Belton v. State

• Decision Date: 06 March 1918
• Docket Number: (No. 9412.)
• Citation: 21 Ga.App. 792,95 S.E. 299
• Parties: BELTON. v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

21 Ga.App. 792

95 S.E. 299

BELTON.

v.STATE.

(No. 9412.)

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

March 6, 1918.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from City Court of Swainsboro; Geo. Kirkland, Jr., Judge.

Tom Belton was convicted of receiving stolen goods, his motion for a new trial was overruled, and he excepts. Affirmed.

Williams & Bradley, of Swainsboro, for plaintiff in error.

Alfred Herrington, Jr., Sol., of Swainsboro, for the State.

HARWELL, J. The plaintiff in error was tried under an accusation charging him with the offense of receiving stolen goods, and was found guilty. The trial judge overruled his motion for a new trial, and he excepts.

1. The fourth ground of the motion is to the effect that the accusation charges that the principal thief had pleaded guilty at the July term, 1917, of the superior court, and that there was no proof that the plea was entered at that term; and the fifth ground complains that the court charged the jury that, if they found that a plea had been entered by the principal thief, it was at the July term, 1917, of the superior court. The accusation against the principal thief was preferred at the July term, 1917, of the superior court, a plea of guilty was entered thereon by the principal, and the defendant in this case was tried at the August term, 1917, of the city court, and the judge was doubtless correct in his statement that, if the jury found the plea had been entered, it was at the July term, 1917, of the superior court. At any rate the plea of guilty on the accusation, though not dated, was necessarily entered at some time in July or August prior to the trial in the instant case. One of the material facts which the state must prove, where the offense charged is that of receiving stolen goods, is the guilt of the principal thief. The evidence should show that the principal was convicted or pleaded guilty before the trial of the receiver of the stolen goods, unless the principal is unknown and that fact is alleged. When the principal thief is unknown, and the receiver of the stolen goods is on trial, then every fact, including of course the time of the theft, essential to the conviction of the principal, would have to be proved, as well as that the party on trial received the stolen goods, within the statute of limitations, with knowledge that they were stolen; but when the principal thief has been convicted or has pleaded guilty before the trial of the receiver of the stolen goods, as in the instant case, it is not essential, in order to sustain the conviction, to prove the exact date or term of court when the principal entered a plea of guilty. Licette v. State, 75 Ga. 253; Wright v. State, 1 Ga. App. 158, 57 S. E. 1050.

We think, therefore, that neither of the grounds above referred to affords a reason for the grant of a new trial. The statement of the court that the plea of the principal, if entered, was at the July term, if erroneous, was not such harmful error, under the facts of this case, as to require the grant of a new trial.

2. The sixth ground of the amended motion complains that the judge, in his charge to the jury, failed to state, that, to the accusation preferred, the defendant had entered his plea of not guilty. It appearing that the court charged the jury that, the state "having preferred the charge set out in the accusation, the defendant having entered his plea of not guilty of that charge, the matter is one wholly of fact for your determination, " there is no merit in this ground of the motion.

3. There is no...