Benisek v. Lamone

• Decision Date: 24 August 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. JKB–13–3233
• Citation: 266 F.Supp.3d 799
• Parties: O. John BENISEK, et al., Plaintiffs v. Linda H. LAMONE, et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

266 F.Supp.3d 799

O. John BENISEK, et al., Plaintiffs

v.Linda H. LAMONE, et al., Defendants

CIVIL NO. JKB–13–3233

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Filed August 24, 2017

Michael B. Kimberly, E. Brantley Webb, Micah David Stein, Paul Whitfield Hughes, Stephen Medlock, Mayer Brown LLP, Katherine Monks, Mayer Brown, Washington, DC, Susan Millenky, Patterson Belknap Webb and Tyler LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Jeffrey Lewis Darsie, Jennifer L. Katz, Sarah W. Rice, Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants.

Before Niemeyer, Circuit Judge, and Bredar and Russell, District Judges.

MEMORANDUM

Bredar, District Judge.

On May 31, 2017, Plaintiffs O. John Benisek, et al. ("Plaintiffs") filed a Rule 65(a) Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and to Advance and Consolidate the Trial on the Merits or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 177.) The State responded on June 30, 2017, with a Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 186.) Both motions have been briefed. On June 28, 2017, this three-judge Court set in a hearing on Plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion. On its own motion, the Court directed the parties to also address whether further proceedings in this case should be stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision in Gill v. Whitford , No. 16–1161, a political gerrymandering case set to be argued in the forthcoming Term. A hearing on both matters was held on July 14, 2017.¹

For the reasons explained below, the Court now DENIES Plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion and STAYS this case pending the outcome of Whitford . As set forth in Part II.B, Judge Bredar concludes that such action is necessary because the justiciability of political gerrymandering claims remains in doubt, but the Supreme Court will likely resolve or clarify this threshold jurisdictional matter in its Whitford decision. As set forth in Part II.C, Judges Bredar and Russell conclude that Plaintiffs have not made an adequate preliminary showing that they will likely prevail on the causation element of their First Amendment retaliation claim. While the Court by no means excludes the possibility that Plaintiffs may ultimately prevail, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they are entitled to the extraordinary (and, in this case, extraordinarily consequential) remedy of preliminary injunctive relief. A stay pending further guidance in Whitford is appropriate at this juncture.

As set forth in his dissenting opinion, Judge Niemeyer would grant Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief.

I. Procedural History

A review of the recent history of this redistricting case may prove helpful. Following a remand from the Supreme Court on a procedural issue, see Shapiro v. McManus (Shapiro I ), ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 450, 193 L.Ed.2d 279 (2015), the case was assigned to a three-judge panel composed of Circuit Judge Niemeyer and District Judges Bredar and Russell. (ECF No. 42.) On March 3, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint challenging Maryland's 2011 congressional districting map as an unconstitutional political gerrymander. (ECF No. 44.) The State moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 51.)

On August 24, 2016, the Court denied the State's motion to dismiss in a 2–1 decision, with Judge Bredar dissenting. See Shapiro v. McManus (Shapiro II ), 203 F.Supp.3d 579 (D. Md. 2016). In its ruling, the panel majority held that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint stated a justiciable claim for relief. The majority went on to endorse a standard for assessing political gerrymandering claims under the First Amendment:

When applying First Amendment jurisprudence to redistricting, we conclude that, to state a claim, the plaintiff must allege that those responsible for the map redrew the lines of his district with the specific intent to impose a burden on him and similarly situated citizens because of how they voted or the political party with which they were affiliated. In the context of redistricting, this burden is the injury that usually takes the form of vote dilution .... [T]o establish the injury element of a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show that the challenged map diluted the votes of the targeted citizens to such a degree that it resulted in a tangible and concrete adverse effect.... Finally, the plaintiff must allege causation —that, absent the mapmakers' intent to burden a particular group of voters by reason of their views, the concrete adverse impact would not have occurred.

