Benson v. State
Decision Date | 13 June 2014 |
Docket Number | CR–12–1876. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Parties | Lorenzo J. BENSON v. STATE of Alabama. |
Robert Dale Bryant, Marion, for appellant.
Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Jean A. Therkelsen, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Lorenzo J. Benson, was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of marijuana in the first degree, a violation of § 13A–12–213, Ala.Code 1975, trafficking in cocaine, a violation of § 13A–12–231, Ala.Code 1975, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a violation of § 13A–12–260, Ala.Code 1975. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Benson pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana in the first degree and the remaining charges were dismissed. The circuit court subsequently sentenced Benson to 10 years' imprisonment; the court split the sentence and ordered Benson to serve 12 months in the Hale County jail followed by 3 years' supervised probation. The circuit court further ordered Benson to pay all mandatory fines, fees, and assessments.
Before pleading guilty, Benson filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence and statements to police on the grounds that the search and seizure in this case was illegal. Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied Benson's motion to suppress. Benson pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress the narcotics recovered from his house and his statement to police. This appeal followed.
At the suppression hearing, the circuit court considered the following evidence. On November 30, 2011, Timothy Dillard, an officer with the Hale County Sheriff's Department, was notified by the United States Marshal's Office that they had an arrest warrant for a person named Michael Nolan. Nolan was wanted for attempted murder in Tuscaloosa County. Dillard “put word out on the street to a couple of [his] contacts” and received a telephone call around 3:00 p.m. from a reliable confidential informant who informed Dillard that Nolan was at Benson's house playing video games. (R. 5.) Benson's house was known as a house where drugs were sold, and drug arrests had been made there on previous occasions.
Dillard notified the United States Marshal's Office that he had received a tip from a reliable confidential informant that Nolan was at Benson's residence. The agents from the Marshal's Office met with officers from the Moundville Police Department and traveled to Benson's house for the purpose of arresting Nolan. The officers arrived at Benson's house between 3:30 and 4:30 p.m. Although the officers possessed an arrest warrant for Nolan, they had no search warrant for Benson or his house. The agents from the Marshal's Office knocked on the front door and then entered Benson's house while Dillard and another officer guarded the back of the residence.
When the agents entered the house, Nolan was sitting on the couch. The agents saw Benson toss an unknown amount of crack cocaine on the floor when they entered the house. When Dillard entered the residence seconds after the agents, they informed Dillard of Benson's actions. Dillard saw, in plain view, what was later determined to be 46 grams of crack cocaine lying on the floor; he also saw a half-pound bag of what appeared to be marijuana in plain view on a table. Benson and three other males were in the house. The evidence was secured and sent to the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences for testing. A drug-analysis test confirmed that the two substances found in the residence were cocaine and marijuana.
Benson was advised of his Miranda1 rights and proceeded to make a statement to police. At the suppression hearing, Benson testified that the house where the search took place had been his residence for over a year and that he lived there alone. He also testified that everything in the house belonged to him.
Benson's sole contention on appeal is that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence as having been illegally seized. Specifically, Benson argues that the evidence seized from his house and his subsequent statement to police should be suppressed because, he says, officers entered his house without a search warrant and did not meet any of the exceptions for a warrantless search. Benson further argues that his statement should also have been excluded as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
In State v. Landrum, 18 So.3d 424 (Ala.Crim.App.2009), this Court explained:
18 So.3d at 426. Because the evidence presented at the suppression hearing is not in dispute, the only issue before this Court is whether the circuit court correctly applied the law to the facts presented at the suppression hearing, and we afford no presumption in favor of the circuit court's ruling.
“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and it provides that search warrants shall be issued only upon a finding of probable cause.” McIntosh v. State, 64 So.3d 1142, 1145 (Ala.Crim.App.2010). We have explained:
“
Woods v. State, 695 So.2d 636, 640 (Ala.Crim.App.1996).
Ex parte Tucker, 667 So.2d 1339, 1343 (Ala.1995). In other words, for the entry into Benson's home to be legal, law-enforcement officials not only had to have probable cause to search, but also exigent circumstances had to exist that justified the warrantless entry. See Cameron v. State, 861 So.2d 1145, 1149 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) ().
In Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), the United States Supreme Court addressed the propriety of a warrantless entry into a residence of a third party who was not the subject of an arrest warrant. In Steagald, agents with the Drug Enforcement Administration received a tip from a confidential informant that Ricky Lyons, a federal fugitive, could be reached at a certain telephone number within 24 hours. Agents also discovered that Lyons had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. After agents secured the address that corresponded to the telephone number, they drove to the address to search for Lyons. Agents saw two men, one of whom was Steagald, standing outside the house. The agents searched the men and determined that neither was Lyons. Agents then entered the house but did not find Lyons; however, during the search of the house an agent observed what he believed to be cocaine. After this discovery, an officer went to obtain a search warrant. In the meantime, a second search was conducted during which additional incriminating evidence was found. A third search conducted pursuant to a search warrant resulted in agents discovering 43 pounds of cocaine inside the house. Steagald was arrested and indicted on federal drug charges. Steagald subsequently filed a motion to suppress the drug evidence; that motion was denied.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court framed the issue before it as follows:
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