Bennett v. Trevecca Nazarene University, No. M2004-01287-COA-R3-CV (TN 10/7/2005)
| Decision Date | 07 October 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. M2004-01287-COA-R3-CV.,M2004-01287-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | GARY EDWIN BENNETT, ET AL. v. TREVECCA NAZARENE UNIVERSITY. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County; No. 02C-3649; Walter Kurtz, Judge.
Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed.
Timothy T. Ishii, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Gary Edwin Bennett and Thomas W. Cantley.
Peggy L. Tolson, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellee, Trevecca Nazarene University.
William B. Cain, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which William C. Koch, Jr., P.J., M.S., and Patricia Cottrell, J., joined.
Plaintiffs, certified low voltage electricians, filed a personal injury action against university for negligently informing them that university's switchgear cabinet was low voltage, when in fact, it was high voltage, for failing to provide a conspicuous high voltage warning sign on the high voltage switchgear and for obscuring the manufacturer's identifying product plate. Plaintiffs suffered injuries as a result of university's alleged negligence. The Circuit Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, Judge Walter C. Kurtz granted university's motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs appealed. The decision of the trial court is reversed and case remanded.
Defendant, Trevecca Nazarene University (TNU), experienced partial power failure at approximately 10:00 a.m. on December 26, 2001. TNU campus administrator, Michael Yonnotti (Yonnotti), and TNU maintenance supervisor, Bill Adams (Adams), discovered that multiple buildings on the campus were without power or had power at reduced levels. Attempting to assess the outage themselves, Yonnotti conducted a continuity check on the fuses with Adams' voltmeter, thereby, damaging the voltmeter. Realizing that repair of the power outage was beyond their expertise, Yonnotti called Stones River Electric Company (Stones River). TNU alleged that Yonnotti told Stones River that he thought that the partial power failure was due to a blown 600 volt fuse in a three-phase switchgear cabinet.
Plaintiffs, Gary Bennett (Bennett) and Thomas Cantley (Cantley), were employed by Stones River as electricians. Both electricians were only qualified and trained to work on low voltage equipment, which according to industry standards, means 600 volts or less. Stones River sent Plaintiffs to the TNU campus to locate and repair the problem, where they were met by Yonnotti and Adams. Plaintiffs claim that upon arrival and in response to their inquiry, Yonnotti advised them that the switchgear operated at low voltage. It was disputed by the parties whether the switchgear cabinet containing the equipment had a warning sign that the equipment contained high voltage and it was further disputed by the parties whether the manufacturer's product identification plate had been painted over by TNU.
Plaintiffs confirmed that the disconnect switch was in the disconnect position and thereafter, Bennett decided to apply his standard 600 volt maximum voltmeter to each of the three phase fuses. Cantley aided Bennett in operating the voltmeter. There was no current in the first fuse tested. However, when testing the second fuse, Plaintiffs were hit by a high voltage current operating at an unexpected 4160 volts, causing the fuse to explode in a ball of fire, which caused severe burns to both Cantley and Bennett. It was subsequently discovered that even though the disconnect switch was in an open position, one or more of the arc blades were stuck in a closed position, which Plaintiffs claim was the result of TNU's negligent failure to periodically inspect and maintain its electrical equipment.
On December 20, 2002 Bennett filed a Complaint against TNU in the Circuit Court of Davidson County, Tennessee. On December 23, 2002, Cantley filed an almost identical Complaint. Plaintiffs alleged that based upon TNU's negligent representation of the involved fuse being low voltage, Stones River sent Bennett and Cantley, both of whom were low voltage electricians, to the TNU campus to locate and repair the problem. Plaintiffs claimed that Defendant was liable for negligent misrepresentation causing their injuries. TNU filed its Answer on April 15, 2003. On May 13, 2002, the cases were ordered consolidated by the trial court as having common questions of law and of fact pursuant to Rule 42.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.
On March 1, 2004, TNU filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, a Statement of Undisputed Facts, and a Memorandum in Support thereof. TNU also filed the depositions of Bennett, Cantley, Yonnotti, and Adams. TNU asserted that it had no duty to Bennett or Cantley, alleging that Plaintiffs were independent contractors. TNU further claimed that because Plaintiffs were injured while making the specific repairs which TNU had contracted with their employer to perform, the independent contractor rule served as a complete bar to recovery. Plaintiffs filed their Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, a Statement of Undisputed Facts, and a Memorandum in Support thereof on March 26, 2004.
The Motion was argued on April 2, 2004 and the court took the Motion under advisement. On April 24, 2004, the court entered a Memorandum and Order granting TNU's Motion for Summary Judgment relying on Blair v. Campbell, 924 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn.1996). Plaintiffs filed a timely appeal.
Plaintiffs assert three issues on appeal. Plaintiffs contend that (1) the trial court erred in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as there are genuine issues of material fact; (2) the court's decision was erroneous under Tennessee precedent regarding the duty of care owed to independent contractors; and, (3) for public policy reasons, the Court should create an exception to the independent contractor rule.
A trial court's determination in a motion for summary judgment is a question of law. Staples v. CBL Assoc., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83 (Tenn.2000). The standard of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness below. Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 88. Our task is confined to reviewing the record to determine if the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 have been met. Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 88.
It is well settled that in a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the initial burden of producing competent, material evidence reflecting that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tenn.1993). The evidence presented must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 210. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and when the undisputed material facts entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 211.
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03 requires that "any motion for summary judgment made pursuant to Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure...be accompanied by a separate concise statement of the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue for trial." The specifications of material facts serve as "road maps" and the trial court should not be required to proceed further if they are not provided. Owens v. Bristol Motor Speedway, Inc., 77 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001).
The trial court in this case, granted TNU's Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the parties' statements of undisputed facts and the Blair case. The court stated in its order, The court then listed both Defendant and Plaintiffs statements of undisputed facts and reasoned that "[b]ased on the above facts and the law as set forth in Blair v. Campbell, 924 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. 1996) and Shell Oil Co. v. Blanks, 46 Tenn. App. 539, 330 S.W.2d 569 (1959), the [Defendant's] motion is granted." However, Plaintiffs assert that the court erroneously disregarded the parties' depositions which established that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether TNU made an affirmative representation to Plaintiffs regarding the amount of voltage in the switchgear cabinet, and thus the court erred in granting TNU summary judgment.
A judge is not bound only to consider the statements of material facts as specified by the parties in determining the merits of a motion for summary judgment. The statements of material facts are designed merely "to assist the court in ascertaining whether there are any material facts in dispute." T.R.C.P. 56.03. Such statements are auxiliary to the motion in order to assist the court in rendering judgment on the motion. Estate of Jenkins, No. M2004-01561-COA-R3-CV 2004 WL 2607531, *5 (Tenn.Ct.App.July, 9, 2004). A decision to grant summary judgment must ultimately be based on the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any." Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. Thus, "while the Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 concise statement points the court to the portions of the record that are particularly relevant to the summary judgment motion, it does not replace the evidentiary materials on which it is based." Estate of Jenkins, 2004 WL 2607531 at *6. We therefore may consider the depositions of the parties in determining whether the trial court's decision to grant TNU summary judgment was proper.
Plaintiffs assert that TNU personnel negligently informed them that the switchgear cabinet was low voltage. Cantley specifically stated in his deposition,
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