Bennett v. State

• Decision Date: 10 September 2021
• Docket Number: No. 1756, Sept. Term, 2019,1756, Sept. Term, 2019
• Citation: 259 A.3d 264,252 Md.App. 549
• Parties: Bryan BENNETT v. STATE of Maryland
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

252 Md.App. 549

259 A.3d 264

Bryan BENNETT

v.STATE of Maryland

No. 1756, Sept. Term, 2019

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

September 10, 2021

Submitted by: Allison Pierce Brasseaux (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, Baltimore, MD), on the brief, for Appellant.

Submitted by: Andrew J. Dimiceli (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, MD), on the brief, for Appellee.

Panel: Arthur, Wells, Patrick L. Woodward (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Wells, J.

A jury empaneled in the Circuit Court for Cecil County convicted Bryan Bennett, appellant, of second-degree assault, conspiracy to commit robbery, conspiracy to commit second-degree assault, and conspiracy to commit theft. The circuit court sentenced Bennett to four years’ imprisonment for the assault conviction, and to a concurrent term of four years for the conspiracy to commit robbery conviction. Based on principles of merger and lenity, the court did not impose sentences on the remaining convictions. On appeal, Mr. Bennett presents the following questions for our review:

1. Did the trial court err when it denied defense counsel's Batson¹ challenge?

2. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it refused to require the State to provide a bill of particulars?

We conclude that the trial court erred when it denied defense counsel's Batson challenge; therefore, we reverse the trial court's decision as to question one, vacate the convictions, and return the case to the circuit court for a new trial. As to question two, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On February 12, 2019, J.S.,² a thirteen-year-old³ boy, used Snapchat to exchange messages with a person identified as the "Elkton Weed Man" ("the seller"). The seller asked J.S. if he wanted to purchase marijuana and J.S. responded that he did. J.S. and the seller agreed to meet at J.S.’s house, where J.S. would give the seller an iPhone 5s in exchange for a vape pen containing liquid THC, a marijuana derivative. According to J.S., he informed the seller that the iPhone 5s was in working condition, but that the phone's charging port needed to be repaired.

Later that same day, the seller notified J.S. that he had arrived at J.S.’s house. J.S. entered the backseat of a waiting Honda sedan and sat next to a White male, who was approximately fourteen to sixteen-years old, wearing a hoodie. J.S. described the driver as a tall Black male with short hair and a beard, wearing a black bandana and a gray hoodie. He described the front seat passenger as a Black male, approximately eighteen years old, with dreadlocks, wearing a black bandana, black hoodie, and black jeans.

According to J.S., the driver drove a short distance before stopping the car to use the bathroom. When the driver returned to the car, he said, "So you're trying to give me a broken phone." J.S. told the driver that the phone was not broken, it simply needed to be taken to the Apple store to be fixed. J.S. then heard the driver tell the front passenger to "get the strap," which J.S. understood to mean a gun. J.S. observed the front passenger reach down and pick up a gun. The front passenger then told J.S. to "give [him] everything." J.S. described the gun as a "yellow-goldish" assault rifle with a scope.

Believing that the front passenger was going to shoot him, J.S. handed him his rose gold iPhone SE. The front passenger instructed J.S. to reset the iPhone so that it could not be tracked. When J.S. responded that he did not know how to reset it, the front passenger instructed the back passenger to reset the phone. The back passenger reset the phone and handed it to the driver. The driver then instructed J.S. to give him his hoodie and shoes, and J.S. complied. The driver told J.S. to get out of the car. He did. J.S. then heard the front passenger say, "Hurry up and run before I shoot you while you're running."

At trial, J.S. identified Mr. Bennett as the driver. J.S. also recognized the iPhone SE, identified as State's Exhibit 2, as the one that he had given to the front passenger. J.S. indicated that the serial number located on the back of the phone was the same number that he had obtained from the iPhone's box and provided to the police.

J.D., who was fifteen years-old at the time of trial, testified that he was seated in the back seat of the vehicle on February 12, 2019 when Mr. Bennett and Montez Alexander robbed J.S. According to J.D., Mr. Bennett, who is also known as "Trigger," was the driver and Mr. Alexander was the front passenger. J.D. identified Mr. Bennett at trial.

