Bennett v. Beaty
| Decision Date | 13 July 1923 |
| Docket Number | 23,448 |
| Citation | 194 N.W. 627,156 Minn. 293 |
| Parties | ROSALIE F. BENNETT v. ELLEN BELLE BEATY AND OTHERS |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Stearns county to compel the commissioners of the city of St. Cloud to surrender possession of a certain street therein and to enjoin them from establishing a boulevard on either side of Third street wider than 6 feet. The case was tried before Roeser, J., who at the close of the testimony denied separate motions of defendants to dismiss the action, made findings and enjoined defendants from establishing a boulevard line with less than 30 feet roadway, unless with the consent in writing of abutting landowners and with enough space at the end to turn. From an order denying their motion for a new trial, the defendants and substituted defendant appealed. Reversed and new trial granted.
Authority of St. Cloud city commission over street spaces.
1. The home rule charter of the city of St. Cloud vests the control of the streets in the city commission, consisting of the mayor and two commissioners. As such the commission has full power to fix curb, sidewalk, driveway and boulevard space in the streets.
Considerations which may affect its decision.
2. In so doing the commission may consider how the abutting property is affected and give the owners thereof as much benefit and use of the street as may be consistent with the public easement therein. In fixing such space it was not improper to take into account that one owner had obtained title to part of the street by prescription.
Courts may not control its decisions ordinarily.
3. The courts may not control the judgment and action of the commission in designating what part of a street shall be a roadway and what part a boulevard unless it has acted arbitrarily, oppressively and against public interest.
Findings not sustained by evidence.
4. The findings that the commission so acted are not sustained by the evidence.
Findings as to damage to plaintiff not sustained.
5. Nor is the finding supported that plaintiff has sustained damages by the location of the curb line on the other side of the street from her property.
J. D Sullivan and R. B. Brower, for appellants.
James R. Bennett, Jr., and Donohue & Quigley, for respondent.
The city of St. Cloud operates under a home rule charter. Its governing body consists of three persons, called the city commission, whose powers in regard to streets are thus conferred: "The Commission shall have power to care for, supervise and control, to name and re-name, to lay out, alter, widen, extend, straighten and narrow, to open, construct, re-construct, build, re-build, maintain, repair and close to travel, to grade and re-grade, to curb, re-curb and gutter, to pave, re-pave and macadamize, to clean, park, beautify and otherwise improve, to cause the same to be done, at such times and in such manner as they deem proper, the highways, streets, alleys, bridges, culverts, parks, parkways, public squares and grounds within said city, or such portion of the same as they deem proper." Section 199, Charter.
In 1917, the commission by resolution fixed the curb line on Third street east of Third avenue at 10 feet from the lot lines, and permitted the sidewalk of 4 feet to be laid against the curb. In the fall of 1918 the commission by resolution changed the curb on the north side of Third street so as to be in line with the curb of the same street west of Third avenue. This placed the curb 18 feet south of the lot line. A clerical error in the resolution was corrected by another resolution adopted in March, 1919. This change of the curb line on the north side of the street occasioned this lawsuit.
Third avenue, running north and south paralleling the west bank of the Mississippi river, is one of the best residence streets of the city. It is 80 feet wide, and has a paved roadway of 36 feet between the curb. The boulevard or space between the curb and lot line is 22 feet wide on each side of the avenue. Third street crosses at right angles; the easterly end, terminating at the river bank, forms a cul-de-sac. It was dedicated as a street to the width of 66 feet.
Some years ago plaintiff acquired by warranty deed from the former owner a tract of land about 317 feet in length, extending from Third avenue to the river bank, and 132 feet in width, bordering the south line of Third street, as platted, with an additional strip 66 feet wide immediately south of and adjoining the easterly half of said first-mentioned tract. She also obtained from such owner a quitclaim deed to 18 feet of Third street adjoining the first-mentioned tract on the north. Thereafter she brought suit against the city to quiet her title to the 18 feet strip of the public street, on the ground that her grantor had obtained title thereto by prescription. She prevailed, and a decree to that effect was entered in May, 1915. In the meantime, the defendants George Reis and Ellen Belle Beaty had become the owners of land north of Third street and east of Third avenue, on which, prior to 1917, each had erected a home. George Reis owned the easterly part, and his dwelling fronted on Third street, his only outlet, the front porch being 6 or 8 feet from the lot line. Mrs. Beaty's home fronted on Third avenue. She had a garage in the rear with a driveway from Third street.
It appears that, when Third avenue was paved, the curb thereon was extended around the corners of intersecting streets, thereby indicating the curb lines on such streets. The engineer who so outlined the curb at Third street, evidently, had no knowledge of plaintiff's claim of ownership of any part of the street, hence such curb indicated a roadway 22 feet in the center of the street as platted, with a boulevard on each side of 22 feet. After erecting their buildings, Reis and Beaty applied to the city engineer for the line to put in cement curb. The then engineer staked out the line as so indicated 22 feet south of their lot line. The curb and sidewalk was put in by Mrs. Beaty. This aroused opposition from plaintiff and her husband. The commission sought to settle the controversy by the first resolution mentioned, and afterwards by the second and third.
Plaintiff was not satisfied and brought this action to permanently enjoin the commission from establishing a boulevard on either side of Third street of a greater width than 6 feet. The court made findings to the effect that the space of 20 feet between the curbs for a roadway, as established by the commission, was entirely inadequate for public travel, and would damage plaintiff's property without compensation; "that the action of the commission in thus appropriating said north strip of 18 feet of said street to private use and in narrowing said street for public travel was not and is not in the exercise of an honest judgment or discretion, but was prompted by ill will towards the plaintiff, and was arbitrary and unreasonable, and without lawful authority, and in utter disregard of the rights of the public in this street and the rights of this plaintiff." As a conclusion of law the court enjoined the city and its officers from establishing a boulevard line which would leave less than 30 feet for a roadway and enough at the end for turning around in. From the order denying a new trial the city and Reis and Beaty appeal.
In our judgment the record fails to support the above findings and conclusions. The administrative and legislative powers of the commission in respect to city streets are clearly ample to fix curb lines, determine width of driveways and locate the same, and designate sidewalk space. As to those matters the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the commission. The latter is a purely administrative or legislative body, whose duties the court has no authority to direct or meddle with, except where there has been a departure from the procedure required by law, or...
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