Bent v. Alexander
Citation | 15 Mo.App. 181 |
Parties | SILAS BENT, RECEIVER, Appellant, v. L. E. ALEXANDER, RECEIVER, Respondent. |
Decision Date | 12 February 1884 |
Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
APPEAL from the St. Louis Circuit Court, THAYER, J.
Affirmed.
THOMAS T. GANTT, for the appellant.
JOHN D. POPE, for the respondent.
The Columbia Life Insurance Company was once called the Mound City Life Insurance Company. The name was changed after the date of some of the transactions mentioned below. As the change of name is quite unimportant, it will save confusion, perhaps, to note this fact once for all, and call the company throughout this statement by the name which it bore at its dissolution.
The Columbia agreed with Charles H. Peck to pay him a large sum of money if he would successfully promote a certain scheme for transferring all the assets of the St. Louis Mutual to the Columbia, and reinsuring all risks held by the St. Louis Mutual in the Columbia. The transfer and reinsurance was effected on January 14, 1874, and on the next day the Columbia transferred to Peck, in payment for his services, securities worth about $100,000. On February 15, 1877, the St. Louis Mutual was dissolved. Bent and others were appointed its receivers, and afterwards Bent became its sole receiver. On October 17, 1877, the Columbia was dissolved, and Alexander was appointed its receiver.
The receiver of the Columbia threatened to proceed against Peck to recover the securities turned over to him; the receiver of the St. Louis Mutual also claimed these securities. Peck effected a compromise for $25,000, of which half was paid to the receiver of the Columbia, and half to the receiver of the St. Louis Mutual, in consideration in each case of a full release. This compromise was approved by the circuit court, and the releases were executed by the receivers under orders of court.
The receivers of the St. Louis Mutual sued the receiver of the Columbia to rescind the contract of reinsurance and to recover the assets transferred. The defendant moved for security for costs; but, in order to facilitate and expedite the decision of this controversy, the receivers of the two companies entered into a written agreement on May 2, 1878, to the following effect: The application for security for costs was withdrawn, and, to obviate the necessity of such security, it was agreed that if the finding of the referee should be against the plaintiff, the receiver of the St. Louis Mutual, and this finding be approved, a decree should be entered for the defendant, the receiver of the Columbia, subject to the right of appeal; but that the decree should contain a clause by consent reserving to the plaintiff the right to present and have allowed a claim against the Columbia based upon the claims filed, or to be filed, before the receiver of the Mutual, for the aggregate of such claims allowed, which amount shall be allowed and paid pro rata out of the funds of the Columbia, in the final distribution of its assets. The amount to be allowed upon said claims to be paid to the plaintiff for distribution according to the orders of the court. If the decree is against the plaintiff and is affirmed, or in case of no appeal, then, in order to place in the plaintiff's hands enough to pay expenses and costs, if costs are adjudged against the plaintiff, the receiver of the Columbia is to place in the plaintiff's hands, in cash, $12,500, and three notes, namely: Eads' note for $5,000, Houston's for $15,000, and Goff's for $6,000. If the plaintiff gets judgment against the defendant, the proceeds of the notes are to be credited to the defendant. If the judgment is for the defendant, “ then the said sum of cash and notes shall be deducted from the aggregate amount of the claim to be allowed to the receiver of the St. Louis Mutual as herein stated.” It was further agreed that the receiver of the Mutual assent to the Peck compromise, on the following terms: Peck is to pay the Columbia receiver $25,000, in full of the claim against Peck, and the plaintiff is to release to Peck all claim against him. This $25,000 is to belong to plaintiff if he succeeds in his action, and, on receiving $12,500 in addition to the $12,500 cash, then he is to credit the Columbia on his judgment against its receiver with the amount of securities which Peck received for his brokerage from the Mutual, and the interest thereon, if the referees allow interest, and in that case the Columbia is to have no credit for the $12,500 paid at the date of the agreement. The releases of Peck spoken of above were then executed.
The receiver of the Mutual was not successful in his action to recover from the Columbia the assets transferred when the Columbia reinsured the risks of the Mutual. In that action, on April 2, 1879, a decree was made, afterwards amended on December 29, 1879, in accordance with the provisions of the agreement, which were based upon the theory of a judgment for the defendant in the matter of the recovery of the transferred assets. This decree, after confirming the report of the referees, dismisses the plaintiff's bill, and then, after reciting the agreement between the parties to the action, set out above, proceeds as follows:--
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