Bennett v. Sweet
| Decision Date | 30 August 1898 |
| Citation | 171 Mass. 600,51 N.E. 183 |
| Parties | BENNETT et al. v. SWEET et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
H.R. Bailey and W.R. Sears, for plaintiffs.
F Hutchinson, for defendants.
It appears that Sweet brought an action of tort against one Kimball, and obtained a verdict, but that no judgment has been entered on the verdict, although by a rescript from this court the superior court could enter judgment. The superior court has continued the case for judgment, and it remains so continued. See Sweet v. Kimball, 166 Mass. 332, 44 N.E. 243. The cause of action there alleged was that Kimball had procured the arrest of Sweet without right, and forced him to pay a sum of money for his release. The present suit is a bill in equity, brought by the partnership of Bennett, Rand & Co. against Sweet and his attorneys in Massachusetts, and against Kimball, to obtain the payment of a debt due to the partnership from Sweet, and it seeks to reach and apply the verdict in the action of Sweet against Kimball in satisfaction of this debt. Sweet is an inhabitant of Rhode Island, and has not been served with process within this commonwealth, but he has appeared specially by attorney, and has filed a motion to dismiss the bill, and also a plea to the jurisdiction. The plaintiffs traversed the plea, and after a hearing on evidence, the superior court dismissed the bill, with costs. The question of law which the case presents is whether the verdict in the action of Sweet against Kimball can be reached and applied in equity in satisfaction of the debt due from Sweet to the plaintiffs. We think that the gist of the cause of action in Sweet v. Kimball was an injury to the person, although by means of that injury Sweet was deprived of property. If one count of the declaration in that action could be regarded as a count to recover money paid to the defendant in that action under duress, yet we understand that the verdict was general upon both counts, and was not confined to the amount of money paid. A verdict in such a case before judgment is not assignable (Linton v Hurley, 104 Mass. 353; Rice v. Stone, 1 Allen, 566), and it cannot be reached by trustee process ( Thayer v. Southwick, 8 Gray, 229), and we are of opinion, for the reasons given in these cases, that a verdict for personal injuries before judgment has been entered upon it is not property which can be reached in...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bethlehem Fabricators, Inc. v. H.D. Watts Co.
...the statute (Pettibone v. Toledo, Cincinnati & St. Louis Railroad Co., 148 Mass. 411, 419, 19 N. E. 337,1 L. R. A. 787;Bennett v. Sweet, 171 Mass. 600, 51 N. E. 183), but, in view of the broad language of the statute (see Orange Hardware Co. v. Ryan, 272 Mass. 413, 416, 172 N. E. 654, and c......
-
Denadai v. Preferred Capital Markets, Inc.
...relied, in turn, on Pettibone v. Toledo, Cincinnati & St. Louis Railroad Co., 148 Mass. 411, 19 N.E. 337 (1889), and Bennett v. Sweet, 171 Mass. 600, 51 N.E. 183 (1898). Pettibone held that a claim for breach of contract that could not be assigned could not be reached and applied under the ......
-
Tyler v. Superior Court
...in the recent case of Flynn v. Butler, 189 Mass. 377, 75 N. E. 730 (1908). And see Linton v. Hurley, 104 Mass. 353; Bennett v. Sweet, 171 Mass. 601, 51 N. E. 183. So in Weller v. Jersey City, H. & P. St. R. Co., 68 N. J. Eq. 659, 662, 61 Atl. 459, 400 (1905), it was said by Gummere, C. J.: ......
-
Adams v. Silverman
...having found that the property sought to be reached could be attached on trustee process, the bill was dismissed. In Bennett v. Sweet, 171 Mass. 600, 51 N. E. 183, the defendant was a nonresident, not served with process, who appeared specially to object to the jurisdiction. The property so......