Bennett v. Fairfax County, Va.

• Decision Date: 25 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 1:05-250.,Civ.A. 1:05-250.
• Citation: 432 F.Supp.2d 596
• Parties: David S. BENNETT, Plaintiff, v. FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

432 F.Supp.2d 596

David S. BENNETT, Plaintiff, v. FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA, Defendant.

No. Civ.A. 1:05-250.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division.

April 25, 2006.

Ellen Kyriacou Renaud, David Shapiro, Swick & Shapiro, Washington, DC, for plaintiff.

Robert M. Ross, James Wilcox, Fairfax, VA, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

LEE, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Fairfax County, Virginia's ("Fairfax County") Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, under FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b); Motion for a New Trial, under FED. R. CIV. P. 59; and Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, under FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). This case concerns the claim of a Caucasian Fairfax County employee, David Bennett, that county administrators discriminated against him when an African American employee was promoted over him for a job vacancy for which he applied. After a one week jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Bennett and against Fairfax County. The jury found that Mr. Bennett was denied the promotion because of his race and awarded Mr. Bennett a verdict of $540,000.00. The issues before the Court are:

(1) whether the Court should grant Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law because, at trial, Plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence of discrimination and the jury was called to speculate that the articulated legitimate non-discriminatory reasons given by Defendant were pretexts for race discrimination.

(2) whether the Court should grant Defendant's Motion for a New Trial because Plaintiff's award of $540,000.00 was excessive and was the result of passion and prejudice by the jury.

(3) whether the Court should remit Plaintiff's award of $540,000.00 to the 5300,000.00 statutory cap on damages, under Title VII.

(4) whether the Court should substantially remit Mr. Bennett's award because, based on the evidence adduced at trial, the jury's award of $540,000.00 is excessive and inconsistent with similarly situated federal cases.

The Court denies Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law because the Court finds that there was evidence adduced at trial on which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of Mr. Bennett. The Court denies Defendant's Motion for New Trial because although the verdict was excessive, there is no evidence that it was the result of passion or prejudice by the jury. Even if the jury verdict was not excessive, the Court remits the jury award from $540,000.00 because the Court finds, and Plaintiff concedes, that the statutory maximum amount he can recover for compensatory damages for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses under Title VII is 8300,000.00. Additionally, the Court remits the jury award to $50,000.00 because the jury's award is inconsistent with similarly situated federal cases and is not proportional to the actual injury incurred by Mr. Bennett.

I. BACKGROUND

This case concerns the claim of a Caucasian Fairfax County employee, David Bennett, that county administrators discriminated against him when an African American employee was promoted over him to fill a job vacancy for which he applied. In denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment before trial, the Court identified a list of evidence that it believed a reasonable jury could use to infer that Fairfax County's articulated legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting Mr. Bennett were a pretext for race discrimination. (See Court Mem. Order dated Nov. 28, 2005, Docket No. 31.) Mr. Bennett testified at trial that he was humiliated by not receiving the promotion (Bennett Trial Tr. Nov. 28, 2005, afternoon session ("Bennett Tr."), at 77); because of his humiliation he had to leave the Housing Department (Id.); he reapplied for a position in the Housing Department in late November, 2004 (Id. at 68); and that he suffered chronic headaches, insomnia, and irritable stomach problems, from which he still suffers occasionally. Most notably, Mr. Bennett testified that he did not seek medical treatment for any of these conditions.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Bennett and against Fairfax County and awarded Mr. Bennett a verdict of $540,000.00.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Judgment as a Matter of Law

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) allows parties to renew a motion for judgment after trial, or in the alternative, to seek a motion for a new trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). The moving party must first make a motion for judgment as a matter of law prior to the case being submitted to the jury. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)-(b). The Court must enter judgment as a matter of law if "a reasonable jury could reach only one conclusion based on the evidence or if the verdict in favor of the non-moving party would necessarily be based upon speculation and conjecture ...." Myrick v. Prime Ins. Syndicate, Inc., 395 F.3d 485, 489 (4th Cir.2005) (citing Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156, 160 (4th Cir.1988)). If, however, the evidence is susceptible to more than one "reasonable inference, a jury issue is created and a motion for judgment as a matter of law should be denied." See Myrick, 395 F.3d at 490 (citing Hofherr v. Dart Indus. Inc., 853 F.2d 259, 261-62 (4th Cir.1988)). The jury verdict must stand "[i]f there is evidence on which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party." Lovell v. BBNT Solutions, LLC, 295 F.Supp.2d 611, 617-18 (E.D.Va.2003). In making this determination, the Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Myrick, 395 F.3d at 490 (citing Hofherr, 853 F.2d at 261-62). The district court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury or make credibility determinations. Price v. City of Charlotte, N.C., 93 F.3d 1241, 1249-50 (4th Cir.1996). While the district court is compelled to accord the utmost respect to jury verdicts and tread gingerly in reviewing them, the court will not rubber stamp the conclusions of the jury, but rather has a duty to reverse the jury verdict if the evidence cannot support it. Id.

Motion for New Trial

The standard governing motions for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 is significantly different from that governing motions for judgment as a matter of law. Lovell, 295 F.Supp.2d at 618. On a Rule 59 motion, a district court may set aside the jury's verdict and grant a new trial only if "(1) the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, or (2) is based upon evidence which is false, or (3) will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict." Id. (citing Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 594 (4th Cir.1996)). On a motion for a new trial addressing compensatory damages, the trial court must weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of the witnesses to determine whether the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence or was based upon evidence that was false. Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 647 (4th Cir.2001). If the trial court weighs the evidence and determines that it is deficient to sustain a verdict, then the trial court can set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. Id. The grant or denial of a motion for a new trial is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court and will be reversed on appeal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 305 (4th Cir.1998).

Remittitur

If a court concludes that a verdict is excessive, "it is the court's duty to require a remittitur or order a new trial." Cline, 144 F.3d at 305 (internal citations omitted). There is no specific provision for remittitur under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but it is well established that a remittitur should be ordered when a jury award will result in a miscarriage of justice. Id.; see also Robles v. Prince George's County, Maryland, 302 F.3d 262, 272 (4th Cir.2002); G.M. Garrett Realty Inc. v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., 17 Fed.Appx. 169, 172-73 (4th Cir.2001). Under the practice of remittitur, "the trial court orders a new trial unless the plaintiff accepts a reduction in an excessive jury award." Cline, 144 F.3d at 305. The decision as to whether damages are excessive is "entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court." Robles, 302 F.3d at 271.

B. Analysis

1. Judgment as a Matter of Law

The Court denies Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law because the Court finds that there was evidence adduced at trial on which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of Mr. Bennett. The Court must enter judgment as a matter of law if "a reasonable jury could reach only one conclusion based on the evidence or if the verdict in favor of the non-moving party would necessarily be based upon speculation and conjecture ...." Myrick, 395 F.3d at 489. (citing Crinkley, 844 F.2d at 160). If, however, the evidence is susceptible to more than one "reasonable inference, a jury issue is created and a motion for judgment as a matter of law should be denied." See Myrick, 395 F.3d at 490 (citing Hofherr, 853 F.2d at 261-62). The jury verdict must stand "[i]f there is evidence on which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party." Lovell 295 F.Supp.2d at 617.

In its Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Defendant argues that, even if Mr. Bennett made out a prima facie case of race discrimination, his own evidence at trial revealed a number of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for Mr. Bennett's non-promotion. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law ("Def.'s Br."), at 2.)¹

However, the Court finds that based on the totality of the evidence adduced at trial, there was evidence on which a reasonable jury could have returned a verdict in favor of...