When a plaintiff adequately alleges the three elements of intent, injury, and causation ... he states a plausible claim that a redistricting map violates the First Amendment and Article I, § 2. Of course ... the State can still avoid liability by showing that its redistricting legislation was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.

Id. at 596–97.²

Following the Court's decision at the pleading stage, the parties entered a contentious period of discovery, which resulted in voluminous procedural rulings that need not be reviewed here. At the conclusion of this discovery period, the parties filed their pending motions. (ECF Nos. 177, 186.)

As explained more fully in Part II, the Court concludes that preliminary injunctive relief is inappropriate at this stage because Plaintiffs have not shown that they can likely prevail on each of the three elements of their First Amendment claim. Moreover, any further proceedings—whether in relation to the pending cross-motions for summary judgment or at a bench trial—would be premature because the Supreme Court is poised to consider issues that go to the heart of Plaintiffs' gerrymandering case. Until the Supreme Court speaks, prudence compels this Court to stay further proceedings.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Decision

1. Preliminary Injunction

Plaintiffs seek preliminary injunctive relief in the form of an order barring the State from enforcing the 2011 redistricting plan and requiring the State to implement a new map in advance of the 2018 midterm elections. To prevail on their motion for such relief, Plaintiffs must show (1) that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their political gerrymandering claim, (2) that they will likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and (4) that an injunction would serve the public interest. WV Ass'n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave , 553 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. NRDC , 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) ). "A preliminary injunction is an 'extraordinary remed[y] involving the exercise of very far-reaching power' and is 'to be granted only sparingly and in limited circumstances.' " Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump , 857 F.3d 554, 588 (4th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. , 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001) ), cert. granted , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 2080, 198 L.Ed.2d 643 (2017).

Rule 52(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in "granting or refusing an interlocutory injunction, the court must ... state the findings and conclusions that support its action." See Greenhill v. Clarke , 672 Fed.Appx. 259, 260 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (" Rule 52(a)(2)... requires that the district court make particularized findings of fact supporting its decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction; such findings are necessary in order for an appellate court to conduct meaningful appellate review."); accord Booker v. Timmons , 644 Fed.Appx. 219 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem.). Because Judge Bredar's discussion in Part II.B, concerning justiciability, involves a pure question of law, no findings are enumerated in that Part. However, the opinion of the Court in Part II.C, concerning the causation element of Plaintiffs' First Amendment theory, includes findings germane to that issue as well as separately stated conclusions of law. Such findings and conclusions are, given the procedural posture of this case, preliminary, and they will not bind the Court in any future proceedings. See Blake v. Balt. Cty. , 662 F.Supp.2d 417, 421 (D. Md. 2009) (citing Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch , 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981) ).

2. Stay of Proceedings

The Supreme Court has long recognized that the "power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." Landis v. N. Am. Co. , 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936) ; see also Williford v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc. , 715 F.2d 124, 127 (4th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that courts enjoy the inherent authority to grant a stay "under their general equity powers and in the efficient management of their dockets"). The decision to stay an action "calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance." Landis , 299 U.S. at 254–55, 57 S.Ct. 163 ; see also Rogler v. Fotos , Civ. No. WDQ-14-228, 2015 WL 7253688, at *13 (D. Md. Nov. 17, 2015), aff'd , 668 Fed.Appx. 462 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem.); Cutonilli v. Maryland , Civ. No. JKB-15-629, 2015 WL 5719572, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2015), appeal dismissed , 633 Fed.Appx. 839 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem.).

In deciding whether to stay proceedings, a court should consider the likely impact of a stay on each party as well as the "judicial resources that would be saved by avoiding duplicative litigation if the case is in fact stayed." Mitchell v. Lonza Walkersville, Inc. , Civ. No. RDB-12-3787, 2013 WL 3776951, at *2 (D. Md. July 17, 2013) (citing Yearwood v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc. , Civ. No. RDB-12-1374, 2012 WL 2520865, at *3 (D. Md. June 27, 2012) ).

B. Justiciability

At the pleading stage in Shapiro II , the panel majority recognized "the justiciability of a claim challenging...