Singleton v. City of New York

• Decision Date: 25 September 1980
• Docket Number: D,No. 596,596
• Citation: 632 F.2d 185
• Parties: Jerome SINGLETON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Ronald Salzer and Anthony Dellaventura, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 79-7628.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 185

632 F.2d 185

Jerome SINGLETON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Ronald Salzer and Anthony Dellaventura Defendants-Appellees.

No. 596, Docket 79-7628.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Feb. 8, 1980.

Decided Sept. 25, 1980.

Ernest Holzberg, New York City, for plaintiff-appellant.

L. Kevin Sheridan, Asst. Corp. Counsel, New York City (Allen G. Schwartz, Corp. Counsel of the City of New York, Ronald E. Sternberg, Douglas E. Libby, New York City, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Before WATERMAN and MANSFIELD, Circuit Judges, and WEINSTEIN, District Judge. ^*

MANSFIELD, Circuit Judge:

Jerome Singleton appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York entered by Judge Constance Baker Motley on September 9, 1979, dismissing plaintiff's complaint against the City of New York and two of its police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that in violation of his constitutional rights he was assaulted, falsely arrested and maliciously prosecuted for resisting arrest. The complaint was dismissed on the grounds (1) that the false arrest and assault claims were time-barred and (2) that the malicious prosecution claim, though timely filed, failed to allege that the state prosecution terminated in plaintiff's favor. We affirm.

On November 14, 1975, Singleton was in a restaurant in New York City. Two plainclothes New York City police officers, Ronald Salzer and Anthony Dellaventura, arrived at the restaurant after receiving a report that a black male had committed a robbery at a different restaurant which they apparently mistakenly believed to be the restaurant where Singleton was present. What happened next is a matter of dispute. Singleton, who is black, alleges that the police officers failed to identify themselves, assaulted him and arrested him for the crime of robbery. He also alleges that the police officers, upon learning that he was not the robbery suspect sought, falsely charged him with felonious assault and with resisting arrest, thus subjecting him to criminal prosecution.

Defendants, on the other hand, deny that the police officers failed to identify themselves, assaulted Singleton or ever made an arrest for robbery. They contend that plaintiff was properly arrested for the crimes of assault, resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration. Defendants concede, however, that once Singleton was arrested for these crimes and taken to the station house it was established that he did not commit the robbery which gave rise to the incident.

On November 15, 1975, Singleton was arraigned on the criminal charges and his subsequent trial in the Criminal Court of the City of New York on those charges ended in a hung jury on March 31, 1976. On June 14, 1976, with Singleton's consent that court ordered that the action be "adjourned in contemplation of dismissal." N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law § 170.55. ¹ The action was finally dismissed in accordance with § 170.55 on December 16, 1976.

Singleton subsequently commenced an action in state court, which is apparently still pending, alleging assault, false arrest and malicious prosecution. Thereafter, on February 9, 1979, he commenced the present federal action under § 1983, alleging that the defendants' conduct deprived him of "rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States," by assaulting Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the action was time-barred. The district court found that the § 1983 action was governed by the three-year limitation period imposed by N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(2), which applies to actions "to recover upon a liability ... created or imposed by statute." Finding that Singleton's § 1983 cause of action for false arrest and assault accrued on November 14, 1975, the date on which the incident occurred, the court concluded that these claims were time-barred since Singleton commenced his action more than three years after that date. As to the malicious prosecution claim, which allegedly arose on December 16, 1976, when the prosecution of Singleton was terminated, the court concluded that although the claim was timely filed, it must be dismissed for failure to allege that the state court prosecution had terminated in favor of plaintiff, as required by Cardi v. Supermarket General Corp., 453 F.Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y.1978). From the judgment dismissing his complaint, Singleton appeals.

him on November 14, 1975, by arresting him without probable cause or a warrant on the same date, by causing him to be arraigned on false charges on January 14, 1976, and by causing him to be brought to trial on the false charges which ended in a dismissal of those charges on December 14, 1976. The complaint seeks $5,000,000 in damages.

