Benson v. State
| Decision Date | 30 December 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 50A05-0203-PC-113.,50A05-0203-PC-113. |
| Citation | 780 N.E.2d 413 |
| Parties | Charles T. BENSON, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender of Indiana, Randy A. Elliott, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Christopher L. Lafuse, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
In May 1990, pursuant to a plea agreement, Charles T. Benson pleaded guilty to charges of Child Molesting, as a Class C felony, and Attempted Child Molesting, as a Class C felony. The State agreed to dismiss an unrelated charge of Child Molesting, as a Class B felony, previously filed against Benson, and not to pursue an habitual offender enhancement. The trial court accepted the guilty plea and entered judgment of conviction on both Class C felonies. However, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court sua sponte vacated the guilty plea and set the case for trial. A jury later convicted Benson on all three charges. The jury also found Benson to be an habitual offender, and the trial court imposed a sixty-six year sentence. Benson appealed the attempted child molesting conviction, which this court affirmed. See Benson v. State, 574 N.E.2d 934 (Ind.Ct. App.1991)
.
Benson then filed a petition for Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR") claiming the trial court erred when it vacated his guilty plea and failed to sentence him to sixteen years as provided in the plea agreement. Benson also claimed that his counsel was ineffective for having failed to challenge the vacation of his guilty plea on appeal. The post-conviction court denied Benson's petition, finding that the trial court had never accepted Benson's plea agreement because there was no entry to that effect in the order book. Benson now appeals the denial of his PCR petition and raises two issues for our review, one of which we find dispositive, namely, whether Benson was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
We reverse and remand.1
On October 13, 1989, the State charged Benson with child molesting, as a Class B felony, based on allegations that he molested his five-year-old stepdaughter, J.W. While Benson was out on bond, the State charged him with unrelated counts of attempted child molesting and child molesting, both as Class C felonies. Under the terms of a written plea agreement, in exchange for Benson's guilty plea on the two C felonies and a sixteen-year executed sentence, the State dismissed the first charge of child molesting and agreed not to pursue the habitual offender enhancement. At the May 14, 1990, plea hearing, the trial court determined there was a factual basis for the guilty plea, stated that it was "going to enter judgment at this time," and "ordered and adjudged ... Benson ... [to be] guilty." The State requested that Benson be incarcerated that day "since the Court has entered judgment of conviction." The judgment of conviction is not reflected in the court's order book for May 14, 1990. But the chronological case summary ("CCS") entry for that day indicates that the court entered a judgment of conviction. The court declined to incarcerate Benson before the sentencing hearing that was set for June 5, 1990.
On June 4, 1990, Benson filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. At the hearing on that motion, the State argued that Benson could not withdraw his guilty plea since he had already been convicted and was able to challenge his conviction under the post-conviction rules. The court denied the motion and entered an order which read, in pertinent part, as follows:
4. The Court accepted the plea agreement and advised the Defendant of his rights ... and entered Judgment against the Defendant.
* * *
8. The Court finds no just reason has been shown to allow the Defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty ... the Court has entered Judgment against the Defendant and he now awaits sentencing.
Between the entry of judgment and the sentencing hearing, the trial court received letters from two social workers expressing their concern that Benson would be released from jail in time to molest his stepdaughter again given the number of years Benson would serve under the plea agreement and his stepdaughter's young age. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court informed Benson that it would "not accept the plea agreement as it is with the dismissal of Count I [the B felony]." The court suggested that the plea agreement should also include a guilty plea and sentence on the B felony. After conferring with his attorney, Benson refused to modify the plea agreement since he had "originally agreed to have that charge dismissed." The trial court then "rejected" the plea agreement, declared the judgment of guilty a "nullity," and consolidated the separate causes for trial.
At trial, the jury convicted Benson on all three counts of child molesting, and the court imposed a sixty-six year sentence. Benson, represented by his trial counsel, appealed the judgment alleging insufficient evidence to support the conviction on the attempted child molesting count. This court affirmed the conviction. In August 2000, Benson filed an amended PCR petition, alleging fundamental error and ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing in September 2001, the PCR court denied his petition, finding, in relevant part, that the trial court had not accepted the plea agreement. The PCR court stated:
A plea agreement was presented to the Court which was later rejected. Regardless of the terminology used in open Court at the time of submission, the trial Court Judge had not legally accepted the plea agreement as the statements made were never reduced to a judgment and properly entered as such. (See State v. Daniels, 680 N.E.2d 829 (Ind. 1997)
).
Benson now appeals.2
The purpose of a petition for post-conviction relief is to raise issues unknown or unavailable to a defendant at the time of the original trial and appeal. Lockhart v. State, 632 N.E.2d 374, 375 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied. "Thus, post-conviction relief is not a `super appeal' which allows the rehashing of prior proceedings regardless of the circumstances surrounding them." Collier v. State, 572 N.E.2d 1299, 1301 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied. When the petitioner has already been afforded the benefit of a direct appeal, post-conviction relief contemplates a rather small window for further review. Montano v. State, 649 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied. The petitioner bears the burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). To the extent the PCR court denied relief in this case, Benson appeals from a negative judgment and faces the rigorous burden of showing that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite to that reached by the post-conviction court. Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 154 (Ind.1999).
A court that hears a post-conviction claim must make findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented in the petition. Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1164 (Ind.2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1925, 152 L.Ed.2d 832 (2002). The findings must be supported by facts and the conclusions must be supported by the law. Id. Our review on appeal is limited to these findings and conclusions. Id.
Benson asserts that he was deprived of the effective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. Benson argues that his attorney was ineffective when she failed to object in the trial court and raise on appeal the trial court's rejection of his plea agreement and unilateral vacation of his guilty plea. A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, if not raised on direct appeal, may be presented in post-conviction proceedings. Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1220 (Ind.1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 861, 120 S.Ct. 150, 145 L.Ed.2d 128 (1999).3
There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered effective assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment, and the burden falls on the defendant to overcome that presumption. Gibson v. State, 709 N.E.2d 11, 13 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. To make a successful ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show that: (1) his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as determined by prevailing professional norms, and (2) the lack of reasonable representation prejudiced him. Mays v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1263, 1265 (Ind.Ct. App.1999) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)), trans. denied. The prejudice component requires the defendant to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ind. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1164, 122 S.Ct. 1178, 152 L.Ed.2d 120 (2002).
Benson first argues that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's rejection of the plea agreement and vacation of his guilty plea. To determine whether trial counsel was ineffective, we must first determine whether the trial court, in fact, accepted the guilty plea and plea agreement. The PCR court found that the trial court had not accepted Benson's plea agreement because the court's in-court statements "were never reduced to a judgment and properly entered as such." In its order denying Benson's PCR petition, the post-conviction court relied on our supreme court's opinion in State v. Daniels, 680 N.E.2d 829, 833 (Ind. 1997), which states that "[c]ourts ... speak through their order books, not through the judge's unarticulated intentions." However, the court's reliance on ...
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