Benoit v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 06 March 1978
• Docket Number: No. 60336,60336
• Citation: 355 So.2d 892
• Parties: Sweeny BENOIT, as personal representative of William Benoit, Jr. v. FIREMAN'S FUND INS. CO., Standby Crews, Inc. and Deepwater Boats, Inc.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 892

355 So.2d 892

Sweeny BENOIT, as personal representative of William Benoit, Jr. v. FIREMAN'S FUND INS. CO., Standby Crews, Inc. and Deepwater Boats, Inc.

No. 60336.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 6, 1978.

Ronald J. Bertrand, Nathan A. Cormie & Associates, Lake Charles, for plaintiff-applicant.

Karl E. Boellert, Camp, Carmouche, Palmer, Barsh & Hunter, Lake Charles, for defendants-respondents.

MARCUS, Justice.

Plaintiff, Sweeny Benoit, as personal representative of the decedent, William Benoit, Jr., brought this action for wrongful death under the Jones Act, the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), and the general maritime law against defendants, Deepwater Boats, Inc., Standby Crews, Inc., and Fireman's Fund Insurance Company to recover damages for and on behalf of the decedent's three minor children and mother.

On March 8, 1973, while serving as a member of the crew of the M/V Carol Ann, William Benoit, Jr., disappeared and was presumed drowned near Eugene Island in the Gulf of Mexico. His body was never recovered. The M/V Carol Ann, which at the time of the decedent's disappearance was tied to a drilling platform rig for use as a standby vessel, was owned by Deepwater Boats, Inc., and was operated and manned by Standby Crews, Inc., the decedent's employer. Both of these corporations were insured by Fireman's Fund Insurance Company.

On August 22, 1973, plaintiff, an uncle of the decedent, was appointed administrator of the decedent's succession. ¹ In that capacity as the decedent's personal representative, plaintiff filed the instant suit on March 5, 1975, alleging the unseaworthiness of the vessel and negligence on the part of defendants, Deepwater Boats, Inc. and Standby Crews, Inc. Also named a party-defendant was Fireman's Fund Insurance Company as the insurer of the above two defendants. Asserting an action under the Jones Act, DOHSA and the general maritime law, plaintiff requested a trial by jury. The trial judge granted the request.

Defendants answered plaintiff's petition making a general denial to the allegations contained therein and affirmatively asserted, inter alia, that the decedent's former wife and mother of the three minor children, Harriet Ann Rachal, ² as duly appointed natural tutrix of the minor children had executed a court-approved compromise and settlement of the minor-beneficiaries' claim for the sum of $10,500. The settlement was executed on March 20, 1975, subsequent to the filing of plaintiff's suit. Defendants alleged that this settlement operated to fully release and discharge them from liability for any claim asserted by plaintiff for and on behalf of the decedent's minor children arising out of the decedent's death. Thereafter, defendants filed a rule to strike plaintiff's demand for a jury trial contending that, because the claim of the minor children had been settled on their behalf by their natural tutrix, plaintiff could only assert a claim for damages on behalf of the decedent's mother under DOHSA and the general maritime law. ³ Since an action under DOHSA and the general maritime law is not triable by jury when not joined with a claim for recovery under the Jones Act, defendants argued that plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial on the claim asserted by him on behalf of the decedent's mother.

The trial judge dismissed defendants' rule to strike plaintiff's demand for a jury trial reasoning that the settlement executed by defendants and the natural tutrix on behalf of the minor-beneficiaries was invalid. Thus, plaintiff as the decedent's personal representative could properly maintain an action for damages for wrongful death on behalf of the minor children and the mother of the decedent under the Jones Act, DOHSA and the general maritime law, which action was triable by jury. After trial on the merits, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against defendants awarding damages for decedent's mother in the sum of $75,000 for loss of society and support and for the minor children in the sum of $112,500 for loss of support. The trial judge signed a judgment in accordance with the verdict; an appeal was taken from this judgment by defendants.

The court of appeal concluded that the trial judge committed manifest error in not recognizing the validity of the settlement entered into between defendants and the natural tutrix on behalf of the decedent's minor children. Therefore, the court reversed that portion of the district court's judgment which awarded damages for the minor-beneficiaries and ordered the claim dismissed. The court further ruled that, since the minors' claim under the Jones Act, DOHSA and the general maritime law had been validly settled, plaintiff's claim for and on behalf of the decedent's mother under DOHSA and the general maritime law was improperly tried before a jury. Accordingly, the court reversed the remaining portion of the district court's judgment which awarded damages for decedent's mother and remanded the claim to the district court for consideration and decision by the trial judge on the basis of the record, subject to the trial judge's discretion to allow additional evidence. ⁴ We granted plaintiff's application for certiorari to review the correctness of this judgment. ⁵

The issue posed for our determination is whether under the Jones Act, DOHSA and the general maritime law the natural tutrix of the decedent's minor children could validly compromise and settle with defendants a claim for damages for the decedent's wrongful death on behalf of the minor-beneficiaries after suit to enforce the claim had been instituted by the decedent's personal representative.

The present action was brought pursuant to the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, DOHSA, 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq., and the general maritime law. The pertinent statutes provide:

46 U.S.C. § 688:

Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located. (Emphasis added.)

46 U.S.C. § 761:

Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued. (Emphasis added.)

It is well settled that an action under the Jones Act, DOHSA and the general maritime law must be instituted by the personal representative of the decedent for and on behalf of the appropriate beneficiaries. Futch v. Midland Enterprises, Inc., 471 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1973); Milam v. Reading & Bates Offshore Drilling Company, 471 F.2d 1197 (5th Cir. 1973); Renner v. Rockwell International Corporation, 403 F.Supp. 849 (C.D....