Benavente v. Thayer
| Citation | 285 Or.App. 148,395 P.3d 914 |
| Decision Date | 26 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | A157716 |
| Parties | Dominic BENAVENTE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Willy THAYER, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Oregon |
Willard E. Merkel, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Merkel & Associates.
John R. Bachofner, Lake Oswego, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.
Before Duncan, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and Flynn, Judge pro tempore.
FLYNN, J. pro tempore.
Plaintiff appeals from a corrected general judgment1 and from a supplemental judgment awarding attorney fees, which the trial court entered after plaintiff accepted defendant's offer to allow judgment, pursuant to ORCP 54 E. The challenged judgments reflect the trial court's post-acceptance ruling allowing defendant to use the interpleader process of ORCP 31 to resolve third-party interests in the settlement and ordering plaintiff to pay defendant's attorney fees. Plaintiff contends that the court exceeded its authority under ORCP 54 E by "hearing and then granting" defendant's motion for interpleader because the terms of defendant's offer did not provide for interpleader. Defendant contends that the order for interpleader is "consistent" with the terms of the offer of judgment. We conclude that the court erred in granting defendant's motion, because the ruling resulted in judgments that varied from the terms of the offer of judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the supplemental judgment and otherwise affirm.
We pause to provide a brief overview of the two rules of civil procedure that are at the heart of this dispute. As pertinent to this appeal, ORCP 54 E allows the party against whom a claim has been asserted to serve an "offer to allow judgment to be entered against the party making the offer" for the sum of money or other relief specified in the offer. ORCP 54 E(1). The offer serves at least two purposes. If the claiming party accepts the offer and files it under the process described in the rule, ORCP 54 E(2) specifies that, "thereupon judgment shall be given accordingly as a stipulated judgment." The offer to allow judgment can also serve to cut off a party's potential liability for costs and fees if the claiming party rejects the offer; if the claiming party prevails at an adjudication but fails to obtain a judgment more favorable than the offer to allow judgment, then that party "shall not recover costs, prevailing party fees, disbursements, or attorney fees incurred after the date of the offer." ORCP 54 E(3).
The interpleader process of ORCP 31 permits a party that is concerned about potential "double or multiple liability" to bring all competing claims before the court and to let the court sort out the competing claims. ORCP 31 A. As used here, the rule allows a party to deposit with the court property or an amount of money for which the party admits it is liable. The rule then allows the party to obtain both a discharge of liability and an order requiring any parties with interests in the money to resolve their claims only through interpleader in the existing action. See ORCP 31 B. The rule also provides that "the party filing suit or action in interpleader shall be awarded a reasonable attorney fee in addition to costs and disbursements" once the funds are deposited with the clerk of the court. ORCP 31 C.
The material facts in this case are procedural and not in dispute. Plaintiff sued defendant, alleging that defendant negligently caused plaintiff to sustain injuries in a motor vehicle collision. Defendant sent two alternative offers "to allow judgment." One offered "the sum of $32,000, ‘inclusive,’ " specifying that the sum "include[d] plaintiff's obligation to satisfy any and all [Personal Injury Protection (PIP) ] reimbursement, liens, and/or other subrogated interests" that third-parties might have against plaintiff's recovery.2 The alternative offered "the sum of $17,000, ‘new money,’ " specifying that it included plaintiff's obligation to satisfy liens but not an obligation to satisfy the PIP demand for reimbursement. Plaintiff accepted the $32,000 offer.
After plaintiff accepted the offer, but before defendant paid the $32,000, defendant advised plaintiff that it was concerned that it could face further liability if plaintiff failed to satisfy the third-party interests and, thus, that it was presenting plaintiff with two options: either defendant would withhold payment of the $32,000 until it received "written confirmation of lien releases or satisfactions filed with the Recorder's office," or defendant could deposit the $32,000 settlement amount with the court and allow the court to resolve the lien disputes through the interpleader process of ORCP 31.
Plaintiff provided proof that he had satisfied the major lien, but he advised defendant that he intended to dispute the PIP insurer's claim to reimbursement. He wrote that he agreed "to protect and hold harmless" defendant and his insurance company from any claim by the PIP insurer and that he expected defendant to forward the settlement funds without waiting. Defendant disagreed with plaintiff's approach and, before entry of a judgment, defendant filed a motion requesting, among other things, an order "allowing initiation of counterclaims and cross-claims for interpleader" and awarding attorney fees to defendant, pursuant to ORCP 31 C.
The trial court granted defendant's motion for interpleader and attorney fees and entered defendant's proposed form of general judgment, which specified that plaintiff was granted judgment against defendant "in the sum of $32,000." The judgment also specified that, because defendant had deposited the $32,000 with the clerk of the court "pursuant to this Court's Order granting Defendant's Motion for Interpleader, this Judgment shall be marked satisfied in the sum of $32,000."
Two months later, the trial court signed the following documents all on the same day: (1) a "corrected" general judgment that corrected a typographical error in the original general judgment; (2) a supplemental judgment awarding defendant, "pursuant to ORCP 31 C," attorney fees in the amount of $2,000; and (3) an order for the clerk to forward the deposited interpleaded funds to plaintiff, as "no party [had] asserted any claim against the funds and Plaintiff [had] petitioned the Court for release of the funds."3
ORCP 54 E(1). Plaintiff argues that, "once the Offer of Judgment was timely accepted and filed with the [trial court], the [trial court] lacked authority to do anything other than enter a [j]udgment based on the terms of the offer plaintiff accepted," and that hearing and granting defendant's motion exceeded the scope of the court's authority. Defendant emphasizes, however, that the offer of judgment specified that plaintiff, and not defendant, would be responsible for satisfying lien obligations of which both parties were aware. He argues that he and his insurer faced potential liability for the liens asserted by plaintiff's medical providers if they were not paid,5 and that the trial court was authorized to order interpleader as a method of ensuring that the liens would be satisfied in a manner that was "consistent with the express requirements" of the offer of judgment.
We construe the rules of civil procedure, including ORCP 54 E, using 6
Rains v. Stayton Builders Mart, Inc. , 258 Or.App. 652, 657-58, 310 P.3d 1195 (2013). Unless the legislature subsequently amends a rule of civil procedure, our task "is to discern the intent of the Council on Court Procedures, which promulgates the rules." Id .7
The words of the rule, along with its context, are the best evidence of its meaning. See State v. Gaines , 346 Or. 160, 171, 206 P.3d 1042 (2009) (); Duvall v. McLeod , 331 Or. 675, 679, 21 P.3d 88 (2001) (). Here, plaintiff's argument focuses on the language that, if the party making the claim has accepted, endorsed and filed the offer, "thereupon shall judgment be given accordingly as a stipulated judgment." Considering first the ordinary meaning of the words, we have explained that when the legislature uses the word "shall," the term ordinarily expresses a mandatory obligation. See Ajir v. Buell , 270 Or.App. 575, 580-81, 348 P.3d 320 (2015) ().
We have explained that "accordingly" means " ‘in conformity with a given set of circumstances,’ ‘as a consequence,’ or ‘as a logical outcome.’ " Pioneer Resources, LLC v. D. R. Johnson Lumber Co. , 187 Or.App. 341, 362, 68 P.3d 233, rev. den. , 336 Or. 16, 77 P.3d 319 (2003) (quoting Webster's at 12). Those ordinary meanings of the text support plaintiff's argument that the trial court must enter a judgment that conforms to the terms on which the parties have agreed.
Our construction of the phrase "judgment shall be given accordingly" is also informed by our decision in Miller v....
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