Benyi v. Broome County, NY

• Decision Date: 23 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 91-CV-18 (NPM).,91-CV-18 (NPM).
• Citation: 887 F. Supp. 395
• Parties: John J. BENYI, Plaintiff, v. BROOME COUNTY, N.Y.; County Executive Carl Young; City of Binghamton, N.Y.; and its Mayor, Juanita Crabb, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

887 F. Supp. 395

John J. BENYI, Plaintiff, v. BROOME COUNTY, N.Y.; County Executive Carl Young; City of Binghamton, N.Y.; and its Mayor, Juanita Crabb, Defendants.

No. 91-CV-18 (NPM).

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

March 9, 1995.

Reconsideration Denied June 23, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John Joseph Benyi, Ossining, NY, pro se.

Robert G. Behnke, Broome County Atty., Binghamton, NY, for Broome County, New York.

Linda S. Kingsley, Cty. of Rochester Corp. Counsel, Dept. of Law, Rochester, NY, for Carl Young, County Executive, and Juanita Crabb, Mayor.

OPINION AND ORDER

BAER, District Judge.

Chief Judge Thomas J. McAvoy of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York transferred this dispositive motion (and nine similar motions) to me, by order dated November 5, 1994, due to the backlog caused by a number of vacancies in his district.

Plaintiff John J. Benyi ("Benyi") pro se, a New York State prisoner, brought this suit on January 7, 1991 for sixty four million dollars in damages arising from alleged deprivations of his Constitutional and civil rights pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986. Defendants are Broome County, N.Y., former County Executive Carl Young, the City of Binghamton, N.Y., and its former Mayor Juanita Crabb (collectively "Defendants"). Benyi makes wide ranging factual allegations without linking them to specific statutes or Constitutional rights. All but one of the alleged events occurred over three years before Benyi commenced this action.

Benyi now moves for summary judgment. Defendants cross move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis of Local General Rule 10 and the statutes of limitations. For the reasons that follow, I deny Benyi's motion and grant Defendants' cross motion in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This summary represents the Court's best effort to understand Benyi's affidavit of fact. On April 27, 1987, the City Court of Binghamton, N.Y. arraigned Benyi on the charges of attempted rape, sodomy, and sexual assault and remanded him to the Broome County Correctional Facility. Plaintiff's Affidavit of fact at ¶ 4. Benyi was tried, convicted, and sentenced to five to fifteen years for attempted rape and two to six years for sexual abuse on March 18, 1988. Id. at ¶ 42.

In May 1987, J. Lalyer, an inmate, threatened to kill Benyi after he told Lalyer of the sex crimes charged against him. Deputy William Guzzy moved Benyi to another part of the prison and told Benyi to tell the other inmates that the state charged him with burglary. Id. at ¶ 5. Shortly thereafter, Benyi asserts that Deputy Guzzy moved Lalyer into Benyi's section of the prison. Lalyer then told other prisoners of the charges against Benyi. Id. at ¶ 8.

Between May 16 and May 23, 1987, Benyi sent three notes about "potential trouble" to the prison's main desk. Id. at ¶ 10. On or about May 23, 1987, Benyi asserts that Deputy Guzzy stopped inmate Haven's assault of Benyi. Haven apparently knocked him unconscious for over an hour. Id. at ¶ 12. Lourdes Hospital diagnosed injuries to Benyi's right ear, right eye, right mandible, and to the right side of his trachea. Id. at ¶ 12.

In May 1987, Benyi claims the staff of the Broome County Correctional Facility, knowing that he was a disabled veteran, denied him medical treatment. Id. at ¶ 4. Benyi informed Corrections officers in a medical questionnaire of his allergy to steroids. Id. Benyi alleges that on May 28, 1987 Dr. William Teller, at Wilson Hospital in Johnson City, N.Y., injected him with steroids to perform a "craniotomy." Id. Benyi asserts that he had repeated seizures throughout the Summer of 1987 in reaction to the steroids. Id. at ¶ 15.

