Beltran v. State

• Decision Date: 14 October 2015
• Docket Number: NO. PD–1076–14,PD–1076–14
• Citation: 472 S.W.3d 283
• Parties: Ricardo Beltran, Appellant v. The State of Texas
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

472 S.W.3d 283

Ricardo Beltran, Appellant

v.The State of Texas

NO. PD–1076–14

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

DELIVERED: October 14, 2015

Robert Udashen, Dallas, for Appellant.

Michael R. Casillas, Assistant District Attorney, Dallas, Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, for State.

OPINION

Richardson, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Ricardo Beltran was convicted by a jury of murder and sentenced to seventy years' imprisonment. In a single issue on direct appeal, Beltran asserted that the trial court erred in denying his request for an instruction on sudden passion. The Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction because there was no evidence that Beltran caused the victim's death under the immediate influence of sudden passion. We disagree and hold that Beltran was entitled to an instruction on sudden passion. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for a harm analysis in accordance with Almanza v. State.¹

BACKGROUND

A. Ricardo Beltran's Testimony

The only witness to the death of Sheldon McKnight who testified at appellant's trial was appellant, Ricardo Beltran. According to Beltran, on the evening of the murder, he contacted Victor Ramos to buy some heroin. Before meeting with Ramos, Beltran met up with another friend, Alprintice Green, at a DART ("Dallas Area Rapid Transit") station and boarded a train to meet Ramos. Along the way, Beltran and Green stopped near McKnight's apartment so that Green could buy Xanax from McKnight. Beltran testified that he had never met McKnight and did not speak to McKnight at that time. From there, Beltran and Green went to a park where they consumed the Xanax, and then they walked to Ramos's apartment complex to meet Ramos. When they met Ramos at his apartment complex, the three men sat outside and started "getting high" and drinking Jack Daniels. At some point, Green expressed a desire to go home, so Ramos arranged for McKnight to pick them up. McKnight arrived, and the three men got into McKnight's car. McKnight drove Green home, and Beltran then asked to be dropped off at his home, but he changed his mind when Ramos offered to sell him more heroin.

The three men (McKnight, Beltran, and Ramos) then went to McKnight's apartment. McKnight went upstairs while Ramos and Beltran continued to consume more drugs. After a time, McKnight came downstairs to sit on the couch next to Beltran, stroked his face, and told Beltran he was a "pretty little thing." At that point, Beltran asked Ramos to take him home, but Ramos said that they needed to "chill," and McKnight went back upstairs. Ramos and Beltran resumed snorting heroin. McKnight then came back downstairs and told Beltran and Ramos that they had to go upstairs because McKnight was expecting "company." Beltran and Ramos went upstairs while McKnight stayed downstairs. Once upstairs, Beltran and Ramos consumed more drugs. Ramos then went downstairs, leaving Beltran on the bed upstairs. Beltran said that he took off his shoes, laid down, and passed out, with all of his clothes on.

Beltran testified that he was awakened by McKnight "behind him." Beltran was naked from the waist down, and McKnight was licking Beltran's anus. Beltran testified that McKnight was not wearing any clothes.² Beltran said that he "panicked" and "moved" and "all of a sudden [McKnight] jumped on top" of him. Beltran said he was screaming "in panic, not knowing what was going on." Beltran testified that he was facing down and McKnight was "pushing [his] face down [into the pillow] trying to shut [him] up," and that, "all of a sudden," he felt McKnight fall on top of him. Beltran then stated that, "all of a sudden" Ramos was there and had hit McKnight with something. Beltran admitted to being "light-headed" and having "blurred vision," and that he was "trying to get up," and Ramos was "trying to pull [him] from underneath." McKnight then grabbed Ramos, and Beltran said that he "grabbed" McKnight from behind and told Ramos to "get some help." Beltran then testified that "all of a sudden," Ramos started stabbing McKnight, who was "kicking" and "reacting crazy." Beltran said that he continued to tell Ramos to get help, but Ramos just "continued stabbing the man." Beltran held tight to McKnight to "protect" Ramos and himself. Beltran just "closed his eyes for awhile," and Ramos "was still stabbing" McKnight. After they realized McKnight was dead, Beltran, who was "totally naked" and "full of blood everywhere," "just started crying."

