Benjamin v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA
Decision Date | 26 February 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 2009-CA-000417-MR.,2009-CA-000417-MR. |
Parties | Janice BENJAMIN; Eugene C. Blankenbaker; Sandra A. Brubaker; Ettine S. Eschbach; Charles D. Franklin; Myrna Hobbs; William H. Kroeckel; Martha J. Lincks; Kimberly M. Lunieski; Debra S. Maxberry; Pamela M. McNeil; Collista A. Metcalf; John M. Murphy; Kenneth L. Murphy; Raymond T. Murphy; Shauna Musuraca; Kerry Sans; Kristina Sans; Patricia Sans; Randall Sans; Steven C. Sans; Theodore A. Sans; Mary L. Taucher; Thomas J. Taucher; Gail Young; Richard L. Sans, Jr.; Kristina L. Sans; Susan Diane Oliver; Laura Lynn Young; Bonnie Louise Stutzman; Jackie Ann Jones; and Todd Anthony Sans, Appellants, v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Successor Trustee of the Katherine Ida Kroeckel Hagan Trust, Under Will; the Humane Society of the United States; Fund for Animals; People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals; Society of Animal Protective Legislation; National Hemlock Society (Now Compassion and Choices); the United Animal Nations; Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine; Kentucky Humane Society—Animal Rescue League; Jeffersonville Humane Society—Arm!; Nicholas Sans; Wildlife Waystation; American Horse Protection Association; and Floyd County Animal Rescue League, Appellees. |
Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
George E. Riggs, Jr., David S. Stierle, Louisville, KY, for appellants Janice Benjamin; Eugene C. Blankenbaker; Sandra A. Brubaker; Ettine S. Eschbach; Charles D. Franklin; Myrna Hobbs; William H. Kroeckel; Martha J. Lincks; Kimberly M. Lunieski; Debra S. Maxberry; Pamela M. McNeil; Collista A. Metcalf; John M. Murphy; Kenneth L. Murphy; Raymond T. Murphy; Shauna Musuraca; Kerry Sans; Kristina Sans; Patricia Sans; Randall Sans; Steven C. Sans; Theodore A. Sans; Mary L. Taucher; Thomas J. Taucher; Gail Young; Richard L. Sans, Jr.; Kristina L. Sans; Susan Diane Oliver; Laura Lynn Young; Bonnie Louise Stutzman; Jackie Ann Jones; and Todd Anthony Sans.
Alan N. Linker, Laura E. Landenwich, Bruce F. Boldt, Louisville, KY, Jennifer Hinkebein Culotta, Jeffersonville, IN, for appellees Humane Society of the United States; Fund for Animals; People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals; Society of Animal Protective Legislation; National Hemlock Society (Now Compassion and Choices); United Animal Nations; and Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine.
Before ACREE, KELLER, and LAMBERT, Judges.
JP Morgan Chase Bank, as successor trustee under the last will and testament of Katherine Ida Kroeckel Hagan, brought this action for a declaration of rights with regard to certain funds presently held in a testamentary trust established for the benefit of thirteen charitable organizations (the "Trust"). Appellees are ten of the thirteen named beneficiaries of the Trust who have entered an appearance in this case (the "Charities"). Appellants are Hagan's thirty-two heirs-at-law (the "Heirs"). The Heirs ask that the bulk of the trust funds be distributed to them under Kentucky's statutory intestacy scheme. Both the Charities and the trustee seek to distribute all the Trust funds to the Charities. The Jefferson Circuit Court entered judgment in favor of the Charities on February 5, 2009, holding that the Trust funds should be distributed to the Charities pro rata according to Hagan's expressed intent and the cy pres doctrine. After careful review, we affirm.