J.D. testified that Mr. Bennett and Mr. Alexander informed him that they were "pulling up to somebody's house to buy a phone or something." J.D. stated that J.S. got in the car and gave Mr. Bennett a cracked iPhone 4. Mr. Bennett told J.S. to give him his other phone, which was a rose gold iPhone, and either Mr. Bennett or Mr. Alexander pointed the "fake AR15" or "Airsoft gun" at J.S. J.D. stated that Mr. Bennett told J.S. to "take the iCloud" off the gold iPhone. Mr. Bennett also took J.S.’s hoodie before letting him out of the car.

State Trooper John Wildman, the primary investigator assigned to the case, testified that J.S. provided him with the ME ID serial number for the iPhone SE. Based on information discovered in the course of his investigation, Trooper Wildman secured an arrest warrant for Mr. Bennett, and located and arrested him. A search of the residence where Mr. Bennett was arrested revealed a backpack containing a rose gold iPhone SE with an ME ID number matching J.S.’s iPhone SE, as well as a silver and black vape pen and a black bandana.

Mr. Bennett was ultimately sentenced solely on charges related to the assault of J.S. and conspiracy as previously discussed.

DISCUSSION

I.The Batson Challenge

During jury selection, the State exercised a peremptory strike as to juror number thirteen. After the jury was selected, but before the jury was sworn, defense counsel raised a Batson challenge as to juror number thirteen, arguing the prosecutor had stricken the juror on the basis of race, as she was the only Black person in the venire.

Your Honor, Juror No. 13 is the only African American juror, potential juror, in the entire pool. She did not raise any issues during her voir dire that would suggest that there is any particular reason to strike her from the jury other than her race.... And for that reason the jury is not acceptable to the defense.

Defense counsel also argued that "there were numerous members of the jury pool who indicated that they had been victims of some crime or another that was unsolved or that a defendant was acquitted or never charged." Specifically, defense counsel noted of the jurors selected, juror number four had been the victim of a theft two weeks prior, for which no one had been arrested or charged, and juror number twenty-seven's in-laws had been the victims of an unsolved burglary. Juror number twenty-seven had recounted that the burglary occurred "ten-ish" years ago, and that the stolen property had been found at a pawn shop and that a man had been charged, though the juror could not recall if the case went to trial.

The prosecutor emphasized that his decision to strike juror number thirteen "had nothing to do with race," and "was solely because of the response she gave in response to voir dire questions." The prosecutor provided the following explanation for striking juror number thirteen:

... Juror No. 13 indicated that her ... mother had been the victim of a crime and she indicated that person had not been convicted and I was concerned that that lack of conviction and perhaps follow through from law enforcement would lead her to have some kind of either distrust in the prosecutor's office or in law enforcement.

The prosecutor further explained he had stricken juror number thirteen, "[s]olely related to that issue and nothing else."

The trial court denied the Batson challenge, finding that the prosecutor's explanation showed no discriminatory purpose:

[Defense counsel] says [prospective juror number thirteen] was stricken improperly. [The prosecutor] indicates that she answered a question relating to crimes against her mother which were unsolved. [Defense counsel] indicates that in particular Juror No. 4 in reference to a crime that occurred two weeks ago, that was not solved. With regard to Juror No. 4, that was theft of a wallet while she was in a location. That was not the nature of the crime that I have described here. Based on what I have before me, I deny the Batson challenge. I find the evidence is insufficient and I find the suggestions or explanations given by the state's attorney are sufficient.

Defense counsel noted an objection to the jury as seated. The trial commenced. Mr. Bennett was ultimately tried, convicted, and sentenced.

Mr. Bennett argues the trial court's acceptance of the prosecutor's explanation for striking juror number thirteen violated Batson because the result (1) disparately impacted Black jurors, (2) ensured that no Blacks were seated on the jury that tried Mr. Bennett, who is Black, and because (3) the prosecutor inconsistently applied his stated policy for striking jurors who had been the victims of crime. The State responds that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in finding that the prosecution's reason for using a peremptory strike as to juror number thirteen was race-neutral and not pretextual.

II.Standard of Review for a Batson Challenge

In Maryland, courts use the three-part analysis set forth in Batson to evaluate whether a peremptory strike was racially discriminatory. Ray-Simmons v. State , 446 Md. 429, 435, 132 A.3d 275 (2016) (citing Batson , 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ). First, the party challenging the strike must "make a prima facie showing—produce some evidence—that the opposing party's peremptory challenge to a prospective juror was exercised on one or more of the constitutionally prohibited bases." Id. at 436, 132 A.3d 275 (citing Purkett v. Elem , 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995)...