Benford v. State

Decision Date27 October 1981
Docket Number6 Div. 496
Citation435 So.2d 1327
PartiesWalter Davis BENFORD v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Roderick Beddow, Jr. and Steven R. Garrett, of Beddow, Fullan & Vowell, Birmingham, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen. and Elizabeth Ann Evans, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

LEIGH M. CLARK, Retired Circuit Judge.

A jury found defendant (appellant) guilty of manslaughter (Code 1975, § 13A-6-3) after a trial on an indictment charging him with murder (Code § 13A-6-2) of David Harris, by shooting him with a pistol. The court sentenced him to imprisonment for ten years.

No issue is raised on appeal as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, and we find no reasonable basis for such an issue. We limit our summary of the evidence to portions thereof that have some bearing upon the issues presented.

The evidence shows without dispute that about noon, March 21, 1980, the deceased was killed by a bullet from a pistol in the possession of defendant, while the two were in or about the front yard of 1504--31st Street Ensley, which was residential property owned by the deceased and his fiancee and which at the time was unoccupied as a residence and was undergoing improvements in anticipation of its future occupancy by the engaged couple.

Some of the work had been done by defendant, a general contractor, particularly some tile work in the bathroom, sheetrocking some walls, putting in a window and placing wallpaper on some walls. They came to an agreement as to the work to be done and the price to be paid therefor but had reached a disagreement as to the quality of the work performed by defendant, particularly as to the tile in the bathroom, which disagreement led to the confrontation that resulted in the death of Mr. Harris. The defendant was contending that he was entitled to be paid as agreed upon, and Mr. Harris was contending that the work was not satisfactory and payment should not then be made.

Mr. Harris had discussed what he considered unsatisfactory workmanship with Leroy Dumas, another contractor. Mr. Harris and Mr. Dumas were together a large part of the morning of the alleged homicide, during which time Mr. Dumas inspected the work that had been performed by defendant and was in the process of planning some additional work on the house. They were together at the house when defendant arrived in a truck about 11:00 or 11:30 A.M. With the defendant were Andrew McCall and a man by the name of Ashley.

Leroy Dumas testified on call of the State and Andrew McCall, as well as the defendant, testified on call of the defendant. They and Ashley, who did not testify, were the only living persons who saw and heard what occurred at or about the house until about a half hour later, when Mr. Harris was killed and was left lying in the front yard pending arrival soon thereafter of law enforcement authorities.

A material part of the testimony of the defendant was as follows:

"Q. All right. Then what occurred, sir?

"A. We started into the house. And when we started in he [David Harris] went in first and stopped at the hall. And I started down the hall going to the bathroom. The bathroom is at the end of the hall that goes halfway of the house.

"And I could hear him in behind me telling McCall that if he was with me to leave because I was going to do that.

"Q. Now, between the time that you talked to him there at the door and going back to the bathroom, did you notice anything on Mr. Harris' person?

"A. I noticed he had a gun then. But I really wasn't paying that much attention because I wasn't thinking about it.

"Q. All right. He had a gun. Where did he have the gun?

"A. It was stuck in his belt.

"Q. All right. When he told McCall to leave, what did you do or say, if anything?

"A. Well, the harshness that he said it in made me look back at him. And then I said let's go. I went right past both of them and out the door. Mr. Harris followed me and said wait a minute, I want to hold up my half--

"MR. ADAMS: We object, not responsive.

"THE COURT: Sustained.

"Q. All right. You went out the door. Do you know where Mr. McCall was at this time?

"A. Behind me.

"Q. Did you know where Mr. Ashley was at this time?

"A. On the porch.

"...

"Q. What did you do, if anything, then?

"A. Well, Harris had a gun. So, I took the gun that was in the truck and put it up under my jacket in my belt.

"Q. Did you put it in either one of your pockets?

"A. It wouldn't fit in the pocket.

"Q. All right. Where was the gun? Where did you put it?

"A. Into my belt up under my jacket.

"...

"Q. All right. Then what occurred, sir?

"A. At that time he had walked up to me. And when he got close enough to me he hit me. He hit me with his--He really didn't sound like he was going to hit me when he was talking because he was talking about too many different things.

