Bennett v. School Dist. of City of Royal Oak, Docket No. 3496

• Decision Date: 26 March 1968
• Docket Number: No. 2,Docket No. 3496,2
• Citation: 159 N.W.2d 245,10 Mich.App. 265
• Parties: William BENNETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF ROYAL OAK, Defendant-Appellee
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 245

159 N.W.2d 245

10 Mich.App. 265

William BENNETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF ROYAL OAK, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 3496.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 2.

March 26, 1968.

Released for Publication June 20, 1968.

Leave to Appeal Denied June 18, 1968.

Bernard J. Fieger, Craig & Fieger, Detroit, for appellant.

V. John Manikoff, Patterson & Patterson, Barrett, Whitfield, Manikoff & White, Pontiac, for appellee.

Before T. G. KAVANAGH, P.J., and FITZGERALD and McGREGOR, JJ.

T. G. KAVANAGH, Presiding Judge.

In October, 1966 the superintendent of schools in the city of Royal Oak filed, with the school board, charges against plaintiff, a teacher, and requested his suspension and discharge. The board suspended plaintiff who then requested a hearing on the charges pursuant to the tenure of teachers act. C.L. 1948, § 38.71 et seq., as amended (Stat.Ann.1959 Rev. and Stat.Ann.1965 Cum.Supp. § 15.1971 et seq.). A hearing was held and the superintendent submitted his proofs and rested. Plaintiff Bennett thereupon moved for a dismissal of some of the charges against him on the ground that the superintendent had failed to establish a prima facie case as to them. The board denied the motion without giving any reasons therefor, and ordered Bennett to proceed with his defense. Rather than so proceed plaintiff filed a complaint in circuit court seeking a writ of superintending control (GCR 1963, 711) to compel the board to dismiss such charges. The circuit court dismissed plaintiff's complaint, and on leave granted plaintiff appeals.

Article 6 of the tenure act, supra, provides:

'A teacher who has achieved tenure status may appeal any decision of a controlling board under this act within 30 days from the date of such decision, to a state tenure commission.' C.L.1948, § 38.121, as amended by P.A.1963, No. 242 (Stat.Ann.1968 Rev. § 15.2021).

The word 'decision' refers to a final disposition of the case and does not comprehend interlocutory rulings which are not decisive of a case. See Scola v. Director of Division of Employment Security (1950), 326 Mass. 180, 93 N.E.2d 523. The denial, as opposed to the granting, of a motion to dismiss is palpably interlocutory. We view the board's action as an interlocutory ruling rather than an appealable 'decision.'

Plaintiff argues that because the ruling of the board is not appealable under the act his administrative remedy is inadequate and thus, he contends, the writ of superintending control should have been issued.

The fact that administrative action may be erroneous does not create any exception to the rule that the statutory administrative procedures must be exhausted before judicial relief is sought. Holland Furnace Company v. Purcell (D.C.Mich., 1954), 125 F.Supp. 74. Nor can the exhaustion rule be circumvented by asserting that the charges are groundless.

'Lawsuits * * * often prove to have been groundless; but no way has been discovered of relieving a defendant from the necessity of a trial to establish the fact.' Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation (1938), 303 U.S. 41, 51, 52, 58 S.Ct. 459, 464, 82 L.Ed. 638, 645).

The basis for the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the presumption that 'the administrative agency, if given a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide correctly, and (the doctrine) is at least influenced by the assumption that the agency will not fail in the performance of any duty imposed upon it by the Constitution and other laws.' 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law § 595, p. 429.

A remedy is...