Benge v. Superior Court
| Decision Date | 29 April 1982 |
| Citation | 182 Cal.Rptr. 275,131 Cal.App.3d 336 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Hoyt BENGE et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF TULARE COUNTY, Respondent; MAC MACHINES et al., Real Parties in Interest. Civ. 6841. |
This case involves four consolidated actions filed by 32 plaintiffs. Plaintiffs (hereinafter petitioners) are suing real parties in interest for damages resulting from lead poisoning which occurred when petitioners worked at the Visalia Prestolite Battery plant. Petitioners are members of a local chapter of the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Workers of America (hereinafter union).
In the summer of 1976, two union meetings were held at the Goshen Community Center. Only members of the union working at the Prestolite plant were invited to the meetings. Two attorneys retained by the union also were present. At the meetings, certain members apparently made statements concerning lead dust conditions at the plant. The attorneys advised the members of their legal rights concerning the lead dust. Of the approximately 65 union members present at the meeting, 32 ultimately retained one of the attorneys, Mr. Biren, to represent them in the instant action.
During depositions, real parties in interest sought to elicit information regarding the contents of the communications made at the meetings between the union members and their attorneys. Petitioners objected and refused to answer the questions claiming the attorney-client privilege.
Real parties in interest then moved in the superior court to compel answers to the questions and for a protective order in connection with future depositions of petitioners. Real parties in interest argued that what occurred at the meeting is relevant to the issue of whether the statute of limitations bars petitioners' suit, i.e., when petitioners knew or reasonably should have known they had a potential cause of action. A trial on the single issue of the statute of limitations is set for May 3, 1982.
The superior court granted the motions to compel answers. Petitioners were ordered to disclose the following information about the union meetings: (a) persons present; (b) identity of persons who spoke; (c) identification of written documents circulated; (d) testimony concerning what was said by the speakers at the meetings; (e) what was specifically said at the meetings which caused petitioners to believe they had a cause of action against real parties in interest; (f) how petitioners became parties in the lawsuit; and (g) all facts and events which transpired at the meetings relating to the issue of lead intoxication or lead poisoning alleged to have been contracted by petitioners as a result of working at the Prestolite Battery plant.
When petitioners refused to comply with the disclosure order, contempt proceedings were initiated in the superior court. Thereafter, the California Supreme Court granted petitioners a hearing and transferred the matter to this court with directions to issue an alternative writ of mandate to be heard before the court. The Supreme Court also granted a stay of the contempt hearing in the superior court; the stay to continue in effect pending final determination of this matter by this court.
For reasons to be explained, we hold that petitioners have an attorney-client privilege with respect to all communications made at the meeting between petitioners and the other union members and the attorneys concerning the alleged lead dust at the Prestolite plant. Accordingly, we will issue a writ to set aside the trial court's order compelling petitioners to disclose the contents of the privileged communications made at the meetings.
Mr. Biren worked for a law firm which was on a retainer to the union. The retainer agreement required the firm to provide legal advice to the union and its members.
At the request of the full-time union representative assigned to the Visalia area, Biren was asked to attend a special meeting of union members working at the Visalia Prestolite facility. Biren attended the meeting to obtain information concerning the lead poisoning situation, to evaluate possible litigation, and to advise the union and its members of their rights.
Biren emphasized in a supplemental declaration that the meeting in question was not a regular union meeting because it was open only to union members who worked in the Visalia Prestolite facility. The local union is an amalgamated union which includes employees from many different facilities. Employees from other facilities were not invited to attend nor did they attend. The only persons present besides the Prestolite members were the two attorneys and possibly a doctor.
Biren declared the meeting was scheduled for a dual purpose. The union wanted him to advise it concerning its legal rights relative to the lead poisoning and as provided under the collective bargaining agreement in effect between Prestolite and the union. In addition, the union also requested that Biren consult with the individual members, collectively, concerning their individual right to take action against the company under the workers' compensation law as well as against third parties who might have contributed to the lead poisoning. Finally, Biren was asked by the union to advise the members concerning the advantage of a concerted action by the employees against the employer through the workers' compensation laws as contrasted with third party lawsuits.
Lewis Gonsolus, one of the petitioners, provided the following information during a deposition taken in August of 1981. Two meetings were held in the summertime of 1976 in which the union members consulted with the attorneys. Gonsolus was informed of the lead hazard just prior to the first meeting via a pamphlet provided by the union. The first meeting was a regular monthly meeting attended by the union employees, local union representatives and two attorneys. Gonsolus was told about the lead poisoning at this meeting. Gonsolus stated that prior to the first meeting he had not hired an attorney to represent him in filing a lawsuit against Prestolite, nor did he have an attorney personally representing him at the meeting. He also indicated he did not know there was going to be a discussion at the meeting regarding lead dust or health problems. 2 The second meeting was held for the purpose of instigating a lawsuit. Gonsolus had been informed prior to the meeting that attorneys would be present. Apparently Gonsolus decided to participate in the lawsuit at the second meeting.