DISCUSSION

Since Congress has not established a federal statute of limitations for actions brought in federal court under § 1983, we are instructed to apply the state statute of limitations most appropriate to § 1983 actions. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). Following this mandate we have held that the three-year limitations period imposed by N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(2), which applies to actions to recover upon a liability created by statute, governs § 1983 suits brought against individuals in federal courts in New York. Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 1980); Leigh v. McGuire, 613 F.2d 380, 382 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded for further consideration, --- U.S. ----, 100 S.Ct. 2935, 64 L.Ed.2d 820 (May 27, 1980); Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 726, 728 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830, 98 S.Ct. 112, 54 L.Ed.2d 90 (1977); Kaiser v. Cahn, 510 F.2d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 1974).

Section 214(2) has also been held by us to govern § 1983 actions against municipalities. Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., supra, 613 F.2d at 449. We reasoned in Quinn that "(t)o create different limitations periods for two similarly situated classes of defendants would create a distinction without a difference, and would engender unnecessary confusion for litigants and judges alike." 613 F.2d at 449.

Defendants-appellees here contend on the basis of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979), that the appropriate state statute of limitations is not N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(2) but either N.Y.Gen. Municipal Law § 50-i(1), which specifies a one-year, 90-day limitations period for actions against municipalities for wrongful conduct, ² or N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 215(3), which fixes a one-year limitations period for "an action to recover damages for assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel, slander ...." Their argument is that since the Court in Chapman stated that § 1983 "does not provide any substantive rights at all," 441 U.S. at 618, 99 S.Ct. at 1916, but only furnishes a remedy for enforcement of federal constitutional rights The only other possibly relevant state statute of limitations is N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 213(1), which governs "an action for which no limitation period is specifically prescribed by law." Section 213(1) has generally been understood to govern actions for equitable relief, not actions for damages. ⁴ The Practice Commentaries to the section state:

an action under § 1983 is not one "to recover upon a liability ... created or imposed by statute" within the meaning of § 214(2), which does not apply to "statutory provisions which provide only additional remedies or standing (but) do not create or impose new obligations," State v. Cortelle Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 83, 378 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655, 341 N.E.2d 223, 224 (1975). However, in holding in Quinn, supra, that such actions are governed by § 214(2) we questioned earlier suggestions that N.Y.Gen. Municipal Law § 50-i(1) establishes "the appropriate limitations period for § 1983 suits against municipalities," 613 F.2d at 449 n. 7; see Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1975); Lombard v. Board of Education, 440 F.Supp. 577 (E.D.N.Y.1977); Adekalu v. New York City, 431 F.Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y.1977). In any event, for reasons stated below we need not decide in this case whether Quinn must be reconsidered in the light of the Supreme Court's decision in Chapman. ³

"(Section 213(1)) corresponds with CPA § 53 (its predecessor), and reduces the residual statute of limitations from 10 to 6 years. This period, which governs actions in equity, had always been unnecessarily long. It had created many problems by encouraging tardy plaintiffs whose causes of actions were barred at law to conjure up improbable theories of equity to gain the benefit of the longer statute...." (Emphasis supplied).

Although § 213(1) is not by its terms limited to equitable actions, we must in choosing among state statutes of limitations to be applied in federal actions look to the state court interpretations of the statutes to "see where the claim fits into the state scheme." Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338, 344 (2d Cir. 1970). As so interpreted this longer period for equity actions is clearly unavailable where full relief to plaintiff can be granted at law. Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d at 344 (1970); Gilbert v. Meyer, 362 F.Supp. 168, 172 (S.D.N.Y.1973). Here plaintiff seeks only damages and makes no claim for equitable relief. Accordingly § 213(1) must be eliminated as a statute that might be applied in the present case.

Appellant agrees that the present action is governed by N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(2), requiring that it be commenced within three years from the date of accrual. However, he contends that his claims for false arrest and assault did not accrue on November 14, 1975, as determined by the district court, but rather on December 16, 1976, when the state prosecution terminated. Alternatively, appellant argues that the applicable state...