Benton v. Alexander
| Decision Date | 03 January 1945 |
| Docket Number | 381 |
| Citation | 32 S.E.2d 584,224 N.C. 800 |
| Parties | BENTON v. ALEXANDER. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
The plaintiff brought this action to remove a cloud from the title of the lands described in the complaint, arising out of the claim of ownership by the defendant as devisee under the will of William H. Benton, husband of plaintiff. The will is as follows:
'North Carolina
'Lenoir County
'I William H. Benton, being of sound mind and disposing memory but realizing the uncertainty of this my earthly existence do make and declare this my last will and testament, hereby revoking any and all wills by me heretofore made.
'Item One: I will and direct that my Executrix hereinafter named shall cause the burial of my body suitable to the wishes of my friends and relatives.
'Item Three: I will and devise to my beloved wife, Myrtle Benton all my real estate, consisting of lands and buildings thereon for the term of her natural life, and at the death of my said wife, I will and devise the said real estate to my friend, Alice Alexander.
'Item Four: I hereby appoint my beloved wife, Myrtle Benton, the Executrix of this, my last will and testament.
'In testimony whereof I hereunto set my hand and seal this the 5th day of February, 1938.
'William H. Benton (Seal)
'Signed, sealed, published and declared by the said William H. Benton to be his last will and testament in the presence of us, who, at his request and in his presence (and in the presence of each other) do subscribe our names as witnesses hereto.
'This the 5th day of February, 1938.
Upon the death of William H. Benton, which occurred January 5, 1939, the plaintiff, as executrix, offered the will for probate and thereafter qualified as executrix and entered into the administration of the estate.
The testator, William H. Benton, at no time owned any interest in lands other than those described in the complaint, which under a deed executed February 4, 1938, by B. J. Alexander and Mrs. Alice Alexander (the latter being the defendant) were conveyed to the said W. H. Benton and wife, Myrtle Benton, and which at the time of the making of the will and at the time of the death of the testator were held by W. H. Benton and his wife, the plaintiff, as an estate by the entirety. There is an admission in the record that the lands in controversy are the lands referred to in the will.
The plaintiff denied that she had sufficient knowledge or information of conditions which might put her to an election under the will--if such election was required--and offered evidence of her physical and mental condition at the time she offered the will for probate, of her want of knowledge as to the effect of the will and of the fact that she had no counsel or adviser in the matter, all of which was rejected by the Court.
On this the defendant contended that plaintiff was put to an election as to the land in controversy, and by probating the will exercised that right and she now has only a life estate therein, as given by the will.
When the case came on to be submitted to the jury, the following issue was submitted:
'Does title to the land in controversy rest in Mrs. Alice Alexander in fee simple, subject only to the life estate therein of the plaintiff, Mrs. Myrtle Benton, under the will of W. H. Benton, deceased?'
Upon this issue, the plaintiff requested the following instruction:
'Upon the evidence, and all of it, offered in this case, the Court charges you that the plaintiff was not put to her election and that you should answer the issue No.'
The Court refused to give this instruction.
Expressing the opinion that the case resolved itself into a question of law and that the plaintiff was put to her election under the will, and having probated the same, that she was bound by all of its provisions, the Judge instructed the jury that if they believed all the evidence in the case, it would be their duty to answer the issue 'Yes.'
Thereupon, the jury answered the issue 'Yes,' and the Court rendered its judgment that the defendant, Alice Alexander, was 'the owner in fee simple, subject only to the life estate thereon of the plaintiff, Mrs. Myrtle Benton, of the lands in controversy in this action,' describing the lands referred to in the complaint, and taxed the costs against the plaintiff.
From this judgment the plaintiff appealed, assigning errors.
Guy Elliott and J. A. Jones, both of Kinston, for plaintiff, appellant.
F. Ogden Parker and J. Faison Thomson, both of Goldsboro, and Geo. B. Greene and F. E. Wallace, both of Kinston, for defendant, appellee.
While decided differently in many jurisdictions, it is settled law in this State that, nothing else appearing, a beneficiary under a will, who is under the necessity of making an election, has exercised that privilege by offering the will as executor and procuring its probate. Mendenhall v. Mendenhall, 53 N.C. 287; Tripp v. Nobles, 136 N.C. 99, 48 S.E. 675, 67 L.R.A. 449; Elmore v. Byrd, 180 N.C. 120, 104 S.E. 162; Syme v. Badger, 92 N.C. 706.
The question presented here is whether the plaintiff in this action was put to her election under the terms of her husband's will. Bearing upon the issues in controversy, if this query should be answered in the affirmative, we might inquire whether plaintiff was reasonably informed, or in the exercise of due diligence might have become informed, of those facts and conditions reasonably necessary to a valid and irrevocable choice, and consider the significance of the evidence on that point. Since we are convinced we need not go any further than a construction of the will in the light of admitted facts to arrive at a decision, we enter into no discussion of the rejected evidence bearing upon that phase of the case. In passing, however, we observe it is not disputed that the personalty willed to her was insufficient to pay the debts of the deceased, and that she spent substantial sums of her own money in discharging them. While it is contended that, in law, this might ordinarily merely reflect the unwisdom of her choice, it does have a bearing on the intent of the testator, who is presumed to have known his property, its value, and the extent of his obligations, when we come to analyze the question of election from that point of view; and, as hereafter pointed out, it may well be a decisive factor in the case.
In our approach to the problem, we are compelled to cite elementary law and principles well understood by the profession. But in their arrangement it is our purpose to make it clear that no mechanical application of rules will subordinate the intent of the will upon the vital point whether the beneficiary is put to an election.
The equitable doctrine of election is based upon the fundamental principle that a person designated as beneficiary under a will cannot...
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