Bennett v. Mattison, OO-147
| Decision Date | 24 April 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. OO-147,OO-147 |
| Citation | 382 So.2d 873 |
| Parties | Melena BENNETT and Harry Bennett, her husband, Appellants, v. William G. MATTISON and Barbara J. Mattison, his wife, d/b/a Casa MarinaApartments, and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company, aninsurance corporation, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Rodney S. Margol, of Allen, Margol, Fryefield & McCaulie, Jacksonville, for appellants.
Charles Cook Howell, Jr., Gainesville, for appellees.
Appellants brought a slip and fall personal injury action against appellees. Following the presentation of all evidence, the trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of the movant appellees. This appeal is from the final judgment entered pursuant to the directed verdict. Appellants correctly contend that the case should have been submitted to the jury. Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment and remand the case for a new trial.
Melena Bennett, a tenant and part-time employee of the Casa Marina Apartments, slipped and fell in a hallway at the apartment complex on July 9, 1978. This hallway led to a beach-front patio. Both the hallway and the patio were provided for the common use and benefit of the tenants.
On the day of the fall, Melena was at work in the apartment complex's office when she received complaints that unauthorized persons were using the patio. Melena left the office, walked through the hallway, and straightened out the problem on the patio. Her mission accomplished, she began her return to the office. While walking down the hallway, she slipped on a wet spot on the tile floor of the hallway and fell. The apartment manager testified that she had received numerous complaints from tenants about the slippery condition of the hallway when it was wet and that she had actually seen people slip in the hallway before Melena's accident. The apartment manager had advised the apartment owners both orally and in writing that the hallway was slippery when wet. There was evidence that water accumulated in the hallway on a daily basis, but there was no evidence as to how or when the water which contributed to Melena's fall got on the floor. The person employed by the owners to sweep the hallway floor was out of town on the day of the accident and for the two days preceding the accident. There was additional testimony that there was no procedure for the inspection of the hallway.
The complaint alleged that the appellees had negligently maintained the hallway. The trial court directed verdict in favor of the appellees, primarily on the grounds that there had been no proof as to how or when the water which contributed to Melena's fall came to be on the hallway floor. This evidence was not essential to appellant's recovery.
The repeated verbal and written warnings to the owners that the hallway was slippery and dangerous put them on notice of the recurring nature of the problem and created a jury question as to whether the landlords exercised reasonable care to guard against a foreseeable danger. Manassa v. New Hampshire Insurance Company, 332 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Since both the hallway and patio were provided for the common use and benefit of the tenants, appellees were required by Section 83.51(2)(a)3, F.S. (1977) to keep these areas safe and clean. The violation of this statutory duty would be evidence of negligence. See de Jesus v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company, 281 So.2d 198 (Fla.1973). Cf. 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, § 288B.
Appellees argue that Melena's recovery is barred because of her superior knowledge of the slippery condition of the hallway. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, whether Melena had superior knowledge is a question for the jury. Second, Melena's knowledge, if any, would present an issue of comparative negligence and would not bar her recovery.
Appellees cannot be charged with either actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of the precise water that contributed to Melena's fall because appellant could not prove how or when the water came to be on the floor. However, appellants were entitled to submit the case to the jury under the theory that (1) appellees failed to take reasonable care to prevent water from coming on the floor; (2) appellees failed to take reasonable care by not having an...
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