Candelario Ramos, another petitioner, was deposed in November of 1981. Ramos was the president of the local union at the time the 1976 meetings took place. He stated the attorneys were present at the first meeting because, "My membership, I think, was just disturbed by the fact that they were being laid off for having lead, high lead count after seeing the doctor and they were upset about the fact that every time they were laid off, they had to wait to get their pay after they were laid off a week or so, and they wanted to get some legal advice on that." Ramos and other members had requested the local full-time union representative to provide legal counsel. Ramos indicated the members were concerned about their rights under the workers' compensation law; however, no request was made for legal advice concerning lead in the plant. Ramos stated at the time of the meeting no attorneys had been retained to represent any of the union members in the present action. Union members were present at the meeting who did not become plaintiffs in the instant case.
Ramos also testified that a special second meeting was held shortly after the first meeting and the attorneys again were present. There may have been members present who did not become plaintiffs in this lawsuit. The meeting was for the benefit of union members who wished to discuss with the attorneys the lead poisoning in the plant. According to Ramos, the substance of the conversations between the members and the attorneys related to "What our feelings were on taking any legal course of action."
Elaine House, a supervisor at the Prestolite plant and a union official, was deposed in late 1981 and early 1982. She stated that prior to the 1976 meetings, both the international union and the local members were very concerned about excessive lead levels in the plant. The first meeting was held because employees had been complaining about the three-day waiting period for disability. In her position as an union official, House contacted the local full-time union representative and requested legal counselling. The first meeting with the attorneys was not a regularly scheduled meeting but a special meeting to address the workers' compensation issue. It was after the first meeting that House decided to retain counsel.
The basic policy behind the attorney-client privilege is to promote the relationship between attorney and client by safeguarding the confidential disclosures of the client and the advice given by the attorney. This policy supports a liberal construction in favor of the exercise of the privilege. (American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 579, 593, 113 Cal.Rptr. 561; see Lohman v. Superior Court (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Mitchell v. Superior Court of Fresno County
...has held the basic policy supports a liberal construction in favor of the exercise of the privilege. (Benge v. Superior Court (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 336, 344, 182 Cal.Rptr. 275; citing American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 579, 593, 113 Cal.Rptr. 561; Lohman v. ......
-
Ghidoni v. Stone Oak, Inc.
...communications in the course of such preliminary discussions are subject to the attorney-client privilege (Benge v. Superior Court, 131 Cal.App.3d 336, 182 Cal.Rptr. 275, 280 (1982); Taylor v. Sheldon, 172 Ohio St. 118, 173 N.E.2d 892, 895 (1961); McCormick, Evidence (3d ed. 1984) Sec. 88, ......
-
Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Superior Court
...(Cal. Law Revision Com. com. to Evid. Code, § 952, 29B West's Ann. Evid.Code (1966 ed.) pp. 528-529.)" (Benge v. Superior Court (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 336, 346, 182 Cal.Rptr. 275.) California courts have held that "the `privilege extends to communications which are intended to be confidentia......
-
People v. Gionis
...by the attorney. This policy supports a liberal construction in favor of the exercise of the privilege." (Benge v. Superior Court (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 336, 344, 182 Cal.Rptr. 275.) Second, Evidence Code section 951 defines a "client" under the attorney-client privilege as "a person who, di......
-
Chapter 4 - §4. Attorney-client privilege
...privilege should be broadly construed in favor of the party asserting the privilege. Benge v. Superior Ct. (5th Dist.1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 336, 344. The privilege is absolute and can take precedence even over a criminal defendant's trial rights. Bell, 7 Cal.5th at 96; Carroll v. Comm'n on Tc......
-
Table of Cases null
...§12.2.2(1); §14.2.4 Bellis v. U.S., 417 U.S. 85, 94 S. Ct. 2179, 40 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1974)—Ch. 4-C, §3.2.3(1) Benge v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. App. 3d 336, 182 Cal. Rptr. 275 (5th Dist. 1982)—Ch. 4-C, §4.1; §4.2.2(3)(d) Bennett v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. App. 5th 862, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 693 (......
-
Accessing the Black Box - What Every Estate Attorney Needs to Know About Attorney-client Privilege
...Co. v. O'Connor, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1011.18. Ibid.19. Id. at p. 1003.20. Id. at p. 1011.21. Benge v. Superior Court (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 336.22. Id. at p. 342.23. Id. at pp. 341-342.24. Id. at pp. 340-342.25. Id. at p. 340.26. Benge v. Superior Court, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. ......