Taggart v. Lorenzen
| Decision Date | 03 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-489,18-489 |
| Parties | Bradley Weston TAGGART, Petitioner v. Shelley A. LORENZEN, Executor of the Estate of Stuart Brown, et al. |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Janet M. Schroer, Hart Wagner, LLP, James Ray Streinz, Streinz Law Office LLC, Hollis K. McMilan, Hollis K. McMilan, PC, Portland, OR, Nicole A. Saharsky, Andrew E. Tauber, Michael B. Kimberly, Matthew A. Waring, Minh Nguyen-Dang, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, Aaron Gavant, Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago, IL, for Respondents.
John M. Berman, Tigard, OR, Daniel L. Geyser, Geyser P.C., Dallas, TX, for Petitioner.
Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, TX, for Petitioner.
Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, DC, for Respondents.
Sopan Joshi for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, in support of neither party.
At the conclusion of a bankruptcy proceeding, a bankruptcy court typically enters an order releasing the debtor from liability for most prebankruptcy debts. This order, known as a discharge order, bars creditors from attempting to collect any debt covered by the order. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). The question presented here concerns the criteria for determining when a court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for attempting to collect a debt that a discharge order has immunized from collection.
The Bankruptcy Court, in holding the creditors here in civil contempt, applied a standard that it described as akin to "strict liability" based on the standard's expansive scope. In re Taggart , 522 B. R. 627, 632 (Bkrtcy. D.Ct. Ore. 2014). It held that civil contempt sanctions are permissible, irrespective of the creditor's beliefs, so long as the creditor was " ‘aware of the discharge’ " order and " ‘intended the actions which violate[d]’ " it. Ibid. (quoting In re Hardy , 97 F. 3d 1384, 1390 (CA11 1996) ). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed with that standard. Applying a subjective standard instead, it concluded that a court cannot hold a creditor in civil contempt if the creditor has a "good faith belief" that the discharge order "does not apply to the creditor's claim." In re Taggart , 888 F. 3d 438, 444 (2018). That is so, the Court of Appeals held, "even if the creditor's belief is unreasonable." Ibid.
We conclude that neither a standard akin to strict liability nor a purely subjective standard is appropriate. Rather, in our view, a court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge order if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor's conduct. In other words, civil contempt may be appropriate if there is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor's conduct might be lawful.
Bradley Taggart, the petitioner, formerly owned an interest in an Oregon company, Sherwood Park Business Center. That company, along with two of its other owners, brought a lawsuit in Oregon state court, claiming that Taggart had breached the Business Center's operating agreement.
Before trial, Taggart filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, which permits insolvent debtors to discharge their debts by liquidating assets to pay creditors. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(1), 726. Ultimately, the Federal Bankruptcy Court wound
up the proceeding and issued an order granting him a discharge. Taggart's discharge order, like many such orders, goes no further than the statute: It simply says that the debtor "shall be granted a discharge under § 727." App. 60; see United States Courts, Order of Discharge: Official Form 318 (Dec. 2015), http:/ /www.uscourts.gov / sites / default / files /form _ b318_0.pdf (as last visited May 31, 2019). Section 727, the statute cited in the discharge order, states that a discharge relieves the debtor "from all debts that arose before the date of the order for relief," "[e]xcept as provided in section 523." § 727(b). Section 523 then lists in detail the debts that are exempt from discharge. §§ 523(a)(1)–(19). The words of the discharge order, though simple, have an important effect: A discharge order "operates as an injunction" that bars creditors from collecting any debt that has been discharged. § 524(a)(2).
After the issuance of Taggart's federal bankruptcy discharge order, the Oregon state court proceeded to enter judgment against Taggart in the prebankruptcy suit involving Sherwood. Sherwood then filed a petition in state court seeking attorney's fees that were incurred after Taggart filed his bankruptcy petition. All parties agreed that, under the Ninth Circuit's decision in In re Ybarra , 424 F. 3d 1018 (2005), a discharge order would normally cover and thereby discharge postpetition attorney's fees stemming from prepetition litigation (such as the Oregon litigation) unless the discharged debtor " ‘returned to the fray’ " after filing for bankruptcy. Id. , at 1027. Sherwood argued that Taggart had "returned to the fray" postpetition and therefore was liable for the postpetition attorney's fees that Sherwood sought to collect. The state trial court agreed and held Taggart liable for roughly $ 45,000 of Sherwood's postpetition attorney's fees.
