Bentley v. Buice, 38381

Decision Date22 June 1960
Docket NumberNo. 38381,No. 2,38381,2
Citation115 S.E.2d 706,102 Ga.App. 101
PartiesT. P. BENTLEY et al. v. J. D. BUICE
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. The Superior Court of Berrien County had jurisdiction to entertain a timely appeal from a judgment of the Board of Workmen's Compensation refusing to set aside an award entered some months previously, and accordingly the judgment of the superior court reversing the ruling of the board and setting aside the agreement, unmodified and unappealed from, as a matter of law unllified the original approval of agreement. The defendant could not thereafter rely on such agreement as an adjudication that the plaintiff was barred from a right of action in tort against these defendants because the subject matter of the dispute was controlled by the law relating to workmen's compensation.

2. The objection raised to the charge of the court are without merit. Where no issue of comparative of contributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff guest passenger in a motor vehicle remains in the case, it is proper to so instruct the jury.

3. The court did not err in refusing to charge the jury that they might consider the passenger's statement to the defendant driver, correctly pointing out that he was taking the wrong road, as negligence proximately causing the plaintiff's injuries.

4. The evidence authorized the verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

James D. Buice filed an action in the Superior Court of Fulton County against Thomas Bentley, the driver, and Besco Corporation, the owner of a truck in which he was riding as a guest passenger when he received certain described injuries. The defendants filed a plea in bar contending that the defendant Besco Coporation was the employer of Buice; that he was injured while within the course of his employment, that an agreement for compensation had been entered into between the parties and approved by the State Board of Workmen's Compensation, and accordingly that this negligence action is not sustainable. The trial court found against the plea on evidence that the agreement in question had, on motion to vacate it filed by the plaintiff on the ground of mistake, been set aside by the Superior Court of Berrien County on appeal from a ruling of the board refusing to do so.

The case then proceeded to trial. The evidence for the plaintiff was to the effect that he was present in the truck not in his capacity of employee but was being given a ride by the driver in a personal capacity; that the driver either because of drowsiness or inattention missed a turn in the road; that the plaintiff called out to him that he was missing the turn; that the driver made a sudden turn, ran off the road, lost control of the vehicle, and hit an obstruction and that the plaintiff was thereby injured. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and it is on the denial of these motions that error is assigned.

T. J. Long, Ben Weinberg, Jr., Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

J. Corbett Peek, Jr., Atlanta, for defendant in error.

TOWNSEND, Judge.

1. 'The judgment of a court naving no jurisdiction of the person or subject-matter, or void for any other cause, is a mere nullity, and may be so held in any court when it becomes material to the interest of the parties to consider it.' Code § 110-709. 'A void judgment may be attacked in any court and by any person. In all other cases judgments may not be impeached collaterally, but must be set aside by the court rendering them.' Code § 110-701. 'The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be collaterally attacked in any other court for irregularity, but shall be taken and held as a valid judgment until it is reversed or set aside.' Code § 110-708. 'A judgment of a court having jurisdiction of both the parties and the subject matter, however, irregular or erroneous, is binding until set aside. Freeman v. Bass, 34 Ga. 355, 89 Am.Dec. 255; Porter v. Rountree, 111 Ga. 369, 36 S.E. 761; Code § 110-708.' Mitchell v. Arnall, 203 Ga. 384(2), 47 S.E.2d 258, 259. The superior courts of this State have jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter in appeals from awards of the Board of Workmen's Compensation. Code § 114-710. Accordingly, where after the plaintiff and corporate defendant had entered into an agreement as to compensation under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act which was approved by the board, but where the plaintiff refused to accept any benefits under the award, and was not otherwise estopped from contesting its validity, he filed a motion with the board to vacate the approval of agreement on the ground that the award had been entered into under a mistake of fact, he not having in truth and in fact sustained the injury in question while in the course of his employment, and where the refusal of the board to vacate the agreement was within the time prescribed by law appealed to the Superior Court of Berrien County, a court of competent jurisdiction, and there reversed by a judgment of that court holding that 'the evidence conclusively shows that the alleged injury did not arise in the course, of, and in pursuance of claimant's employment [and] the board was without jurisdiction of the subject matter,' which judgment of the superior court was not appealed, it stands as a final and conclusive judgment on this issue. All parties to this action were parties to the appeal. The contention that such judgment was erroneous because the claimant waited an unreasonable length of time (18 months) to contest the validity of the original approval of the settlement agreement does not constitute an attack upon the jurisdiction of the superior court either as to the person or the subject matter, and accordingly the judgment of the Superior Court of Berrien County is a valid and binding judgment, never having been set aside or reversed. The effect of that judgment was to vacate the original award of the Board of Workmen's Compensation approving a settlement agreement between the parties. The plea in bar in the instant case, which alleged as its basis the original award of the board consisting of the approval of the settlement agreement which had been set aside, was not sustainable as a matter of law, and the trial court did not err in so holding.

2. Complaint is...

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4 cases
  • Beadles v. Bowen, 39473
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • April 25, 1962
    ...Brooke v. Bowers, 91 Ga.App. 543(1), 86 S.E.2d 341; Parks v. Fuller, 100 Ga.App. 463, 467(2), 111 S.E.2d 755; Bentley v. Buice, 102 Ga.App. 101, 105(2), 115 S.E.2d 706; Sellers v. White, 104 Ga.App. 148(1), 121 S.E.2d 385 and citations. Furthermore, when the defendants pled contributory neg......
  • Browning v. Kahle, 39401
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • May 15, 1962
    ...187; Healan v. Powell, 91 Ga.App. 787(3), 87 S.E.2d 332; Smith v. Harrison, 92 Ga.App. 576(4), 89 S.E.2d 273, supra; Bentley v. Buice, 102 Ga.App. 101, 115 S.E.2d 706; Bellamy v. Georgia Power Co., 67 Ga.App. 569, 21 S.E.2d 294; Wade v. Drinkard, 76 Ga.App. 159, 45 S.E.2d As stated in Russe......
  • Davis v. Laird, 40267
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 1, 1963
    ... ... 543(1), 86 S.E.2d 341; Parks v. Fuller, 100 Ga.App. 463, 467(2), 111 S.E.2d 755; Bentley v. Buice, 102 Ga.App. 101, 105(2), 115 S.E.2d 706; Sellers v. White, 104 Ga.App. 148(1), 121 S.E.2d ... ...
  • Menendez v. Jewett
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 12, 1990
    ...damages, whereas there was no evidence of such. The court came to this conclusion by comparing the similarities in Bentley v. Buice, 102 Ga.App. 101, 115 S.E.2d 706 (1960). However, while there are some common factors, the circumstances in Jewett's case differ materially, and there is some ......

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