Benedict Pineapple Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
| Decision Date | 20 April 1908 |
| Parties | BENEDICT PINEAPPLE CO. v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Orange County; Minor S. Jones, Judge.
Action by the Benedict Pineapple Company against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. Demurrer to the amended declaration was sustained, and, plaintiff refusing to further amend judgment was entered for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed and remanded.
Syllabus by the Court
A demurrer or a ground thereof that in effect merely states that a declaration or a count therein is bad in substance, or fails to allege a cause of action, does not comply with the statute requiring the substantial matters of law intended to be argued to be stated, and will not avail as a demurrer unless it plainly appears from a reading of the declaration or count that it does not, by direct statements, or by fair inferences drawn therefrom, contain all the essentials of a cause of action.
The right of a railroad company to run its engines and trains over its tracks is coupled with the duty to so operate the engine as not to negligently injure the property of others near the track. The duty arises by implication of law out of the relation of the parties to each other and the circumstances of the case.
The negligent act or omission for which a party is liable in damages is one that proximately, i. e., in ordinary, natural sequence, causes or contributes to causing an injury to another, when no independent, efficient cause intervenes, and the injured party is not at fault.
Liability for negligence extends to all its natural, probable, and ordinary results. An injury that under the circumstances is the natural, probable, and ordinary result of a negligent act or omission is in law held to have been contemplated by the negligent party as a probable and proximate result of the negligence, when he is informed, or by ordinary observation would have been informed, of the facts and circumstances attending the negligence.
The ordinary conditions or forces of nature, such as ordinary wind, cold, heat, and the like, that are usual at the time and place and under the circumstances, and that reasonably should have been expected or foreseen as probably to occur are not, in general, independent, efficient causes, when they affect or operate upon a negligent act or omission in causing an injurious result.
Those who are negligent are held in law to know the usual effect of ordinary, natural conditions and forces upon a negligent act or omission, and to have contemplated the probable effect of such conditions and forces upon their negligence or upon its proximate results, and to be liable in damages for the natural and probable proximate results of the negligence.
Where an action is brought for an injury that is the result of the negligence of the defendant and of some other contributing cause not an independent efficient cause, and the result could not have been produced in the absence of either contributing cause, the defendant's negligence is a proximate cause of the injury, if, under the circumstances attending the defendant's negligence, the injury was a probable, natural, and usual result of the two contributing causes that the defendant is held to have contemplated, and the plaintiff or those for whom he is responsible did not contribute proximately to the injury.
Where a means such as a cover has been provided by the owner of property to protect it from an injury that will probably occur, and such cover is, without the fault of the owner injured or destroyed by the negligence of another, who under the circumstances of the case knew, or should have known, of the use to which the cover was applied and of the injury that would probably result from the destruction of the cover, and the destruction of the cover defeats the sole purpose for which it was used, damages may be recovered for injuries to the property that was so protected, which proximately follow or result from the destruction of the cover provided for the protection of the property injured.
Owners of property have a right to use it in any manner desired that is not inconsistent with the rights of others. This includes the right of those having land near a railroad track to place a canvas cover over plants growing on the land, and the mere fact that the cover is within the reach of sparks of fire emitted from locomotive engines passing on the track near by does not relieve the railroad company from liability for its negligence in permitting sparks to escape from the engine and burn the cover.
Where cover is put over growing plants and fruit to protect them from ordinary and usual cold and frost, and the cover is burned by the negligence of another, injury to the growing plants and fruit by ordinary and usual cold and frost that should have been expected at the time and place of the negligence is not such an act of God as will relieve from liability the party who negligently burned the cover.
Where negligence is the basis of recovery, the declaration should contain allegations of the negligent act or omission of the defendant, and also allegations of facts to show injury to the plaintiff, and that such injury was a proximate result of the negligence alleged.
A declaration, which states that the defendant railroad company 'so carelessly and negligently managed and operated one of its locomotives * * * that fire escaped therefrom and set fire to the canvas cover of cloth with which a pinery belonging to the plaintiff and situated near to the track of the defendant * * * was covered, and burned a large part, to wit, about one acre of said cover,' and alleges damages in a stated amount, is sufficient to authorize a recovery of general damages or such as necessarily result from the burning of the canvas cover to the extent of its value within the stated amount.
In an action for damages, where it is in effect alleged that in the month of January the defendant negligently burned the cover used to protect growing plants and fruit from injury by ordinary cold and frost usual 'in the winter season' at the place of the negligence, of which use to prevent probable injury the defendant knew, or should have known, that shortly after the burning of the cover the plants and fruit were injured by frost and cold, which injury defendant should have anticipated, and that the injury 'was caused by the negligence of the defendant in burning part of the cover as aforesaid,' and damages are claimed, it is not necessary to allege 'that at the time of the occurrence of the fire the weather was such that cold and forst could be anticipated by the defendant,' or 'that in the month of January cold and frost of such character as to damage growing plants ordinarily occurred.' The court knows judicially that January is in the winter season. If frost or cold of any degree injured the plants and fruit, as a proximate result of the defendant's negligence, under the circumstances as alleged, the extent of the cold or the condition of the weather at the time of the negligence are not material.
An allegation that injury to growing plants and fruit by frost and cold occurred after and as a result of the negligent burning of the coved used to protect the plants and fruit from frost and cold sufficiently connects by ordinary, natural sequence the negligence and the injury.
In view of the peculiar risks and duties of railroad companies in the use of dangerous machinery running rapidly and carrying fire along the lines of road, the statutes of the state provide that railroad companies shall be liable for any damage to property by the running of trains or other machinery, unless the companies shall make it appear that their agents have exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence, the presumption in all cases being against the companies, and that, if the complainant and the agents of the companies are both at fault, the former may recover, but the damages shall be diminished or increased by the jury in proportion to the amount of default attributable to the complainant. Under these statutes, a complainant has a right of action for the negligence of a railroad company, even if he has also been negligent, but the amount of recovery is affected by the complainant's negligence.
Where a declaration states a cause of action for any recovery, a demurrer thereto should be overruled.
Massey & Warlow, for plaintiff in error.
Sparkman & Carter, for defendant in error. On a former writ of error the original declaration in this cause was held to be defective, and a judgment obtained against the railroad company was reversed. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Benedict Pineapple Co., 52 Fla. 165, 42 So. 529.
The amended declaration is as follows:
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