Beltran decided to take some of McKnight's clothes since his were covered in blood. Beltran testified that he was "totally shocked," "freaking out," and was "scared." He and Ramos left McKnight's apartment, but returned when Beltran realized that he had left his clothes there. Ramos then suggested that they "make it seem like a robbery," and "take the man's belongings." Beltran said that he wanted to leave quickly, so the two loaded McKnight's car with items from his apartment and drove away in McKnight's car. Beltran then went home and took a shower.

In response to questions regarding what his intentions were that night, Beltran denied that he intended to rob and kill McKnight, he denied killing or stabbing McKnight, he denied knowing where Ramos got the knife used to stab McKnight, and he denied that he intended to help Ramos kill McKnight.

B. The Jury Charge

Beltran was charged with capital murder—causing the death of McKnight while in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. The jury was charged that Beltran could be convicted of either capital murder, or the lesser-included offense of murder, as a principal or as a party.³ The jury was also given a self-defense charge, but, having found Beltran guilty of the lesser-included offense of murder, the jury obviously rejected self-defense.

Following the punishment phase of the trial, Beltran requested that the court include an instruction on sudden passion.⁴ However, the trial court disagreed that Beltran was entitled to a sudden passion instruction.⁵ In the absence of a sudden passion instruction, which would have capped the available punishment at 20 years' imprisonment, the jury assessed punishment at 70 years' imprisonment.

C. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals

On direct appeal, Beltran raised only one issue—that the trial court erred in denying his request for an instruction on sudden passion. The appellate court disagreed with Beltran's argument that his testimony was more than enough evidence to justify a sudden passion instruction. The appellate court stated that, to justify an instruction on sudden passion, the record "must contain some evidence that the defendant acted in an excited and agitated state of mind at the time of the killing." The appellate court held that the record "reflect [ed] the contrary," concluding that "there is no evidence Beltran caused McKnight's death under the immediate influence of sudden passion" and that "the record does not ‘minimally support’ a causal connection between the provocation and homicide."⁶

ANALYSIS

We granted Beltran's petition for discretionary review to determine whether the Fifth Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court correctly denied Beltran's request for a sudden passion instruction.⁷

A. The Law On Sudden Passion

Texas Penal Code Section 19.02(d) provides that,

at the punishment stage of a trial, the defendant may raise the issue as to whether he caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. If the defendant proves the issue in the affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence, the offense is a felony of the second degree.

Section 19.02(a)(1) defines "adequate cause" as "cause that would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection." Section 19.02(a)(2) defines "sudden passion" as passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation by the individual killed or another acting with the person killed which passion arises at the time of the offense and is not solely the result of former provocation."

In June of 2013, this Court unanimously decided the case of Wooten v. State.⁸ The defendant in Wooten was convicted of murder and sentenced to 60 years' imprisonment. In Wooten, as in this case, the defendant's request for a sudden passion instruction was rejected. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed Wooten's conviction, but reversed the trial court's judgment as to punishment, holding that the trial court committed harmful error by not including a sudden passion instruction. We reversed that decision, and held that the error did not harm the defendant. In our Wooten opinion, we included a comprehensive overview of the law on sudden passion:

Prior to September 1, 1994, whether a defendant committed murder under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause was an issue that was litigated at the guilt phase of the trial. If the evidence raised the issue of sudden passion, the question was submitted to the jury, and it had the option of finding the defendant guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. Because of certain anomalies generated by this framework, the Legislature acted in 1993 to remove the crime of voluntary manslaughter from the Texas Penal Code. Under the current statutory scheme, the question of whether a defendant killed while under the immediate influence of sudden passion is a punishment issue.

...The defendant has the burden of production and persuasion with respect to the issue of sudden passion. To justify a jury instruction on the issue of sudden passion at the punishment phase, the record must at least minimally support an inference: 1) that the defendant in fact acted under the immediate influence of a passion such as terror, anger, rage, or resentment; 2) that his

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