Beltway Park Baptist Church, Inc. v. Bolton, 11-18-00049-CV
| Decision Date | 21 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-18-00049-CV,11-18-00049-CV |
| Parties | BELTWAY PARK BAPTIST CHURCH, INC., Appellant v. GUY BOLTON D/B/A BOLTON STEEL ERECTORS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 42nd District Court Taylor County, Texas
This appeal arises from a summary judgment. Appellee, Guy Bolton d/b/a Bolton Steel Erectors, filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that all of the claims asserted by Appellant, Beltway Park Baptist Church, Inc., were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. After conducting a hearing on the motion, the trial court entered an order granting Bolton's motion for summary judgment. The trial court's summary judgment dismissed all of Beltway's causes of action with prejudice. In a single issue, Beltway challenges the summary judgment. It asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the accrual date for its claims. We affirm.
In 2009, Beltway contracted with Bolton to construct improvements on Beltway's property. During the construction, Beltway's facility director noticed that the roof of the building leaked. The next year, in the spring of 2010, Bolton and Goldsmith Construction, the company hired by Beltway to serve as a consultant and onsite supervisor for the work, completed construction of the building. Beltway alleged that, after Bolton turned over the building to Beltway, the building continued to leak every time it rained from 2010 to 2017.
In an e-mail sent on September 19, 2012, Beltway's Administrative Pastor, Bruce Reinhardt, described the situation as follows to representatives of Goldsmith: "[W]e've really put up with a 'new' leaking roof since we moved into the newly constructed areas." This e-mail indicated that Beltway had hired a roofing company to evaluate the building. On October 4, 2012, the roofing company provided Beltway with a written report describing the deficiencies of the building and construction.
Beltway contacted Bolton about the leaking building more than once in 2012. Reinhardt's e-mail of September 19, 2012, stated that Bolton had come out "three times" that year and that "all he [did was] recommend that WE repair things." In that same e-mail, Reinhardt stated that Beltway "deserve[s] a non-leaking roof and it's our full contention that we have paid for that service but have never received the appropriate satisfaction." A month later, in an October 18, 2012 e-mail, Beltway's Director of Facilities, Bobby Copelin, stated that Bolton "went on and on about how he couldn't fix the problem properly because the building wasn't designed right."
The next year, on May 15, 2013, Reinhardt sent an internal e-mail to another pastor at the church, David McQueen. The e-mail reiterated that Beltway was havingproblems with leaking water after rain and stated that Reinhardt had again discussed the issue with Bolton. In the e-mail, Reinhardt stated that Bolton was "lying about our communication[s] with him." Further, Reinhardt discussed "possible litigation if this isn't resolved."
Beltway filed the underlying action on May 13, 2015, asserting causes of action for negligence, gross negligence, breach of contract, breach of duty of good and workmanlike manner, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). Subsequently, Bolton filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that summary judgment was proper because the applicable statutes of limitations barred all of Beltway's claims. In response, Beltway filed an amended petition that added causes of action for fraud and fraud by nondisclosure. Beltway responded to the motion for summary judgment by relying on the discovery rule, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, Bolton's alleged breach of the duty of good faith, estoppel, and the continuing-tort doctrine. After a hearing, the trial court rejected Beltway's arguments and granted Bolton's motion for summary judgment.
Beltway presents a single issue for our review concerning whether it raised a genuine issue of material fact as to the accrual date of its claims and whether the applicable statutes of limitations barred such claims. We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010) (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003)). When reviewing a summary judgment, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant, and resolve any doubts against the motion. Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Pasko, 544 S.W.3d 830, 833 (Tex. 2018) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005)).
When a defendant moves for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of limitations, the defendant has the burden to conclusively establish that defense. KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). To meet this burden, the defendant must conclusively prove when the cause of action accrued and negate the discovery rule, if the discovery rule applies and has been pleaded or otherwise raised. Id. The defendant negates the discovery rule by proving as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding when the plaintiff discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered its injury. Id.
The limitations period for negligence and gross negligence is two years. Hunt Oil Co. v. Live Oak Energy, Inc., 313 S.W.3d 384, 387 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied) ) (negligence); Hall v. Stephenson, 919 S.W.2d 454, 467 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied) ) (gross negligence). A claim for a violation of the DTPA is also subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.565 (West 2011); Nghiem v. Sajib, 567 S.W.3d 718, 720 (Tex. 2019). Claims for breach of contract and fraud are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 203, 216 (Tex. 2011) . A claim for breach of the implied warranty of good and workmanlike manner, when not alleged as a violation of the DTPA, may be subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Nghiem, 567 S.W.3d at 720, 725.
Beltway asserts that its claims did not accrue until May 15, 2013, when, according to Beltway, Bolton made a misrepresentation to convince Beltway to forestall litigation. Beltway bases this assertion on Reinhardt's e-mail to McQueen on May 15, 2013, wherein Reinhardt stated: "Bolton said that he does not want any of us to waste money on a lawsuit so he and a crew will be out tomorrow to fix theroof." As stated by Beltway in its brief: "This case is about a contractor that built a bad building, made representations to the owner that he would fix what he had broken - and even represented if you don't sue me I promise I will fix your building."
The question of when a cause of action accrues is a question of law. Provident Life & Accident Ins., 128 S.W.3d at 221. Generally, a cause of action accrues when facts come into existence that authorize a claimant to seek a judicial remedy, when a wrongful act causes some legal injury, or whenever one person may sue another. Am. Star Energy & Minerals Corp. v. Stowers, 457 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Tex. 2015). For example, a claim for breach of contract accrues when the contract is breached. Cosgrove v. Cade, 468 S.W.3d 32, 39 (Tex. 2015). Bolton asserts that, at the latest, Beltway's causes of action accrued in the fall of 2010 after Beltway moved into the newly constructed portion of the church building and experienced leaks. We agree.
Beltway asserts that the discovery rule deferred the limitations period because the harm was "inherently undiscoverable." The discovery rule defers accrual of a claim until the injured party learned of, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of, the wrongful act causing the injury. Cosgrove, 468 S.W.3d at 36. As the party seeking summary judgment on the affirmative defense of limitations, Bolton had the burden to negate the discovery rule by proving as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of fact about when Beltway discovered or should have discovered the nature of the injury. See B. Mahler Interests, L.P. v. DMAC Constr., Inc., 503 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (citing KPMG Peat Marwick, 988 S.W.2d at 748).
The discovery rule is limited to "circumstances where 'the nature of the injury incurred is inherently undiscoverable and the evidence of injury is objectively verifiable.'" Cosgrove, 468 S.W.3d at 36 . "An injury is inherentlyundiscoverable if it is by nature unlikely to be discovered within the prescribed limitations period despite due diligence." S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1996). An injury is not inherently undiscoverable when it could be discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59, 66 (Tex. 2011). "Knowledge of injury initiates the accrual of the cause of action and triggers the putative claimant's duty to exercise reasonable diligence to investigate the problem, even if the claimant does not know the specific cause of the injury or the full extent of it." Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d at 209.
"The discovery rule may apply to a breach of contract claim, but 'those cases should be rare, as diligent contracting parties should generally discover any breach during the relatively long four-year limitations period provided for such claims.'" Clear Lake Ctr., L.P. v. Garden Ridge, L.P., 416 S.W.3d 527, 543 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013,...
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