Belt v. Texas Co.
| Decision Date | 20 September 1943 |
| Docket Number | No. 5568.,5568. |
| Parties | BELT v. TEXAS CO. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Hockley County; Daniel A. Blair, Judge.
Suit in trespass to try title to realty by W. D. Belt, Jr., against the Texas Company. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
E. L. Klett, of Lubbock, and Touchstone, Wight, Gormley & Touchstone and Allen Wight, all of Dallas, for appellant.
H. S. Garrett, of Fort Worth, and Bradley & Wilson, of Lubbock, for appellee.
This is a suit in trespass to try title filed on January 20, 1942, by the appellant, W. D. Belt, Jr., against the appellee, The Texas Company, in which he seeks to recover six tracts of land out of the Bob Slaughter Block in Hockley County. On February 18, 1942, appellee filed what it designated as a suggestion of the absence of necessary parties, in which it alleged that appellant's suit constituted, in effect, an attempt to recover the estates, rights, and interests conveyed to appellee by an oil and gas lease executed on February 26, 1936, by George T. Veal and others, covering the six tracts of land described in his petition, and, if he were accorded the relief for which he prayed, the effect of the judgment would be to cancel and annul the rights, interests, titles, and estates of some thirty-nine other persons who were not made parties to the suit. It alleged in substance that the oil and gas lease under which it and the absent parties held such rights and interests was what is commonly known as a unitized or community lease and that, by its terms, all of the lessors in the various other instruments and leases which made up the unitized block were granted interests in the form of royalties in each of the tracts involved in the entire unitized block. The pleading exhibited the names of the thirty-nine absent parties who it alleged owned interests in the tracts of land sued for, together with the counties of their residence, the date of the respective instruments, and the volume and page of the Deed Records of Hockley County where each was recorded. It alleged that each of the thirty-nine persons was a necessary party to the suit and moved the court to take no further action in the case than to order and require that by the next term of the court appellant make them parties to the suit, and upon his failure to do so, his cause of action be dismissed.
The suggestion of the absence of necessary parties, which included the motion to dismiss the case, was heard by the court on May 9, 1942, and the court heard evidence in support of appellee's allegations, which comprised patents, deeds, and other instruments constituting a complete chain of title from the sovereignty of the soil to George T. Veal and wife covering the land sued for by appellant, and the unitized lease from George T. Veal and others to appellee. After hearing the evidence and argument of counsel, the court sustained appellee's motion and ordered appellant to make parties to the suit the other owners of the royalty interests under the unitized lease. In order to give appellant ample time to comply with the order, the case was continued until the next term of the court. On March 8, 1943, at a subsequent term, the motion was again considered and, it appearing that appellant not only had failed to comply with the order of the court, but declined to do so, the case was dismissed at appellant's cost, to which action and judgment of the court, appellant duly excepted and gave notice of appeal.
The case is presented here upon a single proposition to the effect that the court erred in holding that appellant, claiming to be the owner of the fee title to the land involved, could not maintain an ordinary action in trespass to try title on a petition in which no equitable relief is sought against appellee, who was then in possession of the land and alleged to be removing the subsurface oil, without also making parties defendant all persons claiming an interest in the one-eighth royalty provided in the oil and gas lease under which appellee claims to have acquired its seven-eighths interest in the oil, gas, and other minerals in and under the land in question.
The oil and gas lease, under which appellee claims, was executed on February 26, 1936, by George T. Veal and his wife, Minnie Slaughter Veal. It leased to appellee for the development of oil and gas fourteen tracts of land, including the six tracts herein sued for by appellant, the entire fourteen tracts aggregating 2025 acres. It provided that, for the purpose of operation and development, the Veal lease and other similar leases upon other lands in the unitized block should be treated as one lease and that each lessor in similar leases covering land in the unitized block should participate in the oil and gas royalties provided in the Veal lease, when and as produced and sold, in the exact proportion as the individual royalty owner's interest in any tract bore to the aggregate number of acres held by the lessee, its successors or assigns, under lease in the unitized block at the time of production. It provided an example for the construction of this provision, to the effect that if at any time oil, gas, or other minerals should be produced from the land covered by the Veal lease, the lessor in that lease, or any other party executing to the lessee a similar lease on land within the unitized block, should own a 100-acre royalty interest and the lessee held under lease in the unitized block 6,000 acres, then the lessor in the Veal lease, or in any other lease, should be entitled to 100/6000 of the one-eighth or other royalty provided for in the Veal lease. All of the other leases procured and held by appellee in the unitized block contained the same provision, the effect of which was to merge all of the leases into one contract and invest all of the lessors in the unitized block with the right to participate in any royalty from oil, gas, or other minerals produced by The Texas Company on any tract or tracts included in the unitized block.
Appellant's contention is that, inasmuch as this is an action in trespass to try title and does not involve any equitable principles, such as the cancellation of an instrument or the removal of a cloud from title, he has...
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