At this point, Taggart returned to the Federal Bankruptcy Court. He argued that he had not returned to the state-court "fray" under Ybarra , and that the discharge order therefore barred Sherwood from collecting postpetition attorney's fees. Taggart added that the court should hold Sherwood in civil contempt because Sherwood had violated the discharge order. The Bankruptcy Court did not agree. It concluded that Taggart had returned to the fray. Finding no violation of the discharge order, it refused to hold Sherwood in civil contempt.
Taggart appealed, and the Federal District Court held that Taggart had not returned to the fray. Hence, it concluded that Sherwood violated the discharge order by trying to collect attorney's fees. The District Court remanded the case to the Bankruptcy Court.
The Bankruptcy Court, noting the District Court's decision, then held Sherwood in civil contempt. In doing so, it applied a standard it likened to "strict liability." 522 B. R. at 632. The Bankruptcy Court held that civil contempt sanctions were appropriate because Sherwood had been " ‘aware of the discharge’ " order and " ‘intended the actions which violate[d]’ " it. Ibid. (quoting In re Hardy , 97 F. 3d at 1390 ). The court awarded Taggart approximately $ 105,000 in attorney's fees and costs, $ 5,000 in damages for emotional distress, and $ 2,000 in punitive damages.
Sherwood appealed. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel vacated these sanctions, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the panel's decision. The Ninth Circuit applied a very different standard than the Bankruptcy Court. It concluded that a "creditor's good faith belief" that the discharge order "does not apply to the creditor's claim precludes a finding of contempt, even if the creditor's belief is unreasonable." 888 F. 3d at 444. Because Sherwood had a "good faith belief" that the discharge order "did not apply" to Sherwood's claims, the Court of Appeals held that civil contempt sanctions were improper. Id. , at 445.
Taggart filed a petition for certiorari, asking us to decide whether "a creditor's good-faith belief that the discharge injunction does not apply precludes a finding of civil contempt." Pet. for Cert. I. We granted certiorari.
The question before us concerns the legal standard for holding a creditor in civil contempt when the creditor attempts to collect a debt in violation of a bankruptcy discharge order. Two Bankruptcy Code provisions aid our efforts to find an answer. The first, section 524, says that a discharge order "operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset" a discharged debt. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). The second, section 105, authorizes a court to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." § 105(a).
In what circumstances do these provisions permit a court to hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge order? In our view, these provisions authorize a court to impose civil contempt sanctions when there is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor's conduct might be lawful under the discharge order.
Our conclusion rests on a longstanding interpretive principle: When a statutory term is " ‘obviously transplanted from another legal source,’ " it " ‘brings the old soil with it.’ " Hall v. Hall , 584 U.S. ––––, ––––, 138 S.Ct. 1118, 1128, 200 L.Ed.2d 399 (2018) ); see Field v. Mans , 516 U.S. 59, 69–70, 116 S.Ct. 437, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995) (). Here, the statutes specifying that a discharge order "operates as an injunction," § 524(a)(2), and that a court may issue any "order" or "judgment" that is "necessary or appropriate" to "carry out" other bankruptcy provisions, § 105(a), bring with them the "old soil" that has long governed how courts enforce injunctions.
That "old soil" includes the "potent weapon" of civil contempt. Longshoremen v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Assn. , 389 U.S. 64, 76, 88 S.Ct. 201, 19 L.Ed.2d 236 (1967). Under traditional principles of equity practice, courts have long imposed civil contempt sanctions to "coerce the defendant into compliance" with an injunction or "compensate the complainant for losses" stemming from the defendant's noncompliance with an injunction. United States v. Mine Workers , 330 U.S. 258, 303–304, 67 S.Ct. 677,...
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