Benjamin v. Stevens Cnty., : 2:18-CV-204-RMP
| Decision Date | 11 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO: 2:18-CV-204-RMP,: 2:18-CV-204-RMP |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Washington |
| Parties | RACHEL D. BENJAMIN, Plaintiff, v. STEVENS COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Washington; PAT WALSH, an employee of the Stevens County Public Works Department; NADINE BORDERS, an employee of Stevens County District Court; and GINA A. TVEIT, Stevens County District Court Judge Defendants. |
BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant Judge Gina A. Tveit's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Rachel D. Benjamin's Complaint, ECF No. 8, and Motion to Exclude Newspaper Article, ECF No. 19. Ms. Benjamin seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as state law claims of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Outrage, and Negligence. ECF No. 1 at 9. The Court has considered the parties' arguments, has reviewed the pleadings and the record, and is fully informed.
On August 4, 2015, Ms. Benjamin pleaded guilty to driving under the influence in Stevens County District Court. ECF No. 1 at 3. Stevens County District Court Judge Tveit sentenced Ms. Benjamin to 364 days in jail with 289 days suspended. Id. On March 28, 2017, Ms. Benjamin filed a motion to have her jail time converted to work crew, which was granted. Id. She was sentenced to 75 days of work crew. Id.
During her work crew sentence, Ms. Benjamin alleges that Defendant Pat Walsh, at the time a supervisor of work crew inmates for Defendant Stevens County, singled out Ms. Benjamin, made her sit in the front seat of the work crew van, and sexually harassed Ms. Benjamin in the form of statements regarding her breasts, her intimate relationship with her husband, and Ms. Benjamin's "sex appeal." Id. at 3-4. Ms. Benjamin complained of Mr. Walsh's sexual harassment to Defendant Nadine Borders, who worked as the Stevens County District Court Administrator and oversaw work crew assignments. Id. at 4. Ms. Benjamin alleges that Ms. Borders intentionally kept the allegations away from HumanResources to handle the matter internally. Id. Ms. Benjamin alleges that Judge Tveit directly supervised Ms. Borders. Id.
Ms. Benjamin told Ms. Borders that she did not want to report to work crew, but Ms. Borders allegedly told Ms. Benjamin that there would be consequences if Ms. Benjamin failed to report. Id. at 5. Eventually, Ms. Benjamin did not report to work crew, so Ms. Borders filed a pleading with the Stevens County District Court reporting that Ms. Benjamin was out of compliance with her work crew sentence. Id. After Ms. Borders' report was filed, Stevens County Prosecutor Tim Rasmussen discovered Ms. Benjamin's sexual harassment complaints against Mr. Walsh. Id. Mr. Rasmussen and Ms. Benjamin's criminal attorney, Graham Stone, filed a stipulated motion in Stevens County Superior Court asking the court to vacate the remainder of Ms. Benjamin's sentence. Id.
After Stevens County Superior Court Judge Reeves granted the order, Judge Tveit issued a sua sponte order finding that Superior Court Judge Reeves, Mr. Rasmussen, and Mr. Stone violated ethics codes by vacating Ms. Benjamin's sentence in Superior Court and not District Court, where Ms. Benjamin was originally sentenced. Id. at 5-6. Judge Tveit then met with Stevens County Director of Public Works, Jason Hart, as well as Stevens County Commissioners Steve Parker and Don Dashiell to discuss Ms. Benjamin's claims of sexual harassment. Id. at 6. At this meeting, Judge Tveit allegedly made disapproving statements regarding Mr. Rasmussen's attempt to vacate Ms. Benjamin's sentencein Superior Court instead of District Court. Id. Judge Tveit also allegedly made comments about Ms. Benjamin's criminal history, how she wanted Ms. Benjamin's complaints handled, and that "if anyone should be angry it should be [Ms. Borders]." Id. (). Judge Tveit continued to preside over Ms. Benjamin's case until Ms. Benjamin filed the present complaint against her. Id. at 7.
Ms. Benjamin filed this suit against all Defendants, including Judge Tveit, on June 20, 2018. ECF No. 1. Ms. Benjamin alleges that Judge Tveit attempted to retaliate against her for reporting the sexual harassment. Id. at 6. Specifically, Ms. Benjamin alleged that Judge Tveit violated her Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and committed the torts of negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, outrage, and negligence. Id. at 9.
Judge Tveit filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 8. Ms. Benjamin responded to Judge Tveit's Motion to Dismiss, including a newspaper article as support for one of her legal arguments. ECF No. 17. Judge Tveit replied to Ms. Benjamin's Response and filed a separate Motion to Exclude the Newspaper Article that Ms. Benjamin filed with her Response. ECF Nos. 19 & 20. The Court considers both the Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Exclude the Newspaper in this present opinion.
A plaintiff's claim will be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible when the plaintiff pleads "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court "accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). A court is not required, however, to "assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations." Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (internal quotation omitted). "[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004).
As a general rule, a district court must convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 when it considers evidence outside of the pleadings, and the nonmoving party must be given an opportunity to respond to the motion after it has been converted to a summaryjudgment motion. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). However, courts may consider matters suitable for judicial notice without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment. "A court may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).
In response to Judge Tveit's Motion to Dismiss, Ms. Benjamin included a newspaper article about Ms. Benjamin's case, in which Judge Tveit allegedly stated that "there is absolutely no supervision of the work crew program by the district court." ECF No. 17 at 16-17. Ms. Benjamin uses this article to argue that Judge Tveit is not entitled to judicial immunity because the work crew program is outside the province of Judge Tveit's control. Id. at 6. Judge Tveit argues that the Court cannot consider the newspaper article, as it is extrinsic evidence. ECF No. 19. The parties also contest whether this Court may rely on Superior Court Judge Strohmaier's orders, submitted as attachments to Judge Tveit's Motion to Dismiss, regarding Judge Tveit's order finding that the Superior Court had no jurisdiction over the terms of Ms. Benjamin's sentence. ECF Nos. 8-1 & 8-2 (Judge Strohmaier's orders); ECF No 21 at 2; ECF No. 23 at 5.
"If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). There are two exceptions to this required-conversion rule. First, under the incorporated-by-reference doctrine, a district court may consider material if it is properly submitted as a part of the complaint, or if the material's authenticity is not contested and the plaintiff's complaint relies on the material. Lee, 250 F.3d at 688. Second, a court may consider matters of public record by judicial notice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Id. at 689. The district court has discretion to either exclude extrinsic materials to avoid converting the motion to a motion for summary judgment, or accept them and convert the motion to a motion for summary judgment. Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1207 (9th Cir. 2007).
Under the incorporation by reference exception, extrinsic evidence is incorporated into the complaint if it is attached to the complaint or the material forms the basis of the plaintiff's claim. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). This exception is similar to Rule 10(c)'s governance on exhibits to pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). Merely mentioning a document in the complaint is not enough to meet this exception; the extrinsic material must be integral to the plaintiff's claim. Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908-09; see also Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010) (). If the complaint does not mention the material in question, the material can only be reviewed as a part of the motion to dismiss in rare instances. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d...
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