Bentley v. Still

• Decision Date: 05 January 1945
• Docket Number: 15047.
• Citation: 32 S.E.2d 814,198 Ga. 743
• Parties: BENTLEY v. STILL.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

32 S.E.2d 814

198 Ga. 743

BENTLEY v. STILL.

No. 15047.

Supreme Court of Georgia

January 5, 1945

Syllabus by the Court.

Judgments and decrees must be construed in reference to the pleadings. Where a judgment standing alone does not contain a sufficient description of realty, but the pleadings in connection therewith fully describe the land, such judgment will not be held to be void, as against a plea of res adjudicata.

(a) Accordingly, where a successor in title of one party to a previous suit sues the other to recover the land, and the issue of res adjudicata is raised, and the judgment relied upon to sustain the issue does not contain a sufficient description of the land, but a definite description is set forth in the pleadings upon which the judgment is predicated and where the judgment discloses a consent decree, the effect of which is to vest in one party the title to the land subject to a life interest in a portion thereof to the other party, the court did not err in finding that the issues raised had been adjudicated in previous litigation and in denying the relief sought.

In February, 1944, J. R. Bentley, Jr., filed in Walton superior court, against D. D. Still, a petition which alleged in substance that he was the owner of a certain described tract of land containing 137 acres, and that his possession was being interfered with by Still, who claimed title thereto, but that the deeds under which he asserted title were void. The prayers were: (a) that Still be enjoined from interfering with the petitioner's possession; (b) that the claim of title held by Still be cancelled as a cloud upon the petitioner's title; and (c) for process.

Still filed an answer denying the material allegations of the petition, and alleging that the exact question raised by the petition had been previously adjudicated in stated cases.

At the trial, Bentley introduced evidence in support of his petition. His title to the land was predicated upon a deed to him executed in January, 1944, by his father, J. R. Bentley. In defense, Still introduced the record of two former suits involving the title to the land in question, to wit: (a) A suit filed October 30, 1939, by J. R. Bentley 'in his representative capacity as the only living beneficiary of a homestead allowed him as head of a family' against D. D. Still, in which it is alleged that Still had taken possession of land set apart to J. R. Bentley in 1914 as a homestead for the benefit of his wife and children. A copy of the proceedings to set aside the homestead were attached. It was alleged that his wife had died, and his children had reached their majority. The suit was for the recovery of 137 acres of land described in the homestead proceedings. (b) Before the foregoing suit was adjudicated Still, on August 19, 1940, filed a petition against J. R Bentley, alleging that he was interfering with his ownership, possession, and efforts to farm the land, and praying for process, injunction, and general relief.

On January 11, 1941, while the two foregoing suits were pending, both parties agreed to and signed a consent judgment of the court as follows: 'It appearing that the parties in the various cases pending between J. R. Bentley and D. D. Still have agreed on a settlement of all litigation between them and that the agreement is as follows: That J. R. Bentley, as long as he lives is to be allowed to occupy the house he now resides in and to have all the land between the land and the river and all land on the river, which is now in cultivation for said J. R. Bentley's personal crop to be farmed as he pleases, except that he is to plant at least the upper half of the bottoms in a legume which must be left on the ground. That in consideration of this, said J. R. Bentley is not to interfere with said D. D. Still, nor his tenants or employees in his use of the balance of the said place or the rest of said buildings. Said J. R. Bentley is to have sufficient pasture for his stock and sufficient firewood for his personal use. Said D. D. Still agrees to cover the 1/2 of the T. part of the house in which J. R. Bentley now resides. It appearing to the court that both parties have agreed to this, same is hereby made the order of this court, and both parties are hereby ordered to comply with same.'

At the conclusion of the evidence in the instant case, the trial...