Beltran v. O'Mara, No. 04-cv-071-JD.
| Decision Date | 20 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-cv-071-JD. |
| Parties | Christopher BELTRAN, v. James O'MARA, Jr. et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire |
Michael J. Sheehan, Sheehan Law Office, Concord, NH, for Christopher Beltran.
John A. Curran, Elizabeth L. Hurley, Getman Stacey Schulthess & Steere PA, Bedford, NH, for James O'Mara, Jr., FNU Bernier, Scott Cunningham, FNU Dalton, FNU Gordon, FNU Lacerte, FNU Laverge, Brian Martineau, MD FNU Murray, FNU Street and Hillsborough County Department of Corrections.
The defendants, who are the superintendent of the Hillsborough County Department of Corrections, the Department itself, and a number of its correctional officers, have moved to dismiss this action arising out of the plaintiff's detention at the Hillsborough County House of Corrections ("the HCHC") on the ground that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e ("the PLRA"). Alternatively, the defendants have moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff lacks evidence to support his claims and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiff, Christopher Beltran, has filed an objection to each motion.1
Although the defendants have styled their request for dismissal under the PLRA as a motion to dismiss, the motion relies extensively on materials beyond Beltran's complaint and therefore must be treated as a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Greene v. Rhode Island, 398 F.3d 45, 48-49 (1st Cir.2005). Beltran's objection to the motion makes the same point, and he has submitted his own evidentiary materials in response. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss may be converted into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(b) without giving Beltran notice or any additional opportunity to respond. McCord v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 390 F.3d 138, 141 (1st Cir.2004).
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the movant carries this burden, the court must then determine whether the non-moving party has demonstrated a triable issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Beltran's complaint sets forth three separate counts against one or more of the defendants.2 In Count II, Beltran alleges physical abuse at the hands of the individual officers named as defendants in violation of his rights to due process and against cruel and unusual punishment. Count III claims that the superintendent of the Department and the Department itself have abrogated Beltran's right to due process through a pattern and practice of imposing unconstitutional conditions of confinement in the form of the HCHC's restricted housing unit ("the RHU"). Finally, Count V asserts that the superintendent and another defendant, named in the complaint as John Doe and further identified as the official "responsible for conducting reviews of plaintiff's placement within the jail," Compl. ¶ 74, violated Beltran's right to due process by failing to conduct meaningful reviews of his assignment to administrative segregation.3 The court will proceed to set forth the relevant background facts as they pertain to each of the counts, albeit in reverse order.
Beltran entered the HCHC on July 23, 2003, while awaiting trial on two counts of second-degree murder.4 The next day, he was classified as a category 2, or "close" security, inmate, resulting in his placement in administrative segregation. According to the HCHC's inmate handbook, administrative segregation serves "the purpose of maintaining control, and safety" and entails one hour of exercise every third day, with telephone, commissary, and visitation privileges to be determined by the classification officer. Obj. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 1, at 7. The classification officer periodically reviews the status of inmates placed in administrative segregation. In accordance with this policy, the classification committee held a hearing to review Beltran's status roughly every thirty days during his time at the HCHC. Each time, the committee upheld his classification.
The classification notice issued to Beltran on July 24, 2003, stated that "[a]ny inmate who desires to do so may appeal his/her classification ... within ten (10) days of the primary classification or reclassification by addressing the appeal to" the classification department. Mem. Supp. Mots. Dismiss & Summ. J. Ex. D, at 1. This process differs from the three-step "Grievance Procedure" outlined in the inmate handbook. In fact, the handbook specifically provides that "[d]ecisions made by the ... Classification Officer cannot be appealed through the grievance procedure." Obj. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 1, at 14.
The first step of the grievance procedure requires the inmate to "make a genuine attempt to seek an informal resolution of [his] problem with the staff member involved." Id. Should this attempt fail, the inmate can proceed to the second step, which "normally" entails the submission of an "Inmate Request Form" stating the problem and a suggested remedy. Id. The HCHC must answer the request within seven working days. If the inmate is dissatisfied with the HCHC's response, he has forty-eight hours to file a grievance, the third step in the procedure. The HCHC must respond to the grievance within fifteen working days.
Beltran did not appeal his classification at category 2 in the manner specified by the classification notice. Instead, he submitted an "Inmate Request Form" stating, 5 Obj. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 5, at 1. An HCHC official responded that Beltran had been classified based on the information garnered at his classification hearing and that, in any event, his classification would receive its periodic review on August 24, 2003. Beltran did not file a grievance.
Beltran submitted another inmate request form on September 4, 2003, again questioning his placement in administrative segregation. He also asked for a grievance form. In response, an HCHC official wrote that "classification is not an issue that is recognized as grievable," but nevertheless provided the form, noting that "it [would] be given consideration" if filed. Obj. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 5, at 2. Beltran never filed the grievance, but he did submit another request form on December 29, 2003, challenging his placement in administrative segregation. An HCHC official simply wrote "Denied" in response to this request. Id., at 3. Again, Beltran did not file a grievance.
Placement in disciplinary segregation, in contrast to administrative segregation, amounts to Obj. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 1, at 6. Furthermore, inmates in disciplinary segregation receive only one hour of recreation each day, "of which the first portion will be used for cell cleaning and personal hygiene." Id., at 18. Beltran was first sent to the RHU on August 8, 2003, for a period of seven days, following the first of what would be many disciplinary hearings where he was found guilty of violations of HCHC rules.
Based on the portions of Beltran's disciplinary record submitted with the defendants' motion, and the statement in Beltran's objection to the motion to dismiss, Obj. Mot. Dismiss ¶ 23, the HCHC appears to have followed the same process in resolving all of the disciplinary charges against Beltran. See also id., Ex. 1, at 18-19. Specifically, at least twenty-four hours before each hearing, Beltran received a "Notice of Disciplinary Hearing" stating the charges against him. In those instances where Beltran was found guilty, he received written notice of the decision and the resulting sanctions. He then had the opportunity to appeal disciplinary findings to the superintendent by submitting a form included with the decision.
On December 1, 2003, Beltran was found guilty of two further violations of HCHC rules and given three more days in the RHU as a result. Before he had served this time, however, Beltran was found guilty of additional violations at another hearing the next day and sanctioned with additional time in the RHU as a result. He proceeded to spend the remainder of his time at the HCHC in the RHU as the result of a continuous series of guilty findings.
Obj. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 10, at 5. In response, an HCHC official denied these charges and noted that Beltran had not "provided any names [or] specific times and dates of these accusations." Id.
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