"Q. All right. What did he do? That's what I asked you?

"A. Oh. He hit me with his hand and knocked me back against the car.

"Q. All right. How far were you away from the car at the time and on the occasion that you struck?

"A. I had just come around the car. About 18 inches.

"Q. When he hit you and knocked you back to the truck, what occurred then, Mr. Benford?

"A. Well, he said, 'I ought to shoot you right now.' And he hit me and pulled his gun. And by me falling--

"Q. All right. When he pulled the gun what did he have the gun in?

"A. In that glove, but it stayed in the glove.

"Q. When he pulled the gun what happened to the glove?

"A. Nothing. It stayed in the glove.

"Q. All right. What occurred then when he pulled the gun?

"A. I was falling. And I sort of knocked him off balance, I guess, because he was falling toward me as I was falling back against the car.

"Q. All right. Then what happened?

"A. I tried to get the gun out and before I could get it completely out it went off. And it almost shot me. It did scrape across my hand. And I caught my balance and he went down on one knee. He had dropped his gun. So, he reached over to get his gun and I clicked back on the gun that I had. And he said don't shoot me anymore."

The parties seem to agree that the testimony of Leroy Dumas as a whole was more favorable to the State and less favorable to defendant than was the testimony of Andrew McCall. Some differences in the testimony of the eyewitnesses are attributable, we think, to the fact that they were not all at the same place on the premises at the same time and were therefore not in a position to be in absolute agreement as to all that occurred.

The evidence as a whole, including the testimony of defendant, justified the submission of the issue of guilt vel non as to each of the three kinds of unlawful homicide, murder, manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide ( § 13A-6-4).

A major contention of appellant is that the trial court erred in overruling defendant's motion for a mistrial. As a preface, appellant sets forth the following portion of the transcript occurring during the direct examination by the State of the fiancee of the deceased:

"Q. Okay. Did Mr. Harris talk with him on that occasion?

"A. Yes, sir, he did.

"Q. And then did he say anything to you after the conversation with Mr. Benford?

"A. Yes.

"MR. BEDDOW: Judge, just a minute, I object to that, may it please the Court.

"THE COURT: What did he say? All right.

"MR. ADAMS: Judge, I want to show that this statement he made was a threat. He threatened to burn the man's house down, ..."

Other portions of the transcript show that the conversation referred to in the portion quoted above was a telephone conversation between defendant and Mr. Harris that occurred early on the morning of Mr. Harris' death and while he and his fiancee were together at a house some distance from 1504--31st Street, Ensley, which the witness did not hear. Immediately after the quoted portion of the transcript, counsel for defendant interposed an objection to further proceedings in the presence of the jury at the time and the jury was then excused for lunch, somewhat prematurely but conveniently, in order that the parties through their counsel could present to the court their respective positions as to what the State proposed to show and as to what special prosecutor for the State had just stated. A discussion ensued in which State's counsel took the position that it should be allowed to show by the witness that Mr. Harris told the witness immediately after the conversation between him and defendant that the defendant had "threatened to burn Mr. Harris' house down." During an early part of the discussion, the following occurred:

"MR. BEDDOW: ...

"That would be the rankest sort of hearsay. And then counsel, representing the State of Alabama made the declaration before the jury, I want to prove there was a threat and I want to prove that this man burned--threatened to burn Mr. Harris' house down.

"I think it's highly improper. Number one, it's hearsay. And--

"MR. ADAMS: Judge, I think it--

"MR. BEDDOW: --Number two, it's a declaration or an offer to prove before the witness something that is irreparable and irretrievable. And we are going to ask for a mistrial."

Thereupon, counsel for the State commenced a reply in part as follows:

"MR. ADAMS: Judge, first of all I want to address a point, and that is, that that is an exception to the hearsay rule. I can give you the exception in a moment that deals with it."

Thereupon, counsel quoted Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 273.02 (1977) as follows:

"If it is material to prove that a person at a specified time had been put on notice about a matter, or entertained a specified belief, acted in good or bad faith, had a specified motive to do or not to do an act or to do an act with a specified motive, or was mentally deranged, proof that a statement was made to him prior to the time in question which was reasonably calculated to create, and which is offered for the...

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