Berenson v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co. of Liverpool, England
| Decision Date | 26 February 1909 |
| Citation | 87 N.E. 687,201 Mass. 172 |
| Parties | BERENSON v. LONDON & LANCASHIRE FIRE INS. CO. OF LIVERPOOL, ENGLAND, et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Berenson & Berenson and H. E. Wales, for plaintiff.
F. M Forbush and H. Bennett, for defendants.
The order sustaining the demurrers to the first four counts of the declarations, having been made by a judge of the superior court other than the one who reported the case, without exception or appeal, is not before us. Brooks v Shaw, 197 Mass. 376, 84 N.E. 110. We treat counts 5 and 6 of the amended declaration as raising the question whether the following is a completed contract either as a negotiable instrument or as a chose in action:
Draft No. 14849 H. O. No Accepted 190 to be paid on acct of the London & Lancashire Fire Insurance Co. of Liverpool, England.
.......... Manager
Countersigned .......... Cashier.
$360.43 Claim No.
Boston, March 4th, 1907.
Upon acceptance the Connecticut Trust and Safe Deposit Co. will pay to the
Three hundred and sixty ..... 43 Dollars which payment evidenced by proper endorsement hereof constitutes full satisfaction of all claims and demands for loss and damage by fire on December 25th 1906 to property described in policy No 6442019 issued at the Lynn Agency and said Policy is hereby cancelled and surrendered to the Company.
To the London & Lancashire Fire Insurance Co. of Liverpool, England.
Agency Department Hartford, Conn.
Joseph F. Givernaud,
Special Agent.
Rev Laws, c. 73, § 18, cl. 2, provides, inter alia, that a negotiable instrument 'must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a certain sum in money.' It is a fundamental rule in the interpretation of written instruments that all words used in it must be given effect if reasonably possible, and they are to be given their ordinary and natural meaning, unless there is some necessity apparent for a different construction. Cotting v. Boston, 87 N.E. 205. This applies as well to negotiable instruments as to deeds, wills or nonnegotiable contracts. If the words, 'upon acceptance' in the ninth line of the instruments as above printed could be eliminated, it would plainly be a foreign bill of exchange drawn by Givernaud, either individually or as agent, for and in behalf of the defendant insurance company upon the latter at its Hartford agency, payable at the Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Company. Carpenter v. Farnsworth, 106 Mass. 561, 8 Am. Rep. 360; Chipman v. Foster, 119 Mass. 189. But these words are in the instrument, and must be given a reasonably intelligible effect if possible. All the language employed may be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning attributed by the parties to those in dispute. The paper was made with the intent that, when paid, it should operate as a settlement of claims for damage arising from a fire in property described in a policy of the defendant insurance company and as a cancellation of the policy. The signature is by one who describes himself as 'special agent.' Reading this language in conjunction with the words 'upon acceptance' seems to make the transaction plain. A fire had injured property insured by the defendant insurance company. The loss, for which it was responsible under the terms of its policy, had been tentatively adjusted between the insured and a special agent of the insurance company, whose authority to make payment or sign an instrument fixing its liability was limited to the extent of requiring approval or ratification by the Hartford Agency of ...
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