Benzies v. Illinois Dept. of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, 86-1240

• Decision Date: 28 January 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-1240,86-1240
• Citation: 810 F.2d 146
• Parties: 42 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1537, 42 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,841, 55 USLW 2495 Bonnie J. BENZIES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, Defendant- Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 146

810 F.2d 146

42 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1537,

42 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,841, 55 USLW 2495

Bonnie J. BENZIES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, Defendant- Appellee.

No. 86-1240.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Jan. 5, 1987.

Decided Jan. 28, 1987.

Nina Puglia, Law Student, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.

Roma J. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee.

Before POSNER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and PARSONS, Senior District Judge. ^*

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.

Bonnie Benzies, who holds a Ph.D. in psychology, was classified as a Psychologist III in the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities. She wanted a promotion to Supervising Psychologist I, a position with higher pay. Illinois civil service rules allow promotions to occur in two ways: competition to fill vacancies, and "upgrading" of a job to reflect more accurately the incumbent's tasks. Before she acquired her Ph.D. Benzies failed twice to obtain a competitive promotion, each time being assured that a Ph.D. was necessary. When she had obtained her Ph.D. she asked for a "job audit" as a foundation for upgrading. Civil service personnel audited her work, found that she was not supervising other psychologists, and concluded that she was not eligible for non-competitive promotion. Meanwhile the Department had promoted four male psychologists--two without Ph.D.s--through the non-competitive audit and upgrade process. Benzies quit in disgust and complained to the EEOC. After that agency issued her right-to-sue letter, she filed this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

The district court held a bench trial and concluded that the Department had not engaged in intentional discrimination. The Department argued that the process of non-competitive upgrading is mechanical, that neutral rules govern who is promoted. Any psychologist with supervisory duties will be promoted; none without will be; the four men had supervisory duties, and Benzies did not, the Department insisted. The district court doubted this explanation but stated: "the court cannot say that it is more probably true than not true that the reasons advanced by the defendant for the promotion of [the four men] are pretext and were not sex-neutral."

Aware that such findings, even on the ultimate issue, are all but conclusive, see Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-76, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511-13, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985), Benzies directs her fire against what she believes is a mistake of law in the district court's opinion. The court stated that the plaintiff "has the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the reasons advanced [for the decision under attack] are a pretext and that a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's decision was discrimination and but for that discrimination, the plaintiff would have been appointed." (Emphasis added.) Benzies insists that and should have been or.

This does not make any difference. The district court concluded both that the reasons the Department gave were not pretexts and that the Department did not act with discriminatory intent. Conjunctive versus disjunctive became immaterial. Witnesses testified that the process of non-competitive promotion is mechanical. The district court expressed doubts, on which Benzies plays, but a doubt is not the same thing as a favorable finding. Neither finding is clearly erroneous.

Just in case, we add that Benzies is wrong on the law. The plaintiff must show that intentional discrimination caused the employer to take some unfavorable action. See United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-15, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Germane v. Heckler, 804 F.2d 366, 368 (7th Cir.1986). To have any hope of showing this, the plaintiff must puncture a neutral explanation the employer offers for its conduct. Benzies argues that if the plaintiff does so--in the argot, shows that the explanation is a "pretext"--then the district court must infer that the employer acted with discriminatory intent. Not so. A demonstration that the employer has offered a spurious explanation is strong evidence of discriminatory intent, but it does not compel such an inference as a matter of law. The judge may conclude after hearing all the evidence that neither discriminatory intent nor the employer's explanation accounts for the decision.

A public employer may feel bound to offer explanations that are acceptable under a civil service system, such as that one employee is more skilled than another, or that "we were just following the rules." The trier of fact may find, however, that some less seemly reason--personal or political favoritism, a grudge, random conduct, an error in the administration of neutral rules--actually accounts for the decision. Title VII does not compel every employer to have a good reason for its deeds; it...