Hagan executed her last will and testament in November 1994. Article II of the will disposes of all of her property and consists of three bequests. The first is a gift of Hagan's jewelry and art boards to her friend, Betsy Hendershot. The second is a bequest of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) and certain book royalties to another friend, Catherine Joseph. The third bequest, and the one relevant to this case, leaves the residue of Hagan's estate to a trust for the benefit of the Charities. This bequest reads as follows:
The specific amounts listed in the bequest total $40,000, which was the approximate value of Hagan's residuary estate at the time she executed her will.
On September 19, 2001, one of Hagan's relatives, Florida Hagan, passed away, leaving Hagan an estate worth approximately $830,000.00. However, by that time Hagan had suffered a decline in mental capacity, and she could neither modify her existing will nor execute a new one. Hagan died in November 2005, having never changed the terms of her will to account for the inheritance. Hagan's residuary estate is presently valued at approximately $1.48 million.
Due to her declining health, Catherine Joseph was unable to serve as trustee upon Hagan's death, and JP Morgan Chase Bank was appointed successor trustee of the Trust. On November 28, 2007 JP Morgan filed an action in the Jefferson Circuit Court asking the court to interpret the Trust to allow for the distribution of all the Trust funds to the Charities in the same proportions directed by Hagan in her will. The Charities filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and in response the Heirs moved for summary judgment.
The Jefferson Circuit Court entered summary judgment in favor of the Charities, finding that on its face, the will left Hagan's entire residuary estate in trust for the Charities, and the trustee's pro rata distribution proposal was appropriate. The Court went on to conclude that the cy pres doctrine afforded the same result and was applicable to the facts of this case. This appeal now follows.
The Heirs' brief makes two arguments. The Heirs first claim that Hagan's will fails to bequeath her residuary estate in trust, and therefore the residuary must pass by intestacy. Next, the Heirs assert that the will evidences a specific intent on Hagan's part to limit the amounts given to the Charities to the sums listed in Article II of the will, with the remainder of Hagan's estate passing to her heirs-at-law. We agree with the trial court that the Heirs' arguments misconstrue the provisions of Hagan's will and ignore both her intent and the express language and spirit of the document. Furthermore, the Heirs did not address the trial court's alternate conclusion that, even if the Heirs' assertion that Hagan failed to bequeath her residuary estate in trust were accepted, the cy pres doctrine would nevertheless save Hagan's estate from passing by intestacy.
As wills are interpreted under the same standards as contracts, we shall apply the de novo standard of review to this case. Compare Dils v. Richey, 431 S.W.2d 497, 498 (Ky.1968); and Ratliff v. Higgins, 851 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Ky.1993); with Abney v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 215 S.W.3d 699, 703 (Ky.2006).
The very making of a will creates the presumption that the testator did not intend for any portion of his or her estate to pass intestate. Sigmon v. Moore's Adm'r, 297 Ky. 525, 180 S.W.2d 420, 422 (1944). "If a will is susceptible of two interpretations, one disposing of property and the other not, that construction disposing of all property will be favored." Id. The presumption against intestacy is even stronger when a will contains a residuary clause. Lester's Adm'r v. Jones, 300 Ky. 534, 189 S.W.2d 728, 730 (1945). In the absence of contrary language set forth in the will, residuary clauses shall be construed "liberally so as to pass all of the testator's estate which is not otherwise disposed of and any exclusion from its operation must be plainly and unequivocally manifested by the will." Sigmon, 180 S.W.2d at 422. See also Breckinridge v. Breckinridge's Ex'rs, 264 Ky. 82, 94 S.W.2d 283, 288 (1936); Andrew's Ex'x v. Spruill, 271 Ky. 516, 112 S.W.2d 402, 408 (1938); Clay v. Security Trust Co., 252 S.W.2d 906, 907-08 (Ky.1952).
The most basic rule of will interpretation is that the testator's intent must be the "polar star" toward which all interpretive efforts are guided, and this intent will be controlling, absent some illegality. Graham v. Fulkerson, 187 S.W.3d 324, 328 (Ky.App.2005) (...
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