Belton v. Richland Memorial Hospital, 19946

• Decision Date: 16 January 1975
• Docket Number: No. 19946,19946
• Citation: 263 S.C. 446,211 S.E.2d 241
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Veronica BELTON, by her Guardian ad Litem, Gladys Martin, Appellant, v. RICHLAND MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, f/d/b/a Columbia Hospital, Respondent.

Page 241

211 S.E.2d 241

263 S.C. 446

Veronica BELTON, by her Guardian ad Litem, Gladys Martin, Appellant, v. RICHLAND MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, f/d/b/a Columbia Hospital, Respondent.

No. 19946.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Jan. 16, 1975.

Lourie, Draine & Curlee, Columbia, for appellant.

Richardson & Plowden, Columbia, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This action in tort for personal injuries against Richland Memorial Hospital was commenced in 1974. The complaint alleges that soon after plaintiff's birth in the Columbia Hospital in January, 1954, by the gross, wanton and willful negligence of the defendant, its agents and employees, plaintiff's feet and legs were severely burned, causing her great pain and suffering and permanent disability.

The defendant, conceding that it is successor to and stands in the shoes of the Columbia Hospital but asserting as defenses to the action the doctrine of charitable and sovereign or governmental immunity, moved for summary judgment on both grounds. The circuit court granted the motion upon the ground that this action against the defendant, an agency of Richland County created by statute of the General Assembly, for the tort of its agents, is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Plaintiff has appealed to this Court.

Recognizing, as they must, that the doctrine relied upon by the circuit court is the law of this State and sustains the judgment appealed from, counsel for plaintiff ably and earnestly argue that our prior decisions should be overturned or modified so as to permit plaintiff to maintain this action. The narrow issue to be decided on this appeal is whether this should be done.

In McKenzie v. City of Florence, 234 S.C. 428, 108 S.E.2d 825 (1959), decided some four years after plaintiff's injuries were sustained, we rejected a similar plea by a plaintiff who undertook to sue the City of Florence for the allegedly tortious conduct of its police officers. The opinion of the Court, written by the present Chief Justice, pointed out that the doctrine, first adopted in this jurisdiction in Young v. Commissioners of Roads, 2 Nott. & McCord (11 S.C.L.) 537 (1820), had been adhered to in an unbroken line of decisions, justifying 'the conclusion that it is now agreeable to, and part of the public policy of the state.' The court refused to overrule the doctrine, quoting with approval from Rogers v. Florence Printing Company, 233 S.C. 567, 106 S.E.2d 258 (1958), the following rationale:

"It is often the function of the courts by their judgments to establish public policy where none on the subject exists. But overthrow by the courts of existing public policy is quite another matter. That its establishment may have resulted from decisional, rather than statutory, law, is in our opinion, immaterial. Once firmly rooted, such policy becomes in effect a rule of conduct or of property within the state. In the exercise of proper judicial self-restraint, the courts should...