Bennett v. Eagle Brook Country Store, Inc.

• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Citation: 557 N.E.2d 1166,408 Mass. 355
• Parties: Mark A. BENNETT v. EAGLE BROOK COUNTRY STORE, INC.
• Decision Date: 16 August 1990

Page 1166

557 N.E.2d 1166 408 Mass. 355 Mark A. BENNETT
v.
EAGLE BROOK COUNTRY STORE, INC. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
Norfolk. Argued Feb. 6, 1990.
Decided Aug. 16, 1990.

Page 1167

John E. Coyne, Boston, for defendant.

Peter C. Kober, Boston, for plaintiff.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

The defendant, Eagle Brook Country Store, Inc. (Eagle Brook), doing business as the Eagle Brook Saloon, located in Norfolk, appealed from a judgment entered against it in the Superior Court based on its serving alcoholic beverages on the night of October 11-12, 1981, to Donald R. [408 Mass. 356] ¹ The Appeals Court upheld the judgment. Bennett v. Eagle Brook Country Store, Inc., 28 Mass.App.Ct. 35, 546 N.E.2d 174 (1989). We granted Eagle Brook's application for further appellate review, and we reverse.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the judge submitted to the jury sixteen special questions, pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 49, 365 Mass. 812 (1974). In response, the jury found that at the time Sanders, a bar manager at Eagle Brook Saloon, was served there after he went off duty, he was not drunk. In pertinent part, the jury went on to respond as follows:

"5. Did the said Donald R. Sanders operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated after leaving the said Eagle Brook Saloon on or about October 11--October 12, 1981? No.

"...

"7. Would a person of ordinary prudence have refrained from serving a liquor to Donald R. Sanders at the Eagle Brook Saloon on or about October 11--October 12, 1981 in the same or similar circumstances? No.

"8. Was the operation of the motor vehicle by Donald R. Sanders on or about October 11--October 12, 1981 a cause of the plaintiff's injury or within the scope of the foreseeable risk? No." ²

[408 Mass. 357] At the time of the accident and trial, G.L. c. 138, § 69, as amended by St.1973, c. 287, prohibited sale of alcoholic beverages

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"to a person who is known to be a drunkard, to an intoxicated person, or to a person who is known to have been intoxicated within the six months last preceding." Section 62 of the same chapter makes a violation of § 69 a criminal offense. In 1988, the Legislature amended § 69 to outlaw only the sale of alcohol to intoxicated persons. The plaintiff's claim against Eagle Brook rested on a showing that it had violated § 69. To special questions focusing on the other offenses then prohibited by § 69, the jury responded as follows:

"10. Was Donald R. Sanders known by the Eagle Brook Saloon to have been intoxicated within the six months last proceeding [sic ] October 11--October 12, 1981? Yes.

"11. If you have answered question # 10 'Yes,' was his being served liquor, if any, on October 11--October 12, 1981, at said place a proximate cause of the accident and injuries to the plaintiff? Yes.

"...

"13. Do you find that Donald R. Sanders was a drunkard on October 11--October 12, 1981? [emphasis in original] Yes.

"14. If your answer to question 13 is 'Yes,' was such fact known by the defendant Eagle Brook Saloon at that period of time that it served him any intoxicating liquor? Yes.

"15. If you have answered questions 13 and 14 'Yes,' was his being served liquor, if any, on those dates at said place a proximate cause of the accident and injuries to the plaintiff? Yes.

[408 Mass. 358] After receiving the jury's response to the original questions, the judge submitted the following additional question, with the apparent intention of clarifying the conflict between the jury's responses to questions eight and eleven:

"Was the operation of the motor vehicle by Donald Sanders on or about Oct. 11-12 at the time he was served intoxicating liquor a reasonably foreseeable risk of the defendant Eagle Brook Saloon? Yes."

From these responses only two clear conclusions can be drawn on the nature of Eagle Brook's conduct on the night of the plaintiff's accident. The first is that Eagle Brook violated the provisions of c. 138, § 69, then in effect, when it served Sanders, while knowing him to be a drunkard and knowing him to have been drunk within the preceding six months. The second is that, in serving alcoholic drinks to Sanders, Eagle Brook was acting as a reasonably prudent person would and was not, therefore, negligent. Rather than supporting the verdict for the plaintiff returned by the jury, these answers require a judgment for the defendant.

While a violation of c. 138, § 69, carries criminal penalties, the statute does not expressly or implicitly grant an independent ground for civil liability. Three Sons, Inc. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 357 Mass. 271, 275, 257 N.E.2d 774 (1970). Barboza v. Decas, 311 Mass. 10, 12, 40 N.E.2d 10 (1942). Any liability on the defendant's part in such a situation must be grounded in the common law of negligence, Cimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., 385 Mass. 323, 327, 431 N.E.2d 920 (1982), Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Social Club, Inc., 7 Mass.App.Ct. 813, 816, 390 N.E.2d 1133 (1979), meaning that the plaintiff has the burden of proving each and every element of that claim: duty, breach of duty (or, the element of negligence), causation (actual and proximate) and damages. Cimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., supra 385 Mass. at 331-332 n. 9, 431 N.E.2d 920. Swift v. United States, 866 F.2d 507, 508-509 (1st Cir.1989) (construing...