Benoist v. City of St. Louis

Decision Date31 October 1853
PartiesBENOIST ET AL., Respondents, v. THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Appellant.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

1. Under the charter of the city of St. Louis, of 1841, there may be different taxes or rates of taxes in the same year, provided the aggregate does not exceed the limit fixed by the charter.

2. Under that charter, the city council might levy taxes either for the fiscal year or the calendar year, in its discretion.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

Petition filed by the respondents to enjoin the appellant from selling land for taxes alleged to be illegal.

The cause was submitted to the court upon an agreed statement of facts. The facts agreed upon were substantially as follows: “That the property upon which the taxes were levied was first brought within the limits of the city by the charter of 1841; that the conditions of the 17th section of article 7, of the charter of 1841, were not complied with until the 25th day of October, 1850; that, for the year 1850, real estate within the “old limits” was taxed at the rate of one per centum for city purposes, besides the special taxes authorized by acts of the general assembly and the city ordinances; that, by the 14th section of article 7, of the charter of 1843, it is declared that the fiscal year of the city shall terminate on the day preceding the second Monday of April in each year, and the disbursements, expenditures and appropriations of the city are made and conducted in reference to the fiscal year established by the charter; that, in the month of November, 1850, an ordinance was passed by the city, levying a tax for the year 1850, of a half of one per cent. on all property within the new limits, and including the land of the plaintiffs; and that such tax is equal to a tax at the rate of the sixteenth of one per cent. per annum, from the second Monday of April to the 25th of October, 1850, and a tax at the rate of one per cent. per annum from the 25th of October to the day preceding the second Monday of April following.”

Upon these facts, two questions were presented for consideration, which are stated in the opinion of the court. The Circuit Court decided that the city could collect more than one-sixteenth of one per cent. for city purposes for the year 1850, but that taxes could only be levied and collected by the city according to the calendar year. The injunction was rendered perpetual as to a portion of the taxes claimed, and the city appealed to this court.

Geyer & Dayton, and J. C. Richardson, for appellant.

I. The Circuit Court erred in deciding that taxes must be levied and collected according to the calendar and not to the fiscal year. In the absence of any express directions upon the subject in the charter, some discretion may fairly be considered as given to the city government, in fixing what particular period shall compose each year. As the disbursements and appropriations of the city are made and conducted in reference to the fiscal year, there is a fitness and convenience, without any conflict with existing laws, in levying and collecting taxes in reference to that year, instead of the calendar year. A reference to some provisions of the charter strengthens the conclusion that the fiscal year is the one intended. Sec. 14, art. 7. Sec. 1, art. 7. Sec. 1, art. 3. Sec. 20, art. 7. Sec. 22, art. 7. Art. 4. Art. 2. Art. 5.

II. The power to tax property in the new limits, at the same rate as in the old, attached, for the future, the moment the condition of sec. 17, art. 7 of charter of 1841 was performed; and this performance having been completed on the 25th of October, 1850, in the midst of a fiscal year, the city had the right to impose taxes, for the residue of such year, at the same rate per year at which taxes had been imposed on property in the old limits that same year. The charter does not prescribe the time of the year at which taxes for the year shall be levied or collected. Without conflict with the charter, the city might levy and collect all its taxes for the year, within the last month of the year, or might divide the year into quarters, and collect one-fourth of the annual tax each quarter.Haight & Shepley, for respondents.

I. The system of city taxation is based upon, and the annual tax is for the calendar year. This is obvious from the provisions of the charter. The first subdivision of the second section of article 3, provides that the mayor and common council shall have the power “to levy and collect taxes not exceeding one per centum,” &c. This means an annual tax. Whenever the word “year” is used in statutes or ordinances, it will be held to mean the calendar year, unless there is something in the context that shows otherwise. Again, the ordinances of the city for the assessment and collection of the taxes on property within the city limits, all look to the idea that a calendar year is intended. (Rev. Ord. 1850, p. 126, secs. 1, 3, 5 and 6. It is provided that the assessors shall, on the first Monday of February, proceed to assess the property within the city subject to taxation. If the tax is to be levied for the year commencing the second Monday of April, here is a provision for assessing the value of the property, at a time altogether outside of the year for which the tax is laid. This would be in conflict with the power granted by the charter, (art. 2, sec. 5,) as well as ordinance 2486, both of which proceed upon the basis that the assessment is to be made upon the value of the property within the year in which the tax is levied, be it fiscal or be it calendar. The ““fiscal year” was first established by the charter of 1843, merely for the convenience of the city in keeping and balancing her accounts at the close of the different administrations. It makes no difference in keeping these accounts, whether taxes are levied for the year commencing January 1st, or the year commencing the second Monday of April. The State and county taxes are levied and assessed according to the calendar year, yet there is, in the statute regulating that matter, no express provision on the subject. The city legislation seems to be taken from the State legislation on the same subject.

II. Whether the year for which taxes were to be levied was the fiscal or the calendar year, the injunction was properly granted, for the reason that the city had no power to levy for that year any larger tax than the one-sixteenth of one per cent., with the exception of the special taxes. The ordinance No. 2520 fixes the taxation upon property in the new limits, at one-half of one per cent. for the whole of the fiscal year ending the day prior to the second Monday of April, 1851, when, confessedly, they had no power to levy more than one-sixteenth of one per cent. up to the 25th of October, 1850, beside the special taxes. If they could levy for any part of that year a tax of more than one-sixteenth of one per cent., they might possibly have done it by levying, in so many words, a tax at the rate of one-sixteenth of one per cent. up to October 25, 1850, and at the rate of one-half of one per cent. for the remainder of the taxable year; but they have not done this. For the whole year, they have levied one uniform tax upon property in the new limits, altogether above that which they had a right to impose, for part of the year at least. Nor does it help the matter out, because, by calculation, we may discover that the tax which they have levied does not exceed one-sixteenth of one per cent. up to October 25, and one per cent. for the remainder of the year.

GAMBLE, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

I. The parties in this case agreed upon and signed a written statement of facts, and at the end of it, stated the questions of law which they desired the court to consider and decide. These questions are thus stated: “the only questions presented for the consideration of the court on the above facts are, 1. Whether the city could demand or collect more than one-sixteenth of one per cent. for any part of the year 1850; 2. Whether, in this case, the city is required to levy and collect taxes according to the calendar year, or a year beginning on the second Monday of April and ending on the day preceding the second Monday of April following.” It will be seen that both these are questions of power, and do not involve the consideration of whether the measures adopted by the city authorities were proper or expedient measures in the execution of the power, if such power existed.

On the first question, it is necessary briefly to state the provisions of the charter under which this property was subjected to taxation. By the charter of 1841, the limits of the city were greatly extended, and embraced a large scope of country which had never been laid out in lots. This property, being brought within the city, was subjected to the power of the corporation, and would have become liable to the burdens to which all other property in the city, was subject, but for a limitation on the taxing power of the city government. It was provided in the charter, that the city should extend the paving of certain streets and avenues through the territory thus brought within the city to the new boundaries of the city, and that, until such improvements were made, the city should not have power to impose a tax for city...

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