Benjamin v. Aroostook Medical Center, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-2024,94-2024
• Citation: 57 F.3d 101
• Parties: 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,616, 32 Fed.R.Serv.3d 514 James BENJAMIN, Jr., M.D., Plaintiff, Appellant, v. The AROOSTOOK MEDICAL CENTER, INC., et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 101

57 F.3d 101

66 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,616, 32 Fed.R.Serv.3d 514

James BENJAMIN, Jr., M.D., Plaintiff, Appellant, v. The AROOSTOOK MEDICAL CENTER, INC., et al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 94-2024.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard Feb. 9, 1995.

Decided June 19, 1995.

James P. Chandler with whom Chandler & Robertson were on brief, for appellant.

Christopher D. Nyhan with whom Elizabeth J. Wyman and Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios were on brief, for appellees.

Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, and STAHL, Circuit Judge.

STAHL, Circuit Judge.

This appeal arises from an action brought by Dr. James Benjamin, Jr., and several of his patients against the Aroostook Medical Center ("TAMC"), alleging the racially-motivated termination of Benjamin's staff privileges. ¹ The district court dismissed the patients' claims, holding that they lacked standing to challenge TAMC's actions. Subsequently, the court dismissed Benjamin's claims with prejudice, explaining that Benjamin's counsel had failed to make himself available for proceedings and to respond to notices from the court. We affirm the dismissal of the patients' claims and modify the district court's order dismissing Benjamin's claims so that it operates without prejudice.

I. Background

On February 12, 1992, Benjamin, a physician of African-American descent, submitted a completed application for staff privileges to TAMC. TAMC did not approve Benjamin's application, but instead, on October 12, 1992, granted him a "provisional appointment." Benjamin had licenses to practice medicine in California, Connecticut, Minnesota and Maine, and had received a certification in the "Specialty of Internal Medicine" from the American Board of Internal Medicine. TAMC, which is located in Presque Isle, Maine, has approximately forty-five physicians on its medical staff and it does not allow physicians without staff privileges to treat patients at its facilities. At the time of Benjamin's appointment, TAMC had no African-American physician on its staff.

On October 11, 1993, TAMC's Medical Staff Executive Committee recommended that TAMC terminate Benjamin's provisional staff privileges. Subsequently, on January 7, 1994, Benjamin and seventeen of his patients commenced this action pro se in federal district court alleging that TAMC, through discriminatory policies and practices, had denied Benjamin staff privileges on account of his race. On February 11, 1994, the district court issued a scheduling order setting forth discovery deadlines and an expected trial date for August 1994. The district court amended the scheduling order twice to extend the time, first for Benjamin and then for TAMC, to designate expert witnesses. On March 4, 1994, TAMC filed a motion to dismiss the patients' claims for lack of standing. After Benjamin and the patients responded through newly obtained counsel, the district court granted the motion, finding that the patients had not sufficiently alleged that they had suffered any "injury-in-fact" as a result of the hospital's actions.

On April 29, 1994, Benjamin's counsel sought to withdraw, citing irreconcilable differences with Benjamin. The district court granted the motion, pending an appearance by replacement counsel (or by Benjamin pro se ). On May 31, 1994, Benjamin's counsel renewed the motion to withdraw, and the district court ordered Benjamin to show cause why he had not obtained new counsel. On June 8, 1994, TAMC filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Benjamin had failed to make himself available for a deposition and had obstructed TAMC's efforts to complete discovery. Two days later, TAMC filed a second motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment, arguing that Benjamin's claims failed on the merits. On June 16, 1994, James P. Chandler of Washington, D.C., entered a notice of appearance on behalf of Benjamin and simultaneously moved to enlarge the time to respond to TAMC's pending motions to dismiss. The district court granted this motion, giving Benjamin and his new counsel until July 15, 1994, to respond.

On July 7, 1994, Chandler became seriously ill and was hospitalized in Washington, D.C. At the time of his hospitalization, Chandler had not responded to TAMC's motion nor consulted with Benjamin's former counsel. On July 15, 1994, a law clerk for Chandler moved for an additional enlargement of time on account of Chandler's sudden illness. The district court denied the motion in light of TAMC's objection and because it was improperly filed by an individual without authority to practice before the court. On August 2, 1994, Chandler filed another motion for enlargement of time, which the district court denied by endorsement.

On August 17, 1994, the district court held a hearing on TAMC's pending motions to dismiss at which neither Chandler nor Benjamin appeared. Noting that, since Chandler's appearance on Benjamin's behalf, Chandler had neither made himself available for any proceedings nor responded to notices from the court, the district court granted TAMC's motion to dismiss with prejudice. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

We address two issues on appeal. First, Benjamin's patients contest the district court's finding that they lack standing to assert their claims against TAMC. Second, Benjamin argues that his counsel's sudden and severe illness should excuse his failure to make himself available and respond to notices from the court.

A. The Patients' Claims

At oral argument, counsel for the patients and Benjamin asserted that the patients' standing argument rested primarily on 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. ² The patients contend that they have standing because TAMC's actions interfered with their Sec. 1981-protected right to contract with Benjamin, a minority physician. TAMC, however, maintains that the patients themselves have no legally cognizable injury and, at best, only assert the third-party rights of Benjamin. After careful review, we conclude that, on the facts alleged in this case, the patients do not have standing.

The burden of alleging facts necessary to establish standing falls upon the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2215, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 114 (1st Cir.1992). We review de novo a district court's standing determination, employing an approach that, in practice, differs little from that used to review motions to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). AVX Corp., 962 F.2d at 114. In conducting our review, we are obliged to "accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and ... construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party." Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206-07; see also Adams v. Watson 10 F.3d 915, 919 (1st Cir.1993).

"Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a particular matter to the Court for adjudication." Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction Sec. 2.3, at 48 (1989). The "inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise." Warth, 422 U.S. at 498, 95 S.Ct. at 2204-05; see also Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 36 (1st Cir.1993). The constitutional limitations derive from the language of Article III that provides, inter alia, that federal courts shall resolve disputes involving only "Cases" or "Controversies." AVX Corp., 962 F.2d at 113. The Supreme Court has interpreted this general constitutional proscription as setting forth three fundamental requisites of standing that every litigant invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts must possess: (1) injury-in-fact--an invasion of a legally-protected interest that is both concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) causation; and (3) redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-37, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 436 (1st Cir.1995).

Several prudential considerations also infuse standing determinations. These considerations, which militate against standing, principally concern whether the litigant (1) asserts the rights and interests of a third party and not his or her own, (2) presents a claim arguably falling outside the zone of interests protected by the specific law invoked, or (3) advances abstract questions of wide public significance essentially amounting to generalized grievances more appropriately addressed to the representative branches. Libertad, 53 F.3d at 436. Consideration of these prudential factors enables the federal judiciary "to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1607-08, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979) (emphasis added); see also Conservation Law Found. of New England v. Reilly, 950 F.2d 38, 41 (1st Cir.1991).

For purposes of this appeal, we need not resolve whether the patients have met the constitutional requisites of standing, rather we believe that, because the patients' allegedly infringed-upon rights fall outside what we have previously found to be protected by Sec. 1981, the patients essentially assert the third-party rights of Benjamin rather than their own. Furthermore, because the patients have not satisfied the minimum requirements for an exception to the prudential rule against third-party standing, and because the reasons underlying the rule obtain in this case, we believe the district court did not err in dismissing their claims.

Whether a party is asserting its own rights, as opposed to seeking to vindicate the rights of a third party, is often a difficult question. See generally, Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 Colum.L.Rev. 277 (1984). Though the patients claim a direct...