Benson v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co.

• Decision Date: 02 January 1914
• Citation: 144 N.W. 774,124 Minn. 222
• Parties: BENSON v. LEHIGH VALLEY COAL CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

124 Minn. 222

144 N.W. 774

BENSON

v.LEHIGH VALLEY COAL CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 2, 1914.

Appeal from District Court, St. Louis County; J. D. Ensign, Judge.

Action by Anna M. Benson, administratrix, against the Lehigh Valley Coal Company. Verdict for plaintiff, and, from a denial of alternative motion for judgment or new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

As between the parties, the relation of master and servant does not necessarily terminate by the sale and transfer by the master to a third person of the property and business in connection with which the relation arose and exists.

Where there is no actual change in the management of the business, and it is continued in the same general way after the sale, by the same servants and employés, and the servants are in no way expressly or otherwise informed of the transfer and the consequent change of proprietors, the relation is presumed to continue for a reasonable time, and the master remains liable to them to the same extent as though no sale or transfer had taken place.

The burden to show knowledge on the part of the servant is upon the master.

Decedent was in the employ of defendant for several years. Defendant transferred its business to a third person on March 1st. The management of the business thereafter continued as before. He was fatally injured on March 13th, by a defective instrumentality furnished by defendant. It is held, that the question whether decedent knew of the change of ownership was one of fact for the jury.

The question whether decedent, the injured servant, was required by the duties of his employment to inspect the machinery and appliances with and about which he performed his duties, and to keep and maintain the same in repair, was, on the evidence, one of fact for the jury.

The record presents no reversible error. Harvey Clapp, of Duluth, and Luse, Powell & Luse, of Superior, Wis., for appellant.

Samuel A. Anderson, of St. Paul, and Warner E. Whipple, of Duluth, for respondent.

BROWN, C. J.

Plaintiff's intestate, employed as a servant upon and about certain coal docks owned by defendant at the city of Superior, in the state of Wisconsin, received a fatal injury from a defective instrumentality connected with said docks, and thereafter this action was brought to recover the compensation provided for by the laws of Wisconsin for death by wrongful act. Plaintiff had a verdict, and defendant appealed from an order denying its alternative motion for judgment or a new trial.

It is contended by defendant in support of the appeal: (1) that the relation of master and servant between decedent and defendant did not exist at the time decedent received the injury causing his death, and therefore that defendant is not liable; (2) that it was one of decedent's duties to inspect the instrumentalities, machinery, and premises with and about which he was required to perform his work, and to repair defects therein or to inform his superior servants thereof to the end that proper repairs might be made, and that the defective instrumentality causing the injury complained of should have been inspected by him which, had it been made, would have disclosed the defect, and that since he failed in his duty in this respect no recovery can be had; and (3) that there were errors in the instructions of the court to the jury for which a new trial should be granted.

[1][2][3][4] 1. The facts bearing upon the first contention, namely, that the relation of master and servant between defendant and decedent did not exist at the time of his injury, are as follows: The docks upon which decedent was at work were constructed and owned by defendant, and such ownership continued down to the time of decedent's death and, so far as the record discloses, still continues. They had been operated by defendant in the commercial handling of coal from the time of the construction thereof until March 1, 1912, at which date it is claimed they were leased to another corporation. Decedent met his death on March 13th, or about two weeks after this change of proprietorship took place. Defendant was incorporated as the Lehigh Valley Coal Company. A short time prior to the 1st of March, 1912, there was formed in New Jersey a corporation named the Lehigh Valley Coal Sales Company, and it was to this corporation defendant claims to have leased the docks on March 1st, relinquishing then and thereby all control over the operation of the same, though defendant remained the owner of the property. There is no controversy about the fact that these two corporations were independent concerns, and it is not claimed that the ‘Sales' Company was a representative of defendant, the ‘Coal’ Company. Some time prior to the 1st of March, the president of the ‘Sales' Company issued a circular notice to the patrons of the ‘Coal’ Company, in the following language: ‘Lehigh Valley Coal Sales Co., 90 West Street, New York. Notice. Feb. 16, 1912. The Lehigh Valley Coal Sales Co., will purchase on March 1st, 1912, and thereafter, the Lehigh Valley Coal Company's output of anthracite coal at the mines, and will take over that company's business of selling, shipping and handling coal. The Lehigh Valley Coal Sales Co. assumes all the obligations of the Lehigh Valley Coal Co. with respect to agreements for the sale of coal; all payments for coal purchased should be made to the Lehigh Valley Coal Sales Co. on and after March 1st. Your continued patronage is respectfully solicited. John W. Skeele, President.’

For many years prior to this transfer defendant had operated the docks through its agents and employés. Decedent was one of those employés, and for about four years prior to this transfer had continuously been in defendant's employ as an oiler of the dock machinery. Other employés included a superintendent and a foreman, who were decedent's superiors. A copy of the circular above set out was given to the superintendent and he was thus expressly informed of the transfer to the Sales Company. The evidence, however, wholly fails to show that decedent was in any manner informed of the change of proprietorship. There is no evidence that he was expressly notified of the change, and the superintendent testified that he did not know whether decedent knew anything about it, though he thought that some of the employés had been informed thereof. The transfer took place on March 1st, and the death of decedent occurred on March 13th following. No change in the conduct of the business took place, the same employés continued in the same general work, and there was nothing to indicate to any of them, except the superintendent, that a change of proprietors had taken place. In this situation the authorities are clear that the original employer continues liable to the employés who have no notice of the change. In other words, as between the parties, the relation of master and servant is not necessarily terminated by a sale and transfer to a third person of the business in respect to which the relation arose. Labatt states the rule applicable to such a situation as follows: ‘In an action by a servant for an injury caused by a defective instrumentality, the obviously reasonable and just doctrine is that, if he was allowed, without notice of a change of masters, to continue doing the same work as that for which he was first engaged, and on premises which ostensibly remained in the possession...