Benyi claims that in July 1987, the Broome County Correctional personnel denied him access to legal materials. Id. at ¶ 16. However, after Deputy Guzzy transferred Benyi to B-Block on February 22, 1988, the prison personnel granted him access to one law book. Id. at ¶ 42.

Benyi also asserts that the Broome County Sheriff's Department, and the Binghamton Police, failed to respond to several "FOIL" requests he filed, presumably pursuant to New York's Freedom of Information Law. N.Y.Pub.Off.Law § 89 (McKinney 1988). Beginning in late 1988, he asked the police departments to turn over "exculpatory material" he believed was in their possession. Plaintiff's Affidavit of fact ¶ 6, 44, 45. The police departments responded that no exculpatory material existed. Former Mayor Juanita Crabb apparently denied Benyi's appeal from the police departments' failure to respond. Id. at ¶ 45. The departments did disclose documents, unrelated to Benyi's defense, describing a burglary of Benyi's apartment. Id. at ¶ 6. The Appellate Division, Third Department, dismissed Article 78 proceedings that Benyi brought against the police departments and the former Mayor regarding the FOIL requests. Id. at ¶ 28.

Benyi further claims that the Broome County Correctional Facility repeatedly denied him temporary release from prison because he did not take two programs recommended by a counsellor. Id. at ¶ 60. Benyi alleges that the program administrators either unjustly rejected or ignored his request for admission into the programs. Id. at ¶ 60.

Lastly, Benyi alleges that "Vigilantes" in Broome County, by which he presumably means the Defendants, sent him a death threat because he filed this action. Id. at ¶ 53. The undated letter, hand written, stapled to an envelope addressed to Benyi and post marked Binghamton, N.Y., November 14, 1990, reads:

You scum-bag mother f____. Now that I know where you live I'm going to come finish what I started in e-section at the downtown jail.

/s/ S. Haven.

P.S. This time you won't get out of the hospital.

Benyi states that he sent copies of the letter to the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York and various law enforcement agencies and that no party acted on the threat. Id. at ¶ 53.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard For Summary Judgement Motions

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) requires me to grant summary judgment if the evidence demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Summary judgment is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to `secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 1). In determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences against the moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962) (per curiam); Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1987). However, the mere existence of disputed factual issues is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Knight v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 1570, 94 L.Ed.2d 762 (1987). The disputed issues of fact must be "material to the outcome of the litigation," Id. at 11, and must be backed by evidence that would allow "a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The non-movant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. With respect to materiality,

substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.

B. Failure to Comply with Local General Rule 10

The Defendants claim that they are prejudiced by Benyi's failure to comply with Local General Rule 10 for the Northern District of New York. Aff. of Robert Behnke, attorney for defs., at ¶ 4. Local Rule 10(c) requires a movant to file a memorandum of law and an affidavit in support of a motion. N.Y.N.Dist.R. 10(c). The Rule also requires that moving papers specify the rules or statutes on which a party bases its motion. The court need not consider any papers not filed in compliance with the Rule, and may deem failure to comply as consent to the grant or denial of the motion.

Benyi fails to comply with Local Rule 10 and his allegations are difficult to decipher. However, in determining the sufficiency of a pro se pleading, this Court must construe it liberally, applying less stringent standards than when counsel prepares pleadings. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S.Ct. 173, 175-76, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980). Thus, I will not bar Benyi's motion for summary judgement because he failed to meet the requirements of Local General Rule 10.

C. Statute of Limitations

Defendants also seek summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. The limitations period for personal injury actions under state law supplies the limitations period for 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. Ortiz v. Morgenthau, 772 F.Supp. 1430, 1432 (S.D.N.Y.1991). Section 214 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") provides a three-year limitation for such actions. N.Y.Civ.Prac.L. & R. 214 (McKinney 1990). By contrast, 42 U.S.C. § 1986 has its own one-year limitation period. Ortiz, 772 F.Supp. at 1432. These claims accrue "when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury which is the basis for this action." Singleton v. City of...