from the evidence, it is the duty of the trial judge to submit the issues of fact to the jury, and it is error to direct a verdict. (Paragraph four of the syllabus in the case of Hamden Lodge No. 517 v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469 189 N.E. 246, approved and followed.)

2. After agreeing with its insured to withhold payment for necessary repairs which it knows have not been made to its insured's damaged automobile, an insurer, acting in a dual capacity as the insurer and as the authorized agent of the insured, is not relieved from its liability under its casualty policy by voluntarily making such payment over the objection of the insured.

Appeal from Court of Appeals, Cuyahoga County.

TURNER J., dissenting.

In the Municipal Court of Cleveland the plaintiff, Albert Belshaw, instituted this action against the defendant, the Agricultural Insurance Company of Watertown, New York, to recover for loss he claims to have sustained as a result of a collision involving his automobile on which the defendant had issued a policy of insurance.

At the conclusion of all the evidence the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant.

On an appeal to the Court of Appeals the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

The case is in this court for review by reason of the allowance of the plaintiff's motion to certify the record.

Beach & Warner, of Cleveland, for appellant.

Alto W. Brown, of Cleveland, for appellee.

WEYGANDT Chief Justice.

Was the trial court correct in directing a verdict for the defendant at the conclusion of all the evidence?

This question of law requires an analysis of the evidence; and if different conclusions can be drawn therefrom by reasonable minds, the issues of fact should have been submitted to the jury and the trial court was in error in refusing so to do.

The long story of the numerous troubles of the parties to this controversy began December 14, 1945, when the plaintiff's insured automobile was severely damaged in a collision with another car. The plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the former's automobile should be taken to a certain garage in Cleveland for repairs. This was done. After a delay of approximately six months the plaintiff finally obtained his car June 8, 1946. At that time he was required to sign a paper containing three parts designated as 'Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss,' 'Subrogation' and 'Payment Authorization and Release.' It is the last of the three that is the nub of the argument at this time.

Two days after the plaintiff obtained his automobile from the garage he drove it to Detroit. While on the way he noticed that the car did not operate properly. He took it to several garages for examination, and was told that it was in such a state of disrepair that it was unsafe for driving. He then left it at one of the Detroit garages where it was discovered that the repairs supposedly made in Cleveland had been either defectively made or not made at all. He immediately notified the defendant insurance company of these facts and asked the company not to pay the Cleveland garage. It was agreed that payment would be withheld until the matter had been adjusted. The plaintiff then had repairs made by the Detroit garage at an expense of $736.27. He asked the defendant to pay this, but payment was refused, and in order to obtain his car the plaintiff himself then paid the bill. Four and one-half months thereafter the defendant, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, paid the Cleveland garage in full, although no adjustment had been made and although this suit had been filed.

The defendant contends that its liability under its policy had been discharged fully by its payment to the Cleveland garage. The defendant relies on the 'Payment Authorization and Release' signed by the plaintiff when he obtained his car from the Cleveland garage. This reads in part as follows:

'To Agricultural
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