Bentley v. Onemain Fin. Grp., LLC (In re Bentley)
Decision Date | 08 July 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 19-8026,19-8026 |
Parties | IN RE: DUANE L. BENTLEY, Debtor. DUANE L. BENTLEY, Appellant, v. ONEMAIN FINANCIAL GROUP, LLC, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, Sixth Circuit |
By order of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. BAP LBR 8024-1(b). See also 6th Cir. BAP LBR 8014-1(c).
File Name: 20b0006n.06
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Covington.
No. 2:18-bk-20281—Tracey N. Wise, Judge.
Before: BUCHANAN, CROOM, and PRICE SMITH, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judges.
ON BRIEF: Robert R. Sparks, STRAUSS TROY CO., LPA, Cincinnati, Ohio, John M. Simms, ATKINSON SIMMS & KERMODE, PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Douglas M. Foley, Stephanie J. Bentley, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Washington, D.C., Adam R. Kegley, FROST BROWN TODD LLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.
The Debtor in this case, Duane L. Bentley ("Debtor"), asserts that the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that OneMain Financial Group, LLC ("Creditor"), did not violate the 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) discharge injunction when it refused to release its lien on a vehicle that Debtor surrendered during his chapter 7 case. Specifically, Debtor argues that Creditor violated the discharge injunction by refusing to release its lien when asked to do so by Debtor and by conditioning release of the lien on payment of an undetermined amount. Debtor argues that Creditor's actions were objectively coercive and sanctionable under the standard set forth by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Pratt v. GMAC (In re Pratt), 462 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2006). Debtor also argues that Creditor's actions were sanctionable under Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795 (2019).
Debtor argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred in granting Creditor summary judgment and concluding that Creditor did not violate the discharge injunction when it failed to release its lien on Debtor's vehicle after it decided not to repossess the vehicle and thereafter attempted to coerce Debtor into paying for a lien release.
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit has jurisdiction to decide this appeal. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky has authorized appeals to the Panel and no party has timely elected to have this appeal heard by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6), (c)(1). A final order of the bankruptcy court may be appealed as of right pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). "Orders in bankruptcy cases qualify as 'final' when they definitively dispose of discrete disputes within the overarching bankruptcy case." Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582, 586 (2020) (citing Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 501, 135 S. Ct. 1686 (2015)). An order granting summary judgment to one party and denying it to another is a final order for purposes of appeal. Walls v. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 881, 884 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hamad v. Woodcrest Condo. Ass'n, 328 F.3d 224, 235 (6th Cir.2003)); Rogan v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co. (In re Rowe), 452 B.R. 591, 593 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The bankruptcy court's denial of a debtor's motion for contempt for violation of the discharge injunction is also a final, appealable order. In re Glaspie, 410 B.R. 261, 266 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
"An order granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo." Church Joint Venture, L.P. v. Blasingame (In re Blasingame), 597 B.R. 614, 616 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). An order denying summary judgment "on purely legal grounds" is also reviewed de novo. Tennessee ex rel. Wireless Income Props., LLC v. City of Chattanooga, 403 F.3d 392, 395-96 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Walls, 343 F.3d at 884). "Under a de novo standard of review, the reviewing court decides an issue independently of, and without deference to, the trial court's determination." Menninger v. Accredited Home Lenders (In re Morgeson), 371 B.R. 798, 800 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
The court's interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 524 is reviewed de novo. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Morton (In re Morton), 410 B.R. 556, 559 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The bankruptcy court's determination that the creditor did not violate the discharge injunction presents a mixed question of law and fact. Id. (citing WesBanco Bank Barnesville v. Rafoth (In re Baker & Getty Fin. Servs., Inc.), 106 F.3d 1255, 1259 (6th Cir. 1997)). Accordingly, "the court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo" and its "findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard." Id. (citations omitted). "[A] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. Ct. 1504 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525 (1948)).
Debtor does not dispute any of the bankruptcy court's factual findings. As such, the factual findings are reproduced here, verbatim (footnotes in original):
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