Benham v. Pryke, s. FTL001623 and FTL00945 and C

Decision Date21 March 1985
Docket NumberNos. 82CA1378,84CA0227,Nos. FTL001623 and FTL00945 and C,s. FTL001623 and FTL00945 and C,s. 82CA1378
Citation703 P.2d 644
PartiesRobert S. BENHAM, as Receiver of Manufacturers and Wholesalers Indemnity Exchange, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John William PRYKE, as lead Underwriter personally and as Representative of those certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, Under Lloyd's Policiesover Notes U73167A and U7316B; and Excess Insurance Co., LTD., Defendants-Appellees. . I
CourtColorado Court of Appeals

Holmes & Starr, P.C., Sidney W. DeLong, Kenneth L. Starr, Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.

Kenneth C. Groves, Philip A. Rouse, Jr., Denver, for defendants-appellees.

PIERCE, Judge.

Plaintiff, the receiver of Manufacturers and Wholesalers Indemnity Exchange (M & W), appeals the summary judgment in favor of defendants, underwriters of Lloyd's of London (the reinsurers). This is an action to recover proceeds claimed to be due under assessment liability reinsurance policies issued by the reinsurers to some subscribers of M & W. We reverse.

M & W was an interinsurance exchange governed by § 10-13-101, et seq., C.R.S. Consequently, M & W subscribers were subject to contingent assessment liability if M & W's liabilities in a given year exceeded its assets. Some subscribers, to negate this risk, purchased reinsurance certificates from the reinsurers to cover possible assessment liability. The terms of reinsurance coverage were provided for in a "Master Agreement" between the subscribers of M & W and the reinsurers. We ruled in Benham v. Pryke, 636 P.2d 1339 (Colo.App.1981) that the currency of the Master Agreement extended until the termination of outstanding reinsurance certificates.

M & W was placed in receivership in 1975, and, in February 1977, the trial court ordered the receiver to levy assessments against all M & W subscribers whose policies were in effect during 1974 and 1975.

Subsequent to Benham, supra, the parties undertook discovery, and filed motions including motions for summary judgment. M & W in support of its motion submitted documents consisting of: the Master Agreement; a computer printout indicating the serial number of each reinsurance certificate, the name of the subscriber, the period of insurance, and the premium charged; a copy of the statements received from Lloyd's of London billing M & W for the issuance of certificates; a copy of M & W's check paying the premium for such issuance; and an affidavit by a custodian of M & W's files testifying from personal knowledge as to these documents.

I.

The reinsurers first argue that M & W's production of only a computer printout as evidence of the existence of the certificates is legally insufficient and entitles the reinsurers to a summary judgment. We disagree.

In Benham, supra, we said:

"The ultimate question then remains as to whether reinsurance coverage existed at the time of the 1977 assessment, and a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether any certificates of reinsurance were issued so as to be in force at the time of the 1977 assessment."

Because such issues of material fact, and others, remained for resolution, we remanded and reversed a dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief granted in favor of defendants. Those same questions of material fact still remain unresolved at this time. By granting summary judgment without trial on these issues the court ruled improperly on the credibility of the proposed evidence in conjunction with the motion for summary judgment. See Discovery Land & Development Co. v. Colorado-Aspen Development Corp., 40 Colo.App. 292, 577 P.2d 1101 (1977).

The admissibility of the computer printout is governed by the rules of relevancy, authentication, and hearsay. M & W's documentation addresses the existence, issuance, and duration of the reinsurance certificates; thus, it is relevant. CRE 403. Although Colorado appellate courts have not addressed the issue of authentication of computer printouts, the notes of the advisory committee on the identical federal rule, Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(9), state that the rule applies to computer-generated information. Additionally, CRE 1001(3) states that if data are stored in a computer, any printout shown to reflect the data accurately is an "original." Thus, authenticity should not be a bar here.

Computer records which are material and relevant are admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule if (1) the computer entries are made in the regular course of business; (2) those participating in the record making were acting in the routine of business; (3) the input procedures were accurate; (4) the entries are made within a reasonable time of the transaction involved; and (5) the information was transmitted by a reliable person with knowledge of the event reported. Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo.1984); see United States...

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2 cases
  • People v. Huehn, No. 00CA0505.
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • 17 Enero 2002
    ...evidence. B. The admissibility of a computer printout is governed by the rules of relevancy, authentication, and hearsay. Benham v. Pryke, 703 P.2d 644 (Colo.App.1985), rev'd on other grounds, 744 P.2d 67 (Colo.1987). The relevancy of the computer records in this case is not The requirement......
  • Benham v. Pryke
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • 5 Octubre 1987
    ...Rouse, Jr., Denver, for respondents. VOLLACK, Justice. We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in Benham v. Pryke, 703 P.2d 644 (Colo.App.1985). The court of appeals held that under a reinsurance agreement, assessment liability coverage was available only for those su......
1 books & journal articles
  • Authentication
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Lawyer No. 25-9, September 1996
    • Invalid date
    ...there was evidence that the instrument used was functioning properly and that the surveyor was a competent operator). 46. Benham v. Pryke, 703 P.2d 644 (Colo.App. 1985); see also C.R.E. 1001(3). 47. C.R.E. 901(b)(10). 48. CRS §§ 13-25-126, 19-4-112, 19-4-113. 49. CRS § 42-7-504. 50. C.R.E. ......

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