Benjamin v. Com., No. 2006-SC-000620-MR.

• Decision Date: 23 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2006-SC-000620-MR.
• Citation: 266 S.W.3d 775
• Parties: Marcus BENJAMIN, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

266 S.W.3d 775

Marcus BENJAMIN, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

No. 2006-SC-000620-MR.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

October 23, 2008.

Julia Karol Pearson, Department of Public Advocacy, Frankfort, KY, Counsel for Appellant.

Jack Conway, Attorney General of Kentucky, Jeffrey Allan Cross, Criminal Appellate Division, Office of the Attorney, Frankfort, KY, Counsel for Appellee.

Opinion of the Court by Justice SCOTT.

Appellant, Marcus Benjamin, appeals as a matter of right his murder conviction from a Graves Circuit Court jury, wherein he was sentenced to life imprisonment. This Court now reviews his conviction pursuant to Kentucky Constitution § 110(2)(b).

Appellant raises multiple issues on appeal, to wit: 1) an alleged violation of Brady v. Maryland, in which Appellant claims the Commonwealth failed to provide him with certain exculpatory evidence; 2) whether the trial judge erred by allowing a combination instruction for murder and for denying an Extreme Emotional Disturbance instruction; 3) the admissibility of taped confessions at trial; 4) whether certain inadmissible hearsay statements denied Appellant his confrontation rights; 5) whether the trial judge properly denied Appellant's request for funding for expert witnesses; 6) the introduction of Appellant's prior convictions under Kentucky Rule of Evidence 404(b); and 7) whether the prosecution acted inappropriately during discovery and closing arguments.

For reasons that shall be set forth below, we hereby reverse Appellant's conviction and remand for retrial.

I. BACKGROUND

In late August 2004, Michelle Benjamin visited Appellant, her husband, with whom she had been recently estranged. They agreed that Michelle would take Appellant to visit his children from a previous relationship later that week. On the evening of September 1, Appellant and Michelle again met and began consuming alcoholic beverages. Testimony indicated that the two often argued when one or both were drinking. By all accounts, the relationship had been troubled, and throughout their marriage various allegations of mutual infidelities and arguments concerning Appellant's children were sources of conflict. On the night in question, Appellant had allegedly been informed that Michelle was having an extramarital affair with his cousin.

The argument resumed the following morning, as the two again quarreled over the alleged infidelities, with the altercation eventually becoming physical. Thereafter, Michelle told Appellant that he could no longer see his children.

Appellant alleged that Michelle was the initial aggressor, in a physical altercation which quickly spun out of control, and eventually resulted in Michelle's tragic death. Details of the precise sequence of events leading up to Michelle's death are unclear. According to Appellant's confession, he indicated he could remember very little of what happened, stating that he was "in and out" during the altercation and then remembers arriving in Murfreesboro, Tennessee to see his children.

On September 3rd, Michelle's body was found in the closet of her apartment under a pile of her own clothes. It was determined that she had died from manual strangulation. The next day Appellant turned himself in to the Mayfield Police Department for her death.

Appellant's and the Commonwealth's version of the subsequent events differ, though it is manifest that Appellant's ensuing meetings with detectives resulted in two taped confessions. Appellant claims, however, that the confessions were given under coercion.

The first confession occurred on September 5th, wherein Appellant told Detective Ty Jackson that he knew that he had killed Michelle. Appellant claimed that he could not remember many details of the dispute and asked to see Michelle's body in order to refresh his memory. Appellant stated that he remembered an argument about allegations of mutual unfaithfulness.

Thereafter, on September 7th, Jackson took Appellant to view the body at the funeral home where a second taped confession was received. Appellant again indicated remembering parts of the argument, in particular that it became physical. Appellant stated that Michelle attacked him and that he pushed her away multiple times before the altercation became deadly. When prompted, Appellant said that he remembered squeezing [her neck]. Appellant then stated that, at the time, he did not know where he was and that the next thing he recalled was being at his mother's house. Appellant also claimed to have confessed to family members during this time. By his own admission, Appellant indicated during this confession that he was aware that he had killed Michelle, but stated that he did not realize what he was doing at the time.

Appellant was subsequently convicted at trial and sentenced to life imprisonment.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Alternative Perpetrator Evidence and Alleged Violation of Brady v. Maryland.

1. Necessity of Materiality

In his first assignment of error, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth failed to provide him certain exculpatory evidence as required under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and in so doing, undermined his capacity to present a defense. We disagree, as the evidence did not impact Appellant's fundamental rights since it was not material to his guilt.

Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to reveal evidence of an alternative perpetrator before trial, thus violating his due process rights. At trial, Detective Morrison testified that upon learning of Michelle Benjamin's death, he initially thought that Tim Brown may have had something to do with the murder. Tim Brown was a known drug dealer in the area and Michelle, who had been working with the Mayfield Police Department as an informant, had made some allegations against Brown. Appellant alleges that he and counsel were unaware that police had considered an alternative perpetrator until hearing Morrison's testimony at trial. Appellant's counsel moved for a mistrial upon grounds of a Brady violation.

In Brady, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of good or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-1197. Implicit in Brady's requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence affected the outcome of the trial. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2400, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). However, in Agurs, the Supreme Court indicated that an item of undisclosed information is not rendered material by the mere possibility that it may have helped the defense or might have affected the trial. Id. at 109-110, 96 S.Ct. at 2400.

Thereafter, in United States v. Bagley, the Supreme Court further revised the materiality requirement, stating that irrespective of the request, evidence is considered material only if there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the trial would have been different. 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). The Court then indicated that in the context of this different result consideration, a reasonable probability was one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

Admittedly, reasonable probability and materiality are nebulous concepts at best. However, the notion was perhaps best clarified in Kyles v. Whitley, wherein the Supreme Court articulated

Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a "reasonable probability" of a different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A "reasonable probability" of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression "undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."

514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. at 3381).

Here, Appellant argues that by not disclosing, before trial, that police had initially considered Tim Brown as an alternative perpetrator, the prosecution suppressed evidence that was both favorable to his defense and material to his guilt. Moreover, Appellant claims that without this disclosure, he did not receive a fair trial or a verdict worthy of confidence, thus violating his due process rights.

2. Appellant's Right to Present a Defense was Not Violated.

Although we are unpersuaded by Appellant's argument, even assuming arguendo that information concerning Brown should have been disclosed, it cannot be credibly argued that information concerning an alternative perpetrator was in any way material, as Appellant confessed — at least twice — to the crime in question prior to Brown ever being developed as a suspect. Significant in the materiality analysis is the chronology and flow of incoming information during the early stages of investigation into Michelle's murder.

On Thursday September 3rd, Michelle's body was found in the closet of her apartment. Detective Morrison testified that when he learned of Michelle's death he immediately thought that Tim Brown might be implicated in some manner. However, on Friday September 4th, Appellant turned himself in. On Monday September 7th, Appellant confessed to Detective Jackson, disclosing key details about the murder which led authorities to reasonably conclude that he was the killer. Appellant then asked Jackson to take him to the funeral home where Michelle's body was located so that he could view it. While at the funeral home, Appellant then made his second taped confession and once again provided significant details concerning the murder. Additionally, there was also testimony to...